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ABSTRACT 
THE APPLICATION OF DATABASE TECHNOLOGIES TO THE 
STUDY OF TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM:  
A POST 9/11 ANALYSIS 
Data and information of the highest quality are critical to understanding and 
countering acts of terrorism. As a tool, database technologies are becoming integral 
to the field of terrorism studies. The intelligence failings of September 11th 2001 
illustrate the need for timely, relevant and accurate data, derived from a plethora of 
complex intelligence sources. 
 
This thesis will argue that, at least until 9/11, the academic study of terrorism and 
counter-terrorism databases has been limited and that the subject lacks an overall 
coherency and direction. The thesis asks: what is the quality and practical value of 
database technologies in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism post 9/11? The 
study will provide a cross-disciplinary approach, specifically from the disciplines of 
political science and computer science. It will present an understanding of the 
conceptual, design, operation, strengths and weaknesses of terrorism and counter-
terrorism databases. The ramifications of post 9/11 and its impact upon the 
intelligence community, and the areas of security, privacy and emerging 
technologies in data mining and terrorism informatics are assessed.  
 
This study will examine mainly open source information on terrorism and counter-
terrorism databases. The research methodology will be carried out using a series of 
case studies, from the ITERATE, RAND/MIPT, WITS, and GTDB data sets.  Primary 
sources, for example, codebooks, and secondary source materials such as Library of 
Congress and GAO reports are used. A comparative sampling of relational databases 
and terrorism data sets is undertaken. 
 
The thesis will illustrate that with increased federal funding, new terrorism database 
technologies, post 9/11, operate under sophisticated schemata, requiring complex 
and systematic synthesis. In addition, issues of data sharing, fusion, interoperability 
and ethical concerns will be addressed. 
 
Implications for future terrorism database technologies will be articulated. These 
require rigorous design methodologies be adopted, while safeguarding ethical and 
privacy concerns. The thesis provides a coherent systematic analysis of terrorism and 
counter-terrorism databases, from what to date has been a disaggregated subject 
field. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE NEED FOR KNOWLEDGE 
 
1.1. Introduction 
At the dawn of the 21st century, the issue of terrorism and political violence remains 
high on the agenda of governments, security agencies and those individuals 
concerned with maintaining democracy and the rule of law. The analysis of terrorism 
events data by policy makers, analysts and academics requires information of the 
highest quality if sound judgements are to be made. Their diverse need for 
information has produced a plethora of databases on terrorism. Sophisticated 
computerised database systems to record and interrogate the accumulated body of 
knowledge on terrorist data have been available for several years. Unfortunately the 
technical potential of these has not always been translated into practical reality. 
Whilst traditional terrorist tactics e.g. bombings, kidnappings and hijackings, have 
largely remained unchanged, the methods by which information on acts of terrorism 
can be stored on computer have been revolutionised in the past twenty years.  As a 
result, the advent of widely available, relatively cheap, but highly advanced 
computer technology, permits storage and a much more sophisticated level of 
interrogation and retrieval of information. 
The subject of information technology within the terrorism field has been 
poorly defined. Classification of the topic under the headings of ‘Information 
Terrorism’, ‘Technology and Terrorism’, ‘Computers and Terrorism’, and latterly 
‘Cyber Terrorism’ has left the subject area in a somewhat confused state.  The use of 
2 
 
terrorism events data sets1 for the analysis of terrorism incidents has been used 
widely in the research field in recent years.2 Unfortunately, however, our 
understanding of the application of computerised data sets to the study of terrorism 
has remained somewhat limited. To date there exists an array of computerised data 
sets on terrorism, all of which vary in size and quality. The development of the data 
sets has been somewhat haphazard. Moreover, no overall body provides guidelines 
for the establishment of computerised databases on terrorism. As a result there is 
little consistency or continuity in their development. This has major repercussions 
for quantitative and empirical research in the terrorism field. Apart from seminal 
research undertaken by Fowler in 1981, 3 and Schmid and Jungman’s compilation of 
databases on terrorism in 1988,4 no comprehensive inventory of terrorism databases 
post 9/11 exists. It is the aim of this thesis to undertake such an analysis with 
particular reference to databases post 9/11. 
 
1.2. Defining the Problem 
This thesis sets out to answer the following questions: first, what is the quality, 
practical value and impact of database technologies in the field of terrorism and 
counter-terrorism post 9/11?;  and second, how can the application of database 
                                                          
1
   Data sets on terrorism events data are usually held within databases systems. They can, however, also be  
       used within spreadsheets and word-processors, with more limited functionality.  
2
  The literature using terrorism events data sets for quantitative analysis is wide and varied. A key U.S. 
Government publication is the National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) annual Report on Terrorism. See:  
http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/docs/2009_report_on_terrorism.pdf Earlier pre 9/11 data sets included the 
United States Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism and Edward Mickolus’s ITERATE (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1988).  
3
  Fowler, William Warner. Terrorism Data Bases: A Comparison of Missions, Methods, and Systems. RAND 
Corporation. Santa Monica 1981. N-1503-RC.  See: http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N1503.html [Accessed 
13/06/10] 
4
  Schmid, Alex P. and Albert J. Jongman,  Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data 
Bases, Theories and Literature. (New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Books, 2nd. Ed, 1988.) 
 
3 
 
systems improve the quality of terrorism and counter-terrorism research? The 
principal advantage of new technology is in its ability to absorb massive quantities of 
raw data, complete an almost infinite array of manipulations, finally synthesising and 
producing data that is meaningful in terms of the questions being asked. Impressive 
as this may sound, further questions relating specifically to the application of 
database systems to terrorism research need to be asked. For example, what is the 
present state of the art with regard to the development of computerised data sets ?; 
what are the major conceptual, definitional, theoretical and practical problems faced 
in the design of computerised data sets on terrorism?; do these have any major 
repercussions for terrorism data sets?; can the subject of computerised terrorism 
data sets be clearly defined within the information technology area of terrorism 
studies?;  what are the strengths and weaknesses of existing open source terrorism 
data sets, and can the quality of these data sets be improved?; can some form of 
minimum standards be agreed upon in the practical design of terrorism data sets?; 
and, indeed, why is this study crucial to the study of terrorism? 
 
With these questions in mind, the main hypotheses of this thesis are: 
1. That the study of computerised terrorism databases has had very little direction. 
The subject area needs to be drawn together under the classification of 
‘Terrorism Informatics’ if its full potential is to be realised.  
2. That despite the fact that computerising terrorism data sets has allowed for more 
sophisticated levels of interrogation, this still does not deal with the issues 
surrounding the problem of soft qualitative data. 
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3. The application of computerised databases to terrorism research requires a high 
level of inter-disciplinarity. This includes the disciplines of international relations, 
computer science and other techniques (empirical, quantitative, content analysis, 
link analysis etc.) derived from a variety of social science disciplines, e.g. 
economics and psychology. The task of integrating such an eclectic array of 
subjects requires a systems approach to the fusion of computers and the study of 
terrorism.  
4. The inevitable shift towards a more technologically based response to countering 
acts of terrorism requires the field of Terrorism Informatics to be more formally 
recognised for the full potential of technology to be realised. 
  
1.3. Scope and Research Design Methodology 
The thesis is particularly concerned with the information aspects of terrorism and 
counter-terrorism in general, and database management systems specifically. The 
scope of databases used in this thesis is mainly limited to publicly available data sets, 
databases and chronologies on terrorism. The thesis will draw upon a wide range of 
publicly accessible sources of information. These include opens source material, as 
well as a number of case studies. In addition, through a variety of field visits, the 
opinions of those people currently working in the field of terrorism research, as to 
the efficacy of particular data sets has been considered. These will be highlighted 
throughout the thesis. 
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Open Source Material 
The thesis will use various research methods to build a comprehensive 
evidence base to answer the above research questions. This study will examine 
mainly open source material and both primary and secondary source material is 
used. Primary source material will include terrorism database codebooks, whilst 
secondary source material will include academic literature, commercial literature, 
Library of Congress material, U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) publications 
and various relevant websites. The open source material will cover two distinct time 
periods: early terrorism database literature pre-9/11 and post 9/11 literature on 
terrorism and counter-terrorism databases. The early pre-9/11 literature will be used 
in Chapter 1 and part of Chapter 2 to provide the historical context and foundation 
from which one can analyse the seismic changes that have occurred in the field of 
terrorism and counter-terrorism database technologies, as a consequence of the 
events of September 11th 2001.  This contextual foundation will provide a point of 
reference from which an analysis of database technologies and their application to 
terrorism and counter-terrorism post-9/11 can be undertaken. 
 
Case Studies 
In addition to primary and secondary source material, the thesis will use a selection 
of case studies to illustrate key arguments and to advance understanding. The case 
studies will focus on three terrorism databases in particular: The Worldwide 
Incidents Tracking System (WITS), The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the 
RAND Worldwide Terrorism Incident Database (RWTID). These three databases have 
been chosen for several reasons. First, they represent a mixture of both new and 
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established open source terrorism databases that all have legacy, and reflect the use 
of state of the art database technologies. In addition to these principle databases, 
the thesis will refer to many other terrorism and counter-terrorism databases where 
relevant, sometimes in some detail, to allow for a cross-comparison of terrorism 
events data to be undertaken. There is a plethora of terrorism and counter-terrorism 
databases within Government, academia and the private sector. The temptation to 
spread the analysis over dozens of databases would be at the cost of the quality of 
analysis. Thus the three principle databases chosen provide the opportunity for both 
in-depth analysis whilst at the same time reflecting the many generic issues involved 
in the development and operation of mainstream terrorism and counter-terrorism 
databases. Importantly, a key element of Chapter Four of the thesis will be the 
development of an Inventory of Terrorism Databases. The inventory will be used to 
provide a comprehensive set of data and narrative commentary on some of the 
world’s principle open-source terrorism databases.  The following section provides a 
brief historical context to the early development of data sets in international 
relations and their subsequent use in terrorism studies. 
 
1.4. Data sets in historical context 
The use of social science data sets as a measurement tool for understanding violent 
social phenomena dates back to the early 1930’s. Pioneers in this field include the 
significant body of work carried out by researchers such as Lewis F. Richardson, 
Quincy Wright5 and Pitirim A. Sorkin.6 Their analysis of conflict by means of 
                                                          
5
  Early efforts in this field were carried out by Lewis Fry Richardson, Qunicy Wright and Pitrim Sorokin Their use 
of quantitative and empirical techniques for events data analysis was ground-breaking at the time. See: 
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quantitative and empirical techniques for the numeric recording of events was a 
move away from traditional historical, normative and purely theoretical methods of 
international relations analysis. The main pioneers of events data7 research carried 
out their work in Universities in the United States and Europe. Among some of the 
earliest empirical data sets developed were Stanford’s Crisis project (1914), the 
Correlates of War Project (COW) at the University of Michigan and the International 
Crisis Behaviour project conducted by the University of Maryland. Pioneering 
empirical work carried out by Lewis Fry Richardson8 on the mathematical 
measurement and analysis of international conflict and the arms race broke the 
mould of traditional theoretical analysis of international relations and set the scene 
for contemporary quantitative techniques. Thus, although in its infancy, this 
diversification from the descriptive, historical analysis of international relations to 
more quantitative techniques, provided an early basis for future empirical research.  
Data sets on political conflict, wars, political violence, terrorism and other 
social phenomena have by their very nature involved the use of multiple variables9. 
At the most basic level this will involve the use of numbers and text.10 The use of 
such data sets in quantitative and empirical research on terrorism often requires the 
application of techniques from the simple aggregation of terrorism incidents to more 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Dougherty, James E.  and  Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Contending Theories of International Relations. (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1990.) p.36-41. 
6
  Sorikin, Pitrim A. Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: American Book, 1937), vol. 3, Fluctuation of Social 
Relationships, War and Revolution. 
7
  Events data is defined by Dougherty and Platzgraff as a “single action events of nonroutine, extraordinary, or 
newsworthy character that in some clear sense are directed across national boundaries and have in most 
instances a specific foreign target.”  Dougherty, James E.  and  Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Contending Theories of 
International Relations. (New York: Harper & Row, 1990.) p.152 
8
  Ibid. 
9
  Some of the most common variables used in terrorism events data sets include: incident number, incident 
description, date, location, type of incident (e.g. bombing, IED, hi-jacking) fatalities, injured, and perpetrator. 
10
  Numerical variables can include numbers injured, numbers killed, estimated damage (financial). Text within 
terrorism data sets often provides a narrative on a particular incident, information about the perpetrator 
(terrorist group and group members) and any relevant contextual political background. 
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sophisticated methods of analysis such as Markovian and Poisson probability 
models.11 Whilst the increasing use of computers to carry out such quantitative 
measurement has now become a standard tool amongst social science researchers, 
this has not always been the case. The rapid development of computers from basic 
calculating and scientific machines to highly sophisticated research tools has 
changed the face of social science research to almost unrecognisable proportions. 
However, without accurate and reliable techniques to carry out such statistical 
analysis of terrorism events, all data would be rendered invalid. Moreover, issues of 
accuracy and reliability are not confined solely to the statistical analysis of terrorism 
data sets held on computer. Of increasing importance is an understanding of how 
the terrorism data set sits within the overall database schema.12 In other words, the 
validity of codification and mapping of terrorist variables into a computerised data 
set requires considerable thought and bears on-going responsibilities for terrorism 
researchers.  Formal design procedures and documentation in the codification of 
terrorism data sets vary enormously. 13 This is due partly to the sensitive subject of 
terrorism itself, the respective organisations developing the data set, (for example 
The National Counterterrorism Center, the RAND Corporation and The Federal 
Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) )14 and the security implications that follow. While such 
documentation in the terrorism field remains limited,15 it is not without precedent 16 
                                                          
11
  For further discussion on these models of analysis see Gurr, Ted Robert. "Empirical Research on Political 
Terrorism: The State of the Art and How it Might be Improved.", in Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl (eds.), 
Current Perspectives on International Terrorism (London: Macmillan, 1988), pp.115-154. 
12
  The description of the database is called the Database Schema; this is distinguished from the actual database.  
13
  These issues are further expanded upon in Chapter 3 of the thesis. 
14
  The National Counterterrorism Center (http://www.nctc.gov), RAND (http://www.rand.org) and F.B.I  
http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-terrorist-screening-database-and-watchlisting-process [accessed 
29/03/11] all produce a series of data sets on terrorism related issues. For further details see Chapter 3. 
15
  The analogy of formal documentation in the area of conflict data sets is useful to a point. On the specific 
topic of terrorism data sets, the very sensitive nature of terrorism incidents or group activities deem that 
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as there is a recognised methodology in cognate areas of study, e.g. low-intensity 
conflict and irregular warfare. 17 
Many such data sets are now held on computer and are increasingly available 
on the internet accompanied by relevant codebooks and documentation. Among the 
more well known data sets are The Violent Intranational Conflict Data Project 
(VICDP)18, Dimentionality of Nations (DON),19 the Conflict and Peace Databank 
(COPDAB),20 the World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS)21 and the PROTOCOL for 
Assessing Non-violent Direct Action (PANDA).22  
In terms of terrorism databases, limited forms of the ITERATE  (International 
Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) data set produced by Edward Mickolus are 
available on the Internet23, although full access is restricted to Yale University 
students. Indeed, complex factors lie behind the lack of publicly available 
computerised terrorism data sets. As Chapter 4 will explain the vast majority of 
publicly available terrorism data sets are now held on some form of computerised 
database system, where early annual reports for example such as the State 
                                                                                                                                                                      
wide publication of information regarding an organisations data sets and its codification procedures may be 
open to threats of national security.  
16
  For a more detailed discussion of coding methodology within conflict studies see: Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio., The 
Scientific Measurement of International Conflict: Handbook of Datasets on Crises and Wars, 1495-1988 A.D. 
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1990.) 
17
  For an extensive range of information on conflict data sets see: A Beginner’s Guide to Conflict Data – Finding 
and Using the Right Dataset. Eck, Kristine Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden (2005). 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/18/18128_UCDP_paper1.pdf [Accessed 02/04/11] 
18
  See: http://mailer.fsu.edu/~whmoore/garnet-whmoore/vicdp/Codebook.pdf [Accessed 02/04/11] 
19
  Dimensionality of Nations Project: Dyadic Foreign Conflict Variables, 1950-1965. See: 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/05408 [Accessed 02/04/11]  
20
  Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), 1948-1978.  See: 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/07767 [Accessed  02/04/11] 
21
  World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) Project, 1966-1978.  See: 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/05211 [Accessed 02/04/11] 
22
  For a brief discussion on the background to PANDA see: http://www.vranet.com/FAQ.html [Accessed 
02/04/11]. 
23
  Part of the ITERATE data sets are available via the ICPSR’s website. See: International Terrorism: Attributes of 
Terrorist Events, 1968-1977 [ITERATE 2]. http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/07947  
[Accessed  01/03/11]. For further in-depth discussion of the ITERATE data sets see Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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Departments Patterns of Global Terrorism 24 or the RAND/ST-Andrews 25 data sets on 
terrorism incidents were only published in hard copy format.26 The format and 
availability of terrorist data sets is dependent upon the type of organisation 
publishing the data. Issues of security, the type of data set, its public, commercial or 
academic status, all affect the type of data set that is made available. In the early 
years of computer availability, the medium on which the data was held, i.e. floppy 
disks such as the ITERATE data set, CD-ROM or internet access varied among 
organisations. This format is all but redundant, with the advent of the Internet, 
secure networks and sophisticated digital archiving technology. Unlike established 
data sets on conflict, for a variety of reasons that will be discussed later in the thesis, 
the development of academic data sets on terrorism has never had an overall co-
ordinating body to set standards in the development of computerised data sets on 
terrorism. No professional standards apply in the field and the development of data 
sets appears to be on an ad-hoc basis, an issue that will be addressed later in the 
thesis. 
For reasons such as these, the study of computerised terrorism data sets 
within the terrorism studies field has historically been weak.27 This has not been 
helped by the wide use of headings such as Information Warfare, Computing and 
                                                          
24
  In recent years, with the advent of the Internet the U.S. State Department has made available .PDF versions 
of Patterns of Global Terrorism. These can be found at: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/index.htm 
[Accessed 19/02/11]. 
25
  The RAND/St. Andrews data sets were never publicly available via the Internet. For further details see: 
Hoffman, Bruce, and Donna Kim Hoffman. “The RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, 
1994.” Terrorism and Political Violence.  Vol.7. No.4, Winter 1995. pp.178-229. Also: Hoffman, Bruce, and 
Donna Hoffman. “Chronology of International Terrorism, 1995.” Terrorism and Political Violence.  Vol.8. No.3, 
Autumn 1996. pp.87-127. 
26
  Access to data published by these organisation can be obtained by computer however that would be 
dependent upon some third party making available the information in a computerised format. 
27
  With the exception of work carried out by William Fowler at the RAND Corporation [William Warner Fowler, 
Terrorism Data Bases: A Comparison of Missions, Methods, and Systems (RAND N-1503-RC Santa Monica 
1981)] no comprehensive overview of the application of computerised databases systems to the study of 
terrorism has been published. See: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2005/N1503.pdf 
[Accessed 09/01/11] 
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Terrorism, or Cyber-Warfare that are both misleading and inaccurate, whilst other 
topic headings under Databases and Terrorism, or the general term of Information 
Terrorism has left classification of the subject area confused and ill-defined.28  This 
lack of definitional clarity on terrorism data sets has long been reflected in its 
omission from recognized typologies of terrorism studies, as can be seen even in 
Jungman’s long-established Typology of Terrorism Research.29  Without a clear 
framework, our understanding of the conceptual, theoretical and practical issues 
that effect the operation of computerised terrorism data sets is likely to be 
somewhat hindered. In addition, problems relating to the design of terrorism data 
sets, the awareness of their current uses and potential future applicability in 
research and counter-terrorism work require further investigation if the full 
capability of modern technology is to be realised. Before doing this, however, it will 
be useful to examine the definitional nature of data sets, chronologies and 
databases. This will allow a clarification of terms that will provide a sound 
foundation upon which the thesis argument can be built. 
 
 
                                                          
28
  Loose classification of terrorism data sets in some literature as chronologies, databases and data banks 
without thought given to their true classification has caused confusion in the literature. Chronologies on 
terrorism events data are an arrangement of terrorism events in order of occurrence by chronological date. 
Databases on terrorism can hold a much more sophisticated schema of data, contained within tables. The 
data can be relationally linked to allow researchers to perform queries, enter data, and generate reports and 
graphical data, in addition to further sophisticated functions. Not all database on terrorism are events 
databases, they could, for example, be based upon terrorist groups or intelligence driven databases 
containing information on individual terrorists and accompanying profiles, such as the NCTC’s TIDE database. 
Data banks is a rather dated term in computing science from the 1970’s.    
29
  Jongman’s typology of terrorism research offers a comprehensive typology and breakdown of areas of 
research in the terrorism field. No specific classification is given for computerised data sets on terrorism or 
computing in general. Reference would have to be made to subjects classified under ‘Counter Measures’, 
‘Intelligence’, ‘Preventative’ and ‘Futuristic Studies’ Within these particular areas no common classificatory 
scheme exists for computerised data sets and terrorism. See: Schmid, Alex P. and Albert J. Jongman,  Political 
Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature. (New Brunswick, 
USA: Transaction Books, 2nd. Ed, 1988.) p.178. 
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1.5. Defining:  data sets, chronologies and databases 
Elmasri and Navathe emphasise the significance of an appropriate definition of the 
term ‘database’, arguing that they should have the following implicit properties: 
‘A database is a logically coherent collection of data with some inherent 
meaning. A random assortment of data cannot be referred to as a database. 
A database is designed, built, and populated with data for a specific purpose. 
It has an intended group of users and some preconceived applications in 
which these users are interested. A database represents some aspect of the 
real world, sometimes called the mini-world. Changes to the mini-world are 
reflected in the database.’ 
 
It is important to differentiate between a database and a database management 
system (DBMS).  
 
‘The DBMS is *hence+ a general-purpose software system that facilitates the 
process of defining, constructing, and manipulating databases for various 
applications. Defining a database involves specifying the types of data to be 
stored in the database, along with a detailed description of each type of data. 
Constructing the database is the process of storing the data itself on some 
storage medium that is controlled by the DBMS. Manipulating a database 
includes such functions as querying the database to retrieve specific data, 
updating the database to reflect changes to the mini-world, and generating 
reports from the data. …..The database and software are together called a 
database system.’30 
 
This issue of clarity over the terminology used to describe a terrorism data set is 
important. Many terrorism data sets are held on a wide variety of computerised 
systems and this has led to inter-changeability of the term chronology and database. 
For example, the ITERATE31 chronologies on terrorism, the Pinkerton Risk 
Assessment Services (PRAS) database (now incorporated into the Global Terrorism 
Database),the RAND-St.Andrews Chronologies on International Terrorism, and the 
State Department’s Threat Analysis Division Information Management System 
(TADIMS) database are among numerous titles given to terrorism data sets. The 
                                                          
30
  Elmasri, Ramez, and Shamkant B. Navathe. Fundamentals of Database Systems. (Redwood City, California: 
The Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Company, Inc. 1989.) pp.3-4.  
31
  Edward F. Mickolus, Todd Sandler, and Jean Murdock, International Terrorism in the 1980’s A Chronology of 
Events Vol. II. 1984-1987 (Ames, Iowa, Iowa State University Press, 1989). 
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problem of classification arises in relation to the functionality32 of the chronology or 
database systems. Simple text based chronologies on terrorism have differing design 
features from that of a fully-fledged database management system (DBMS). 
Consequently design issues can vary between data sets. The capabilities, for 
example, of a text based data set such as ITERATE tend to be much more limiting 
than that of a true database system such as TADIMS. 33  The beauty of the database 
management system is its ability to retain text and coded variables (fields) and 
present terrorism data sets, chronologies and databases as part of its basic 
functionality. 34 Regardless of the type of data set in use, the design, collection, and 
entry of terrorism data into a computerised format requires thoughtful 
consideration. With this in mind, this thesis now turns to an examination of the early 
years of terrorism database creation. 
 
1.6. Development of Computerised Terrorism Data Sets: The Early Years 
The structure of some of the earliest data sets on political violence bears a strikingly 
similar format to that of contemporary data sets on terrorism. Developed largely in 
the 1960’s, terrorism events variables were coded used as the main unit of analysis. 
The most popular technique for analysis was aggregate events data, such as Gurr’s 
Strife Events Data Sets, Causal Model on Civil Strife, 1961-1965 and Arthur S. Bank’s 
                                                          
32
 Functionality relates to the actual functional operations of the data set. For example this could include such 
operations as report generation, querying of the database, input forms, validity checks and mathematical and 
statistical operators.  
33
 A terrorism data set or chronology can be held on a text based computer system and as such this does not 
constitute a true database management system (DBMS). Generally containing large amounts of un-coded 
text, they may or may not contain some variables.  
34
  ‘A database management system (DBMS) is a collection of programs that enables users to create and 
maintain a database. The DBMS is hence a general-purpose software system that facilitates the process of 
defining, constructing, and manipulating databases for various applications’ in Ramez Elmasri and Shamkant 
B. Navathe, Fundamentals of Database Systems (Redwood City, CA: The Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Co. 
Inc. 1989) p.4. 
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Domestic Conflict Behaviour, 1919-1966.35  Although many of these studies are 
available on computer via the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research  (ICPSR), their original format was either manually held or supported on 
text-based software.36  The general use of computers and particularly database 
systems by non-science based researchers was rare. Both computer science and 
terrorism as established fields were in their relative infancies in the 1960’s and thus 
the perceived benefits from computerisation of terrorism data had not as yet been 
realised.  
1961 saw the first generation of generalised database management system. 
It was nearly another decade (1970), until the concept of the relational database 
model, developed by Ted Codd, an IBM research fellow, was conceived. Many of the 
early database systems were designed for larger commercial users such as American 
Airlines or for U.S Department of Defense programs.37  Despite the apparent void 
between availability of systems and application in terrorism research, interest in 
their use as an intelligence-based tool began to emerge in the late 1960’s and early 
1970’s.  
The development by the CIA of their FITE (File on International Terrorist 
Events) database, operating under the Ramis III system, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency’s STIF (Significant Terrorist Incident Files) database, operating on the DIAL 
database system and BDM’s coded chronology of terrorism, were among the earliest 
                                                          
35
 Ibid. pp.139-140.  For a comprehensive list of conflict and political violence data sets see: Schmid and 
Jongman pp.139-175. 
36
 Access to specific ICPSR data sets can be accessed at the  ICPSR’s  web site at: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu 
37
 For a brief outline of the early stages of database system progress and their consequent development see: 
Ramez Elmasri and Shamkant B. Navathe, Fundamentals of Database Systems (Redwood City, CA: The 
Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Co. Inc. 1989) pp.18-19. 
15 
 
known computer applications in the field of counter- terrorism.38 All of these data 
sets were initially designed in the form of coded chronologies on international 
terrorism, using a mixture of public domain sources and intelligence sources, except 
for BDM’s database, which did not have access to classified information. The CIA 
chronology had an extensive array of up to 150 variables detailing incidents from 
1968 onwards, held in the main chronology, and a series of ancillary files relating to 
different terrorism information. Both the CIA and DIA chronologies were used 
primarily for intelligence estimates and forecasting. BDM’s terrorism chronology, on 
the other hand, was used for basic research. 
Although the earliest terrorism data sets took the form of chronologies on 
terrorism incidents, moves towards using computerised databases in a more 
sophisticated format had developed by the early 1970’s. The FBI’s Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), began operating in 1975, their Explosives Incidents 
System (EXIS). The database was operated on a mainframe system from the ATF’s 
offices in Washington D.C. The EXIS database’s main remit was to hold information 
on explosives incidents occurring in the United States that were either being 
investigated by the ATF or had been reported to the ATF.39  Although organisation of 
the database was maintained in Washington D.C., data input on bombing incidents 
came from bomb squads at federal, state and local level.40 
While much of the emphasis on terrorism database development appeared 
to be based in the United States, efforts in Europe to use computers in counter -
terrorism work were being developed in West Germany by the late 1970’s. The 
                                                          
38
 For other basic details on these data sets see: Fowler (note 3). pp.31-40. The BDM Corporation and their data 
sets no longer appear to exist. Extensive enquiries within the United States drew little success as to their 
eventual fate. 
39
 Revell, Oliver B. ‘Counter Terrorism, Planning and Operations.’ The Police Chief,  October 1991. 
40
 Ibid. For a more detailed analysis of the EXIS database see p. 37 of this chapter. 
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German Police Information System (INPOL) was developed in the mid 1970’s and 
was operational by 1977.41 The INPOL system was used by police throughout the 
former West Germany (FDR), both in counter-terrorism work, and in criminal and 
drug related crimes. The INPOL system was, for its time, a fairly advanced system 
offering multiple facilities. A centralised database, with regional network access, 
INPOL maintained a database of wanted terrorists and criminals, including 
fingerprint files. In addition, INPOL held files on known terrorist groups and 
individuals, generated from the result of terrorist activity. What made the INPOL 
system sophisticated for its time was the capability of the system to provide 
documents on legal advice, technical data and dispatch systems for command and 
control. With variable coded terrorist details, relevant ancillary database files, 
narrative documentation and accessibility over national and local police networks 
throughout West Germany, the INPOL systems provided a model for future 
development. 
Whilst the development of terrorism data sets, like INPOL, in the police and 
intelligence fields served specific intelligence needs, such classified information 
remained unavailable to the small, but emerging community of researchers hungry 
for data. This community comprised of academics, policy analysts and commercial 
organisations requiring terrorist data to pursue their requisite needs. Unable to 
obtain classified data, researchers and analysts developed their own computerised 
data sets. Thomas Snitch, at The American University, developed a coded database 
using the statistical software SPSS, basing the unit of analysis on assassination 
                                                          
41
 Karl, H. and R Lodde ‘German Police Information System - INPOL Organization and Technique.’ Paper 
presented at the International Conference on The Use of Computers in Police Operations. London, November 
1977. 
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attempts world-wide between 1968 and 1978.42 In 1972, the RAND Corporation, an 
independent think-tank based in Santa Monica, California, began research work on 
the study of international terrorism, eventually developing an extensive collection of 
computerised chronologies and databases on terrorism (see Chapter 4).  Work at 
RAND, for example, by Waterman and Jenkins, applying computerised heuristic 
modelling techniques to the study of international terrorism, was well advanced for 
its time.43 Driven by growing commercial and multinational interest in business risk, 
the value of terrorism data grew in the early 1970’s with companies such as Risks 
International, Inc. of Virginia, establishing their database of terrorism and political 
violence, which dates back to 1970.44 As a result, terrorism data became ‘valuable’ in 
three main respects: first, as a tool in the intelligence and police communities, to 
help counter acts of terrorism; second, in academic disciplines, to move the 
boundaries of research from traditional historical, descriptive and theoretical studies 
to quantitative and empirical based research and, third: terrorism data had 
commercial value in that it could be sold as part of a consultancy service, to willing 
corporate directors requiring risk analysis for overseas business.  
The late 1960’s and 1970’s were therefore a time for experimentation and 
prototype in the field of computerised terrorism data sets. There appears to have 
been little co-ordination between organisations, and most appeared pre-occupied 
                                                          
42
 Fowler (note 3) p.39. 
43
 Waterman, D.A. and Brian M. Jenkins. Heuristic Modelling Using Rule-Based Computer Systems (Santa Monica 
CA: RAND Corp., P-5811, 1977). See: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2006/P5811.pdf 
[Accessed 13/06/10]. 
44
 Risks International Inc. of Virginia became known as Pinkerton Risk Assessment Services (PRAS). It published 
its Annual Risk Assessment [1970-1997] on world-wide political violence in both hard-copy format and via the 
Internet until the late 1990’s . The entire database was given over to the START project at the University of 
Maryland, to form the core data for the Global Terrorism Database  (GTD) See: 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/  Some of the Internet version of Pinkerton’s data  can be can still be found 
at: http://www.pinkertons.com/pinkerton/prasdocs/news/aintro.htm using the www.archive.org website. 
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with developing and maintaining their respective data sets. Comparative analysis of 
data sets was also difficult to assess, and with such a small amount of data to 
compare, quantitative comparisons of data sets were not meaningful or easy to 
measure. This point did not go unnoticed by several researchers at the time. As 
Fowler noted:  
‘the size of  chronology-based data sets did not permit adequately reliable 
quantitative analysis, particularly in the case of interesting categories of terrorist 
incidents.’45   
 
The quantitative analysis of barricade-and-hostage incidents was a particular 
example of data shortcomings. As Jenkins, Johnson and Ronfeldt note: 
‘It is hazardous to draw statistical inferences from so small a universe. The 
conclusions that may be suggested, or the predictions that seem inherent, are 
quite tentative. In our analysis of the [77 barricade-and-hostage] cases we have 
given the actual numbers and the percentages these represent … to give greater 
meaning to the imprecise words that are commonly used in place of numbers ….. 
[Yet]  the data do not permit a high level of confidence based upon rigorous 
quantitative analysis of a sufficiently large population of events.’ 46 
 
The tragic and ironic solution to such a paucity of data was that through time, as 
incidents of terrorism were likely to occur, data could be coded to permit credible 
quantitative and empirical analysis of terrorism events. 
 
1.7. Information Technology and Terrorism Studies 
Technology and terrorism as a recognisable field in the terrorism literature has been 
growing over the past few years. It is a crucial as a tool in the assessment and 
analysis required to counter acts of terrorism. Where the area of computerised data 
sets on terrorism fits into this field is not clear. Early discussion of the technology 
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area of terrorism research tended to include such areas as explosive detection 
systems, aviation security, terrorist weaponry and nuclear issues relating to 
terrorism. Grant Wardlaw, discussing terrorism and technological change, expresses 
concern over such issues as armaments, biological agents and major advances 
conventional weaponry, that if obtained by terrorists could cause immense harm.47 
These are valid and legitimate areas of concern under the technology heading.48 
What appears to be lacking is a clear Information Technology field and in particular a 
focus on computerised data sets on terrorism. Schmid and Jongman do mention the 
term ‘data base’ in their book Political Terrorism; contextually within the book the 
database area is not specifically classified under an information technology 
heading49. As Chapter Two will illustrate, there have been real concerns regarding 
where best to situate the research on terrorism informatics and, indeed, it is only 
post-9/11 that a much broader literature base has evolved. Very little reference can 
be found within the technology and terrorism literature to information technology 
and terrorism as a classified subject area.50  Even scarcer is published literature on 
the application of database technologies to terrorism data sets and more specifically 
as a tool in terrorism research. As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, it is important to 
differentiate between the study of computerised data sets on terrorism and the use 
of computers in the intelligence field. Although both topics have certain common 
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denominators a fusion of the two topics would not be helpful,51 in particular because 
not all databases systems are intelligence systems. 
There are several reasons how this paucity of published research work in 
computerised terrorism data sets could be explained. First, as an established 
academic field the study of political violence and terrorism has only been developed 
to any extent in the past forty years. Classification of the subject as entry only 
appeared in The New York Times in 1968. Prior to that the subject was classified 
under the general heading of violence or low intensity conflict.  Second, in the same 
forty year period, while the development and use of the computers as a viable 
research tool in the social sciences has advanced considerably, the application of the 
database technology as a research tool in terrorism studies has at times had a rather 
chequered history until recently. While mainframe computers have been available 
for scientific use since the post-war period, their use as a tool specifically in the 
terrorism field did not occur until the 1970’s. Work by Brian Jenkins at the RAND 
Corporation on Heuristics modelling of terrorism incidents in 1977 was one of the 
earliest examples of the application of computing to terrorism research.52 
Consequent development of the RAND chronologies and databases on International 
Terrorism were to follow in 1980. Development of police surveillance systems by the 
German Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst) - BND, in 1977 after 
the Scheyler kidnap53 was one of the earliest attempt to use mainframe computers 
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to gather and establish links between data.54  British efforts at similar data gathering 
techniques was co-ordinated by the Home Office under a project called Holmes.55  
As Ted Gurr notes, for many academics, increasing interest in the study of 
political violence as a legitimate topic of research was initially based upon historical, 
atheoretical and case study approaches to the subject.56 Research carried out by 
Fowler at the RAND Corporation on numerical indexes on terrorism variables in the 
early 1980’s was an early attempt to develop the power of the database using 
mainframe technology.57 Information technology as a recognisable field had not 
developed in the general science literature let alone the specialised area of terrorism 
studies. The capability of these systems was generally limited to the retention of 
variable and text coded data allowing for the creation of chronologies and data sets 
on terrorism. Few academics had the expertise or financial resources and could not 
foresee the potential in developing computerised terrorism database systems. 
Computers were seen among academics as being very much part of the 
mathematical and computing disciplines, and given that the functional capability of 
the available systems were anyway somewhat limited, their potential application 
could not be fully appreciated.   
 
As Fowler notes:  
 
‘The development of large scale data sets on terrorism were left to the 
larger Think Tank organisations such as the Rand Corporation, The Defence 
Intelligence Agency (D.I.A.) established 1970 and private corporations such 
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as the BDM Corporation’s  chronology established in 1965 concentrating on 
terrorist incidents concerning ‘...private business and governmental 
concerns...’.58  
 
 Others included had a relevant interest in maintaining data on terrorism and 
governments agencies and intelligence agencies. This also included military agencies 
both in Europe and North America, their remit being mainly tied to military, scientific 
and commercial use. Many arts and social science researchers were not particularly 
comfortable with the use of computers as a research tool. Indeed they did not even 
envisage it as a tool with which they could use in their work for several years. The 
invention of the personal computers and more sophisticated mainframe computers 
were the move forward that would allow terrorism researchers and analyst to use 
the computer as a tool in terrorism research. However as Chapter Two indicates the 
wide spread use of personal computers among the academic community has not 
seen a parallel increase in published literature on computerised terrorism data sets. 
Certain terrorism analysts developed their own data sets on terrorism including 
former U.S. State Department employee Dennis Pluchinsky, who developed a 
database in a private capacity for academic work.59 However, for several reasons, 
terrorism researchers were slow to adopt the database technologies. Principal 
amongst these was the huge investment of both time and resources required to 
develop and maintain terrorism data sets to a high academic standard and integrity. 
Information technology and terrorism research as an established field was in many 
ways still in its infancy.  The arrival of the Internet and the increasing use of 
computer networks, as well as increased attention being paid to such topics as 
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Cyber-Terrorism, Information Warfare and Information Terrorism60 has tended to 
overshadow the specialist area of computerised terrorism data sets. Instant 
gratification and retrieval of information (of varying quality) has tended to be at the 
expense of a serious analysis of the use of computers in terrorism database research. 
Furthermore the increasing interest being paid to such topics as computer security, 
intelligence systems, computer viruses and the sabotage of computers by terrorists 
under the technology banner has again sidelined the issue of terrorism databases. 
Increasing computer literacy among social scientists and terrorism researchers has 
tended to take the focus of attention away from the core issues of terrorism 
databases. The visual attraction of the internet, coupled with an increasing 
awareness of the volatility of data and information has also tended to obscure the 
importance of studying the topic of terrorism database technologies as a subject per 
se.   
 
1.8. Quantitative Theory Development  
The use of quantitative techniques in terrorism research has grown substantially in 
the past thirty years. Studies by many academics and analysts have increasingly 
relied upon the use of terrorism data sets to further theoretical debate in the field. 
Most terrorism chronologies and databases are coded with a mixture of text 
variables (for example, incident details, name of terrorist group, and type of incident 
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– bombing, hijack, chemical attack) in addition to some numeric indices (number of 
fatalities, number of injured, estimated cost of damage).61   As James Coleman asks,  
‘What is it about quantitative measurement that is so crucial for theory-
development? … *Its power+ … lies in its ability to carry out transformations … 
upon input data.’62 
 
Furthermore, 
‘If these data are in the form of numbers, and maintain their properties as 
numbers after transformation, then powerful transformations of algebra, 
calculus and matrix algebra can be carried out upon them.’ 63 
 
The computer as a tool in the manipulation of such raw terrorist data sets has, as 
Fowler argues, an increasingly vital role in quantitative theory development.64 
Awareness at the Rand Corporation, and among other terrorism researchers, that 
computers could not only store raw data on terrorist incidents but be used for 
quantitative empirical research was becoming apparent by the early 1980’s. Fowler’s 
paper: ‘An Agenda for Quantitative Research on Terrorism'65 recognised the 
potential for developing sets of ‘profiles’ defining the behaviour of terrorist groups. 
These profiles would be numerically indexed in a computerised database. Variables 
or ‘profiles’ included ‘frequency, severity, quality and effect of terrorist acts’. 
Building upon these the creation of aggregate profiles that would reflect national, 
regional and international behaviour began to be added to database research. 
Establishing such a database would allow the use of time-series, process analysis and 
multivariate calculations. The great beauty of such an exercise is that a computerised 
database would allow researchers to model or manipulate the data to form an 
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empirical foundation for further quantitative research. Fowler suggested its further 
use as a projection tool, as well as the evaluation of current trends in terrorist 
incidents. The strength of such databases is their ability to choose varying units of 
analysis, for example the terrorist incident, and on that basis offer aggregate 
information based on multi-dimensional criteria. The great power that numbers have 
over words is their capability for calculation. Increasing requirements for 
quantitative data on terrorist incidents, groups and other events make the 
computerised data sets particularly amenable to quantitative research. The value of 
coded words or text should not be undervalued. At varying levels, textual variables in 
terrorism data sets offer powerful explanatory information to terrorist incidents or 
events. For example the terms ‘ideology’, ‘freedom’, and ‘violence’, and ‘revenge’ do 
not lend themselves to simple numerical coding. The written word within the data 
set offers principally a descriptive mechanism for such entities. In addition, it can 
also offer a more rounded picture of events.   
The ability to generate large computerised data sets on terrorism events for 
quantitative and empirical research does not guarantee that the most useful data 
sets are being compiled. The ramifications of this for quantitative and empirical 
research are serious. For example, as Ted Gurr notes in his paper ‘Empirical Research 
on Political Terrorism: The State of the Art and How it Might be Improved’,66 the lack 
of empirically based research on oppositional terrorism at the expense of 
chronologies on terrorism incidents as the unit of analysis is problematic. Moreover, 
at a very obvious level the application of computer technology to any discipline (e.g. 
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Medicine, Science, Music) is almost automatically seen an advancement in the 
relevant field. What Jones describes as ‘technological utopianism’ has provided a 
strong momentum, as has the perception that new technology by its very nature is 
an advancement in itself, a feeling that can itself provide a false sense of security. 67 
As will be discussed in chapter 3, terrorism database projects are not always 
successful, and a false sense of technological advancement and a pseudo-legitimacy 
of data and information can arise. The very fact that terrorist data is coded into a 
database does not make it either legitimate or valid. The ease with which data can 
now be entered upon computerised system requires that some caution be taken 
when dealing with computerised data sets on terrorism. The availability of software 
that allows for the fast design and collation of data risks overshadowing some of the 
fundamental conceptual, theoretical and practical considerations that need to be 
addressed in the application of database technologies to terrorism research.  
 
1.9. Conclusions 
From a scattered and patchy history, the application of database technologies to the 
study of terrorism and counter-terrorism post 9/11 is a field of research that has 
been thrust by events into taking action.  Chapter 2 of this thesis will assess the key 
literature that contributed to the early development of the field of study. This not 
only provides an historical overview of the foundations of research in the subject 
area. It will discuss the early literature that was foundational in developing terrorism 
database collections. After all, it was the creation and on-going development of early 
chronologies and databases on terrorism in the 1960’s and 1970’s that provided a 
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substantial quantitative continuum for analyst to measure and assess long-term 
trends in terrorism. Chapter 3 of the thesis will assess the major design and on-going 
development issues in terrorism database design. Without solid design 
methodology, data validity and integrity is rendered worthless. In addition to the key 
issue of defining an act of terrorism and its mapping into terrorism databases, the 
chapter will also assess source data issues and the sophisticated functionality of 
terrorism databases systems. It will also discuss some of the key issues surrounding 
the failure of some terrorism and counter-terrorism database projects. Chapter 4 will 
provide a detailed overview and discussion of the principle publicly available 
databases on terrorism. The thesis will present what to date is the most 
comprehensive outline of twenty key terrorism databases compiled.  Chapter 4 will 
also present an assessment and context for some Government counter-terrorism 
databases, and illustrate their varying remits.  Chapter 5 will discuss current and 
future trends in the research in a field that has rapidly become a complex matrix of 
competing demands and challenges.  The chapter will address the legal and policy 
implications for terrorism and counter-terrorism databases post 9/11. Other issues 
such as data privacy, data mining, mission creep, networked technologies and 
information sharing will also be discussed. Finally, Chapter 6 will provide a summary 
and conclusions, with a discussion of the findings and implications for further study. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE PRE-9/11 CONTEXT 
  
2.1 Introduction 
With the exception of a few dedicated articles, published literature on the 
application of database technologies to the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism 
databases pre 9/11 is minimal.68 Indeed, even now, although there are now a 
number of research papers in this area, there remains no monograph that assesses 
comprehensively the use of database technologies in terrorism research. The eclectic 
nature of the field and the lack of an established classification of database 
technologies in terrorism studies has left the study of the subject area scattered and 
incomplete. Given the inter-disciplinary nature of the subject and the lack of a 
cohesive focal point, this chapter will first assess the available literature, pre-9/11, 
before examining post-9/11 material. This chapter is particularly concerned with the 
research undertaken, and impact of database technologies, in the field of terrorism 
and counter-terrorism.  As argued in the hypothesis of this thesis, the non-
incremental way in which the study of terrorism and computers databases have 
evolved has meant there has been no ‘home’ for the subject. Early studies of 
terrorism academically was carried out in political science and history departments 
in Universities. Computing science, founded in the discipline of mathematics, 
eventually evolved into a subject in its own right. For decades each respective 
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subjects lived in parallel worlds. Even with ‘early cross-fertilisation’ of the subject by 
the RAND Corporation, the study of terrorism databases remained fragmented. The 
concept of Terrorism Informatics provides a natural niche and relevant and 
meaningful title to an evolving inter-disciplinary subject area that reflects the real-
world. Terrorism informatics applies sophisticated methodologies with information 
fusion in the management of diverse terrorism related information. It is specifically 
connected to the use of terrorism data in relation to domestic and international 
homeland security. This includes, for example the acquisition and integration of 
terrorism data, which can then be processed and made available for analysis. As 
argued in the hypothesis of this thesis, applying the encompassing term terrorism 
informatics provides boundaries. Terrorism informatics boundaries are wide but 
highly relevant to study of terrorism and counter-terrorism databases. Another 
benefit of using terrorism informatics as a subject title is that it also includes in its 
use inter-disciplinary techniques from statistics, mathematics, public policy, 
linguistics and the social sciences. In many ways it reflects and can respond to the 
complicated narrative that is terrorism in the 21st Century. 
Despite the many classificatory fields of terrorism literature, there has been 
no natural niche, within existing frameworks, for the study of database technologies 
and their application to terrorism studies. Published literature relating to database 
technologies and terrorism studies is spread across many areas within the terrorism 
field. The diverse sources, for example, quantitative studies, events data, 
intelligence, counter-terrorism, commercial consultancy, all with varying remits, 
make it difficult to generalise about the field. Moreover, two principal factors have 
caused confusion over the classification of the use of computers in terrorism 
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research.69 First, computers are perceived purely as a research tool in the research 
process. They are viewed as ‘background’ tools to many areas of terrorism research, 
and as a result of their diverse use and application, agreement even on a simple title 
for their use (e.g. Terrorism Informatics’) has not been forthcoming. Secondly, the 
development of the computer as a legitimate area of study within the terrorism 
field, and not simply a research tool, has further added to an already unsatisfactory 
lack of classification. 70 Despite this situation, a small, but important literature base 
related to terrorism data sets was evolving even from the late 1960s, i.e. the 
beginning of database use within the terrorism field. This chapter will examine this 
early research, setting the scene for the post-9/11 analysis in later chapters. 
 
2.2. Early research - monographs 
Despite its relative youth as an area of academic study, the literature on political 
violence and terrorism is substantial. The many classifications (historical, normative, 
legal, behavioural, social, economic, quantitative, empirical, theoretical, case studies, 
anthologies, events data, and bibliographic) are indicative of the problems 
encountered in generalising about such a complex political phenomena. A useful 
starting point in terrorism studies is Wardlaw’s Political Terrorism.71 This provides a 
comprehensive overview of political violence and counter-terrorist tactics. Balanced 
with a mixture of history, theory on political violence, and suggested practice in 
counter-terrorism tactics this work provides one of the first comprehensive 
introductory approaches to the research field. A large amount of terrorism literature 
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has tended to be based on the historical development of terrorist movements, 
profiles of their members and leadership. Historical anthologies by Laqueur 72 and 
Fromkin 73 have provided useful primary source material regarding terrorist 
activities. Alternatively works by Becker,74 illustrating the development of the 
Baader-Meinhoff group in Germany and Bell’s 75 historical analysis of the IRA and its 
membership, form part of a large and established field of historically based literature 
on terrorism, adding further weight to the argument for historical analysis is 
Laqueur’s Terrorism.76  Laqueur emphasised the effect of previous historical events 
to the behaviour of 19th century Russian terrorist group motivations and beliefs. 
Alternatively, typologies of terrorism by authors such as Walter,77 offer one of the 
earliest sociological perspectives on terrorism – Walter, for example, distinguishes 
between ‘sieges of terror’ and ‘regimes of terror’. In the conceptual and theoretical 
literature, an analysis of revolutionary terrorism is offered by Wilkinson78 who uses 
Gurr’s frustration-aggression hypothesis to develop a theory of terrorism.79 Further 
work by Wilkinson, such as the seminal Terrorism and the Liberal State80 concerns 
itself with the threat of terrorism to liberal democracies. Causal factors and the 
particular methods of countering acts of terrorism within liberal democracies are 
also discussed. Of particular relevance to the terrorism, computing and intelligence 
field is the significance that Wilkinson places on the nature of the intelligence 
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services and upon having central co-ordination of information to avoid duplication 
and maintain standards under democratically accountable authorities. Causal factors 
behind political violence are examined in Ted Gurr’s Why Men Rebel. This classic 
etiology, an early example of work on ‘root causes’, ‘uses deductive reasoning and 
empirical enquiry to synthesise theories about the origin and form of group violence 
in politics’.81 From a completely different angle, work in the counter-terrorism and 
preventative studies field by such authors as Clutterbuck 82 and Jenkins83 have 
sought to emphasise the more practical considerations in counter-terrorism research 
from applied military and security backgrounds.  
 In terms of the early literature on database technologies,84 William Fowler, of 
the RAND Corporation carried out some of the earliest research work in this specific 
area in the early 1980’s: two  papers by  Fowler; An Agenda for Quantitative 
Research on Terrorism85 and Terrorism Data Bases: A Comparison of Missions, 
Methods and Systems86 posits some of the most essential arguments and analysis for 
the use of computerised database system in terrorism research. In particular, An 
Agenda for Quantitative Research on Terrorism illustrates at a most basic, but 
fundamental level, the advantages of using computerised databases for aggregate 
data analysis of terrorism incidents and group behaviour. This early recognition 
(1980) of the potential of database systems in quantitative terrorism research 
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(despite the lack of modern computerised systems) demonstrated the usefulness of 
indexing terrorist variables numerically as a foundation in quantitative research, 
something that could then be pursued further at an empirical level. Using the 
terrorist incident as the unit of analysis – i.e. “who did what to whom and when”, 
Fowler argued that various methods of aggregate modelling could be employed, for 
example, the use of multivariate modelling, including regression techniques. Time 
series models could also be employed to detect seasonal variations in terrorist 
activities, in addition to developing monitoring and forecasting tools. Fowler 
encouraged the use of numeric databases to study terrorism at varying levels of 
analysis. For example, at a macro-analytic level databases could be used to monitor 
terrorist behaviour at international and national levels. Alternatively, micro-analytic 
analysis using behavioural variables related to geography, political and group 
attributes could be coded within a database. Fowler’s, Terrorism Data Bases: A 
Comparison of Missions, Methods, and Systems was one of the earliest attempts to 
outline the conceptual, practical and theoretical problems incurred when designing 
and using computerised data sets on terrorism. Although Fowler’s paper was 
published in 1981, his research continues to have resonance. Fowler’s paper is 
almost unique in that it addresses the specific practical problems encountered by 
terrorism researchers when attempting to design a computerised database on 
terrorism, and his appreciation of the need to employ more formal methods for 
storing information on terrorist incidents highlighted the lack hitherto of the 
importance of formalising databases. It makes many excellent points that are still 
valid today, despite the revolutionary advances in computer technology in the 
intervening period. Fowler recognised the potential applications of computerised 
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terrorism data sets, in terms of basic research, intelligence and query responses on 
terrorism data. These relate specifically to the types of users requiring information, 
rather than the functionality of the system itself. Fowler also outlines the main issues 
of concern in the design of terrorism database, including such concerns as definition 
of terrorism incidents, the scope of the database, the method of data selection for 
terrorist incidents and actual details to be recorded in the database. Other factors 
effecting the scope and content of the systems were also discussed.  For example, 
time frames and variables that were most commonly used at the time of the 
publication.  In many ways this paper was extremely forward looking for its time. The 
strength of this work is in the fact that the underlying issues of concern to Fowler in 
1981 are just as valid and applicable today.  
In terms of the actual use of terrorism data sets, rather than their design, 
what could be considered a standard reference for any researcher setting up an 
events data set on terrorism is Taylor and Jodice’s The World Handbook of Political 
and Social Indicators.87 This is a record of events data on political protest and 
violence, state coercive behaviour, governmental change and elections from 1948-
1977. Although a little dated the strength of this work lies in its rigorous approach to 
the many issues of concern when establishing data sets. The importance of efficient 
collection and collation of raw data and its consequent management and analysis is 
discussed. The authors’ recognition of the importance of consistency in codification 
of variables across national boundaries for comparative use, accessibility of data and 
the need to document data sets are also emphasised. Crucial to the credibility of any 
data set, as Taylor & Jodice point out, is reliability of data, on which to base sound 
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empirical analysis of political violence.88 In addition, recognition of the need for 
systematic criteria of variables in data sets provides valuable guidance on data set 
standards. Taylor & Jodice also highlight the issue of academic concern over quality 
of data sets, the practical considerations involved in the training of coders, inter-
coder agreement, cross-time comparability of data sets and the reliability of sources 
and suggested uses for data sets. These factors all have an important bearing on 
terrorism data sets design and use.89 
 Schmid and Jongman’s Political Terrorism is one of the few guides on 
terrorism to have devoted a specific chapter to ‘Data and Data Bases on State and 
Non-State Terrorism’, and provided a comprehensive analysis of the terrorism data 
set situation at that time. The guide covers computer readable data sets on 
terrorism as well as manual data sets. Their recognition of the abundance of similar 
data on terrorism and the need to develop new data sets to further empirical 
research is highlighted by their survey among academics showing strong reliance on 
government publications at the expense of independent sources. Although published 
in 1988, Schmid and Jongman’s  survey of a large variety of early data sets on conflict 
and political violence developed in the 1960’s and 1970’s as well as more 
contemporary ones, provided an invaluable source of reference, also covering data 
sets developed by academic institutes, journals and the media.  Very little analysis of 
the actual computer systems retaining these data sets (true database systems or text 
based chronologies) and functional capabilities was offered, however, and given the 
time that has now elapsed, most of these data sets have been merged, have become 
redundant, or have developed into sophisticated internet database systems. 
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Moreover, a lack of discussion on issues relating to the design of terrorism data sets, 
typological classification of data sets, chronologies and databases on terrorism, 
temper what could be considered a worthy if slightly dated review of terrorism data 
sets. 
At the same time as Schmid and Jongman were writing on terrorist 
databases, Ted Gurr was analysing the problems encountered in the typological 
design and use of terrorism data sets Gurr’s: ‘Empirical Research on Terrorism:The 
State of the Art and How it Might be Improved’ 90 makes a serious contribution to 
terrorism data set issues and merits some attention. Gurr’s work is of value for 
several reasons. Firstly, he appreciates and warns of the concern among terrorism 
researchers that information obtained from terrorism data sets does not always 
match the needs of researchers. Secondly, he warns that the typological design of 
the data set will have a bearing upon the content of the data set. The ramifications 
of this for quantitative and empirical research are serious. Chosen terrorist variables 
will determine the limits of the research base.  Third, Gurr’s concern that the ‘right’ 
research questions are being asked has crucial bearing on the consequent research 
results. He places heavy emphasis on the analytic questions that are being asked and 
offers appropriate methodologies for answering such questions. The five different 
levels of analysis: global, national, group, incident and individual would permit the 
possibility of different questioning at different levels. Gurr also voices concern over 
the generation of inappropriate or duplicated data on terrorism incidents, for 
example the creation of numerous chronologies on terrorism containing similar data. 
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Similar to Ross’s concerns, Gurr notes the problems and limits encountered with 
using the same data set repeatedly for differing research needs.91  A Conceptual 
Framework for Analyzing Terrorist Groups by Brian Jenkins, Konrad Kellen et. al of 
the RAND Corporation is worthy of some attention.92 Its contribution to the 
literature comes in part from its innovative approach to the analysis of terrorist 
groups. Of particular interest however is the methodology used in the study; a series 
of databases on terrorist groups were devised as part of the framework for the 
project. Twenty-nine terrorist groups were studied from which 150 categories could 
be identified and categorised into ten areas, (Organisation, Leadership, Demography 
Ideology etc.). These were then coded and entered into several databases. Of 
interest to terrorism data set designers is the discussion on code-books, data 
collection and evaluation, and in particular the differentiation between textual 
coded data and variable coded data. The author’s awareness of the value of using 
both types of variables in discussing terrorist groups (as opposed to simple aggregate 
data on incidents) highlights some of the principle design issues in terrorism data 
sets. The importance of reliability versus the validity of terrorist data is identified 
making a valuable contribution to the area of data integrity in terrorism data set 
design. 
In a similar vein, Ross’ s work on political terrorism in Canada recognised the 
conceptual and methodological issues encountered in the creation of an events 
database.93  Ross’s concern over the lack of empirical literature on political violence 
in Canada forms the background to other more general but important issues and 
                                                          
91
 Op cit, p.144. 
92
 Bonnie Cordes, Brian M. Jenkins, Konrad Kellen With Gail Bass, Daniel Relles, William Sater, Mario Juncosa, 
William Fowler, Geraldine Petty, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica CA: 
RAND Corp., 1985) R-3151. 
93
 Op cit. 
38 
 
concerns in terrorism data sets design.  This work was unusual in that it illustrated in 
detail the potential statistical data that can be derived from a well-designed events 
database on terrorism.94 Among the main benefits was the possibility of 
demonstrating that terrorists choose among a certain range of options.95 Ross also 
argues that events databases can attach a statistical probability to terrorist choices. 
In addition, he suggested the possibility of  ‘predict*ing+ the terrorist’s most likely 
actions’ which widened the role and capabilities of carefully developed data sets for 
counter-terrorism purposes. Ross, like other researchers, recognised the well-
established debate over definitional agreement on what constitutes an act of 
terrorism. More importantly however are his concerns over typologies of terrorism 
and delineation of the different types (for example Mickolus, or Wilkinson) for 
practical implementation into events data on terrorism. The common and recurring 
complaint of the ‘lack of good empirically grounded research on terrorism’ is brought 
to our attention in this paper. Ross developed this further by explaining that 
‘“empirical research” implies the use of methodologies of the social sciences’, i.e.: 
‘..techniques for ordering information systematically and drawing inferences 
from that information about the patterns, trends, causes, processes and 
outcomes of conflict. Since political terrorism is a type of conflict, the full 
spectrum of techniques for conflict analysis are potentially applicable to it.’96  
 
The reference to systematic ordered information fitted particularly well with basic 
database design theory and its use as a tool in empirical terrorism research. The 
temptation to focus specifically on terrorism events data as a result of its availability 
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at the expense of other techniques of analysis can be limiting. Ross reminds us that 
events data is not the only methodology for empirical analysis of terrorism. Other 
techniques such as direct observation, content analysis of terrorist self-reporting, 
and survey research all have their part to play in empirical terrorism research.  
Unlike terrorism data sets, documentation in the international conflict data 
set field is well established. An understanding of the need to fully document 
computerised conflict data sets has been recognised.97  Cioffi-Revilla’s Handbook of 
Datasets on Crises and Wars 1495-1988, A.D. 98  although concerned with events data 
on conflict, provides some very useful material on establishing standards in 
computerised data set development. If purely from a generic point of view Cioffi-
Revilla’s emphasis on the need for ‘information profiles’ is an important starting 
point in the design of any computerised data set.  Profiles fully describe the format 
and entities within the data sets. Such documentation sets a standard for 
comparative analysis of differing machine readable data sets. Cioffi-Revilla’s also 
provides comparative analysis of space and time coverage of conflict data sets and 
geographic distribution of conflict. This could, if carefully considered, provide a 
                                                          
97
 The U.S. National Science Foundation initiated under its Political Science Program a project entitled “Data 
Development for International Research” (DDIR). This involved supporting existing and new data sets 
projects, including the Interstate Conflict Datasets Catalog. (ICDC). Longer term aims of developing daily 
events data and intra and inter-state conflict data sets under the umbrella of (DDIR) have been initiated. A 
specialised standard the (ICDC) standard has been developed in response to the specialised needs of conflict 
data set users. The traditional American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard was considered too 
limiting for the (DDIR) data sets. See Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, The Scientific Measurement of International 
Conflict: Handbook of Datasets on Crisis and Wars 1495-1988
A.D.
 (Boulder Colorado: Lynne Reinner 1990) 
pp12-13. 
98
    Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Computational Social Science, Conflict Analysis and the 21st Century Threat Triad, in 
21st Century Information Technologies and Enabling Policies for Counter Terrorism. Ed. by R. Popp, (IEEE 
Press, 2006). 
40 
 
useful method for comparative analysis of existing terrorism data sets to highlight 
the strengths and weaknesses in data collection.99  
 
2.3. Early research – journal articles and datasets 
The journal Terrorism and Political Violence100 was pioneering in the 
development of a forum for research and discussion on the application of technology 
to the study of terrorism and political violence. A small but growing literature field 
has developed to date: terrorism data sets, the use of on-line databases in terrorism 
research and Information Technology applications to Terrorism. Bruce Hoffman and 
Donna Hoffman, for example, provided an overview of the RAND-St. Andrews 
Chronology of International Terrorism.101  This detailed the criteria for inclusion of 
incidents in the RAND-St. Andrews chronologies, the information sources used, and 
also gave aggregate totals of terrorism incidents. A preface providing a profile of the 
data set demonstrates professionalism in providing background and context to the 
data set development. Also, as Avishag Gordon notes, the availability of on-line 
services and CD-ROM as a tool in terrorism research is increasing.102  Using a variety 
of on-line databases and searching by key words on ‘terrorism’  ‘international 
terrorism’ and ‘tactics’ Gordon compares and measures the success of hit rates. 
Gordon’s use of traditional and non-traditional on-line services (for example 
                                                          
99
 Some caution is advised. As no consistent criteria or standard similar to the (ICDC) has been established a 
comparative analysis of existing computerised data sets on terrorism would have to be based upon crude 
aggregate data of common variables among data sets. This issue is discussed in Chapter IV of the thesis. 
100
 Terrorism and Political Violence (London: Frank Cass). 
101
 Bruce Hoffman and Donna Kim Hoffman ‘The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism 1994’, 
Terrorism and Political Violence (London: Frank Cass), 7/4 (Winter 1995) pp.178-229 and ‘Chronology of 
International Terrorism’ Terrorism and Political Violence (London: Frank Cass) 8/3 (Autumn 1996) pp.87-127.  
102
 Avishag Gordon, ‘Terrorism and Computerised Databases: An Examination of Multidisciplinary Coverage’, 
Terrorism and Political Violence (London: Frank Cass), 7/4 (Winter 1995), pp.171-177. See also ‘Terrorism and 
Science, Technology and Medicine Databases: New Concepts and Terminology’, Terrorism and Political 
Violence (London: Frank Cass), 8/1 (Spring 1996), pp.167-173. 
41 
 
‘Engineering Index’, ‘Aerospace Database’, ‘Medline Express’) illustrates the 
widening appearance of terrorism literature in databases that until recently would 
have been considered outwith the realms of the subject area. Work published by 
Devost, Houghton, and Pollard et al also discusses the impact of Information Warfare 
on American national security, a field that is well established on the Internet. Its 
inclusion in an established journal on terrorism has been long overdue and sets a 
precedent for further research.  
In terms of annual data sets, information on incidents of terrorism began to 
be produced by governments, academic centres, and private organisations. These 
publications tended to be the principal, though not exclusive source of terrorism 
events data used for research purposes. Although difficult to generalise, many of the 
reports were presented in a chronological format. Not all data sets appeared on an 
annual basis and some appeared on a periodic basis or materialised as the result of a 
project-driven contract. For reasons of security and to avoid distortion, the 
availability of many data sets tended in these earlier years to be in a hard copy 
format only. Few organisations took advantage of modern computer technology to 
make available complete data sets on terrorism in CD-ROM format or through the 
Internet. 103 The largest sources of data sets on terrorism come from the United 
States. The size and diverse nature of the U.S. Government dictated that no single 
agency was responsible for the publication of incidents on terrorism. The State 
Department, Federal Bureau of Intelligence, American Bomb Data Center in the 
Bureau of Arm, Tobacco and Alcohol, and the Foreign Broadcasting Information 
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Service (FBIS) all published literature on terrorism events data. One of the most cited 
and authoritative sources of record on terrorism is the United States Department of 
State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism.104 This was an annual publication giving regional 
overviews of incidents of terrorism worldwide. The format was a mixture of 
narrative analysis of incidents of terrorism and trends, complimented by 
photographs and graphics. While modern database systems could hold all these 
entities in a single database format this data was held separately on varying 
computer systems and then drawn together for final publication. A chronology (text 
based) of significant incidents, along with statistical reviews (graphics based), formed 
part of the appendices. Aggregate variables on terrorism were not separated from 
the main text in the regional overviews, however quantitative analysis could be 
undertaken from the statistical overview that was present in the appendices. In 
addition, the U.S. State Department published Significant Incidents of Political 
Violence Against Americans on an annual (now periodic) basis. 105 This is a statistical 
overview detailing major anti-U.S. incidents of political violence (including terrorism) 
on a regional basis worldwide. Also listed in a chronological format this publication 
was heavily littered with graphics, photographs of incidents, maps and tabular 
statistics on anti-American attacks. Unique to this report was the inclusion of the 
‘Americans in Captivity’ section. Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against 
Americans did, and still does not, claim to be inclusive of all incidents. The exclusion 
of certain data for classification purposes was mentioned in the initial editorial 
comments. Aside from the highly visual presentation format this publication lends 
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itself well to database retention; however the data set is formed from an amalgam 
of work from separate departments from within the State Department.106 
Dedicated information on events data was also provided in TERRORISM, a 
publication produced by the Federal Bureau of Intelligence.107 This annual 
publication was a mixture of statistical analysis, trend analysis and topical issues 
relating to terrorism. A small chronology of terrorism events data is included as well 
as the definitional criteria given to explain statistical figures.108 The FBI’s Bomb 
Summary detailed bombing incidents in the United States each year.109 This 
publication is an interesting mixture of statistical data divided into several categories 
(incidents by region, state, by target, time of occurrence etc.) that could be used for 
quantitative analysis. In addition the publication contained numerous graphical 
presentations, chronologies and practical guidance (graphically based) on handling 
potential bomb threats. The Bomb Summary wa a combination of authoritative data 
on bombings, practical advice on security techniques, graphics, photographs of 
training, and incident data. Despite its compilation from various databases and file 
formats its format leant itself well to a wide array of computer-based analyses.  
 The Office of Civil Aviation and Security (under the auspices of the U.S. 
Federal Administration) annually published the Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation 
report. The report presented a wide variety of data on criminal acts against airlines 
world-wide. Offering geographic analysis of significant acts (bombings, hijackings and 
attacks) on airlines and their related interests this report offered more specialised 
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data dealing specifically with aviation related incidents. Although lacking the 
subjective visual appeal of other federal agency reports the inclusion of feature 
articles, trends on hijackings, bombings and attacks on airports meant that it was a 
comprehensive analysis of threats to the aviation industry. Detailed chronologies on 
U.S. and foreign carrier hijacking, as well as explosions aboard aircraft, also allowed 
for some form of trend analysis. The lack of numerical variables in the chronology 
limited the potential for consequent quantitative analysis; however aggregate totals 
of incidents by region, target and tactic were supplied in the appendices. Moreover, 
an admission in the report that not all incidents that were recorded could be verified 
illustrated two key points: first, an honesty by the reports authors that no data set 
on terrorism is definitive, something that adds to its integrity, and;  second, it further 
reminds the reader of the problems encountered in collating and verifying such 
incidents.  
In the case of Canada, separate published events data on terrorism had been 
historically difficult to find, in part due to Canada’s close proximity to the United 
States and the general trend to incorporate Canadian statistics under a North 
American banner. Terrorism in Canada 1960-1989, however, offered a balanced and 
unusual mixture of analysis, trends, methodology on coding, and several detailed 
chronologies.  In comparison to similar publications much more attention was given 
to the concept of terrorism, behavioural aspects of terrorism, the motivation behind 
it and some definitional issues. Detailed discussion on the methodology behind the 
design of the data set, codification of variables, validation of events and sources 
used were well outlined, and a broad quantitative coverage of trends and patterns of 
terrorism effecting Canada were also presented using data derived from the four 
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chronologies in the report. The latter were unusual in that they differed in three 
main respects from other comparable chronologies on terrorism: first, separate 
chronologies on domestic and international terrorism were listed in the same 
publication; second, a ‘Terrorism Support Activity’ chronology comprising of ‘actions 
in support of the commission of terrorist acts in Canada either directly.... or 
indirectly...’ were presented, and, finally events that did not meet the prescribed 
criteria for inclusion in the other chronologies were listed in an ‘Excluded Events’ 
chronology. 
The British government also produced data sets on terrorism incidents in the 
United Kingdom in several formats relating to the operation and prevention of 
terrorism legislation. For example, the Home Office produced statistics on bombings 
in the United Kingdom, as well as a separate data set for Northern Ireland 
(something that the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) also did).110 Unlike the 
American federal publications no definition of what would constitute an act of 
terrorism is offered in these statistical bulletins. Also in the U.K., the Centre for the 
Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St. Andrews, 
Scotland was one of few academic centres at that time to maintain a large repository 
of data sets on political violence and terrorism.111 Originally established in 1972 by 
Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation of Santa Monica,112 the annual publication of 
the RAND-St. Andrews University Chronology of International Terrorism Incidents 113 
appeared, as previously mentioned, in Terrorism and Political Violence.114 Covering 
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mainly incidents of international terrorism, and excluding acts of political violence by 
terrorists against nationals of their own country, a rich and diverse source of 
information was available. Whilst making no claim to be the definitive source for 
chronological information on terrorism,115 the rich sources of material used to 
compile the varying data sets (newspapers, journals, news wires, Internet, terrorist 
group communiqués etc.) offered terrorism researchers one of the best sources of 
hard copy and computerised data publicly available in the Western world.  
Another academic centre, the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies produced an 
annual report surveying international terrorism. Established in 1979 under the 
‘Project on Low Intensity Warfare’ it contained statistical data on international 
terrorism. Known as INTER (International Terrorism) the publication was a well- 
balanced mixture of trend and regional analysis, various statistical data based on 
such variables as distribution of terrorism incidents, a chronology and group 
glossary. 116 The strength of INTER lay in its middle-eastern regional analysis of 
events from where the report is produced.  
One of the most widely used commercial data sets on terrorism was 
produced by Edward F. Mickolus, Terrorism, 1988-1991: A Chronology of Events and 
Selective Annotated Bibliography.117 This was a text-based chronology of 
oppositional terrorism and formed part of an on-going series of bibliographies and 
chronologies on terrorism events data that began in 1968.118 Useful background 
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detail on how the chronology had been developed, definitional criteria, sources of 
data, and a summary of aggregate totals of terrorist incidents were used in the first 
three chronologies. Although a genuine, but unfortunate and inappropriate attempt 
to use computer bytes to give some quantitative measurement of terrorist attacks in 
a table format was used in the introduction of the 1988-1991 chronology,119 
Mickolus did provide an extensive and detailed code-book of his terrorism data set 
that was useful for codifying variables. In addition, discussion of how the 
chronologies were applied in empirical research, for example in bargaining models 
with terrorist groups (Atkinson, Sandler, and Tschirhart)120 and time series analysis 
(Cauley and Im),121 gave the reader some examples of applications of the chronology 
to academic work. However, the fact that it was only published periodically, meant 
that its use as an annual up-to-date publication was inappropriate. Nevertheless as a 
cumulative volume of terrorist events data it served many terrorism research 
projects involving longer time periods. As a result of the historical time period 
between the events taking place and their publication in the chronology Mickolus 
included updated information relating to previous chronicled information and its 
value alone in terms of data integrity and accuracy issues in data set compilation 
should not be underestimated.  
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Differing in both style and content the Pinkerton Annual Risk Assessment was 
a commercially based data-set on terrorism published by Pinkerton Risk Assessment 
Services.122 Its target audience was principally the private sector; evidenced in the 
use of ‘risk level definitions’123 in their regional analysis of terrorism. With an 
abundance of aggregate tables, quantitative and narrative analysis the Pinkerton 
report was highly detailed in nature, although a slight emphasis statistically on 
American experiences of terrorism, for example damage to U.S. property, U.S 
ransom demands and U.S. robberies tended to gear the report to the North 
American Corporate sector. In a similar vein, other commercial data sets on 
terrorism were published including the Security Intelligence Report, the Profiles 
Threat Assessment Group, and Mizell & Co.’s Chronologies on Terrorism. The 
American Society for Industrial Security published data sets on terrorism for business 
and corporate clients requiring country profiles or tailor-made analysis of terrorism 
activity in specific countries or regions world-wide. 
Pluchinsky’s The Evolution of the U.S. Government’s Annual Report on 
Terrorism: A Personal Commentary offered a valuable historical insight into the 
development of the United States Government’s (USG) annual publication on 
terrorism.124  Pluchinsky, a former State Department terrorism analyst, detailed the 
evolution over nearly 30 years of the USG’s annual reports on terrorism, from their 
earliest inception in 1976 as a one-off CIA document Research Study: International 
                                                          
122
 Pinkerton Risk Assessment Services, Annual Risk Assessment 1994 (Arlington VA: Pinkerton Risk Assessment 
Services 1994). 
123
 The assignment of ‘security risk levels’ also includes other factors such as violent labour agitation, criminal 
activity and political unrest. The aim is to provide clients with a more rounded picture of events over and 
above specific terrorist incidents. 
124
  Dennis Pluchinsky, “The Evolution of the U.S. Government’s Annual Report on Terrorism: A Personal    
Commentary, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29: 91-98, 2006. 
49 
 
and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis. 125 This eventually became a 
major publication: Patterns of Global Terrorism.  In 1977, Pluchinsky outlined the 
context within which the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence initiated its first annual 
assessment of international terrorism. The paper entitled International Terrorism in 
1976 was produced “…to set the scope and nature of this activity into historical 
perspective…”. While assessing trends and developments in the field and their likely 
future impact upon the United States. The final objective was to “apply these 
judgements and observations to a brief assessment of what may lie ahead during the 
remainder of 1977”. Pluchinsky’s paper provided a candid and robust defence of the 
USG’s annual statistical publication on terrorism. The evolutionary processes of the 
publication, as Pluchinsky highlighted, were many: from the introduction, for the 
first time, of a definition of terrorism (1981) and a chronology of significant terrorist 
incidents (1983), as well as changes to the definition of terrorism and international 
terrorism (1984) and the report being mandated by Congress (1988). The one 
constant with the USG’s annual report on terrorism was change. From subtle 
definitional revisions of statistical methodology to the addition of appendices on 
terrorist group profiles (1988) and “foreign terrorist organisations” (1997) 
Pluchinsky’s annual report on terrorism was in constant evolution.   
Given the political sensitivities of statistics on terrorism, the reports were 
open to periodic criticism from both politicians and academics over many years. As 
Pluchinsky notes “If you create it, they will criticize it”.126  One of the earliest 
criticisms was during the Reagan administration when the New York Times article 
“Data on Terrorism Under U.S. Revision” claimed that incidents of terrorism were 
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“being revised to include ‘threats’ as well as actual acts of politically motivated 
violence”. The consequences of this, it was claimed, would double the count of 
terrorism incidents over a twelve-year period. The motivation for the revisions was 
that it would justify ‘…a more rigid foreign policy abroad’ and be used as an excuse 
by conservatives to increase surveillance of political dissidents within the United 
States.  
Despite critical analysis and periodic revisions to its format, as will be 
discussed later, the USG annual reports on terrorism continued to be published until 
2003. Its ‘downfall’, as Pluchinsky highlights, came in 2004 when, in an article 
published in the Washington Post entitled “Faulty Terror Report Card”, two 
academics from Princeton and Stanford Universities claimed there were underlying 
statistical and analytical methodology issues with the 2003 report. These public 
criticisms of the USG reports on terrorism came against a politically sensitive 
backdrop to events of September 11th 2001 and the need to have accurate data on 
terrorism incidents. After investigation, the USG acknowledged there were problems 
and issued revisions in June 2004. As a consequence the methods by which U.S. 
Governments statistics on terrorism were collated, calculated and presented, was 
completely overhauled.  The result was a new publication titled “Country Reports on 
Terrorism 2004” containing narrative comment and analysis, whilst the chronologies 
and statistical element of the reports were transferred to the newly created National 
Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) website. 
In addition to the useful historical outline of how U.S. Government statistics 
on terrorism have evolved, Pluchinsky’s paper offered deeper insight into what had 
always been a sensitive and controversial area of public reporting. His was paper a 
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unique insiders view of what became the major statistical reference source on 
terrorism for almost thirty years. He acknowledged the many up’s and downs of 
collecting data on terrorism, but given the challenges of providing credible statistical 
analysis that retains integrity amidst a complex political audience, Pluchinsky’s paper 
presents a fair and honest analysis. In particular, he acknowledged that one will 
never please everyone on the issue of defining an act of terrorism. Until the ‘perfect’ 
definition has been achieved, he argued, we should work within the constraints of 
what we have. Pluchinksy also illustrated ‘the ugly’ side to U.S.G. terrorism statistics 
when they are used within a partisan context to push political agendas, thus putting 
at risk the integrity of the data sets.  Despite such shortcomings, Pluchinsky argued 
that no other country in the world could have provided such extensive data sets on 
terrorism consistently over nearly thirty years. What further increases its credibility, 
he argued, was that the report was unclassified after 1986, as mandated by 
Congress. 
 
2.4. Early research - technical literature 
Technical literature on the design and maintenance of terrorism data sets is 
rarely published and often difficult to obtain. Issues of security relating to the nature 
of the data being held is among several complex reasons behind the lack of available 
technical literature, something that will be discussed further in chapter 3. One of the 
few organisations to publish early technical literature on terrorism sets was the 
RAND Corporation of Santa Monica. A series of periodic publications gave insight 
into a less than developed literature base. Research carried out by Dewar and 
Gillogly in 1984 - CODA: A Concept Organisation and Development Aid for the 
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Research Environment - gave a suggested scheme for the development of a 
computerised storage and retrieval system for use in policy research, and the RAND 
Corporation adopted the CODA software to operate their chronologies and 
databases on International Terrorism.127 Dewar and Gillogly’s work differed from 
Fowler’s work on database design in that they approached the problem as computer 
scientists rather than as terrorism analysts. To their credit the authors attempted to 
fuse the needs of the policy researcher - ‘Desiderata’ - with the functional 
capabilities and limitations of existing software and hardware availability at the time. 
Their work is of value for several reasons: it makes a serious and thoughtful attempt 
to understand the needs of the policy researcher in quantitative research and tries 
to ‘mould’ the CODA system to the user’s needs.128 This is complemented by 
discussion of the CODA commands and hardware requirements needed to 
implement such a system. The authors are realistic about the functional limitations 
of the CODA system; recognition that itself adds weight to their analysis in that 
lessons are learnt and further improvements can be suggested, including a ‘Wish 
List’ of capabilities. Moreover their work was further augmented by their work with 
Hammer and together they published the CODA’S User Manual, which aimed to 
provide users of the CODA system with operational advice and contains no research 
and analysis. As a software user manual it is thorough, technical in nature, and 
details the full functionality of the CODA system including data entry, recall, the use 
of operators, indices and menus for querying coded terrorist variables. The literature 
in this area was supplemented by a brief, but interesting, paper on the Management 
                                                          
127
 Development of CODA began in 1982 as an adjunct to the work on the Air Force Computer Study under 
project AIR FORCE. 
128
 Often researchers are given a system designed by computer professional and are expected to work with the 
given system with little thought as to the appropriateness of the given system’. 
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of the RAND Corporation’s Terrorism and Conflict Databases published in 1984 by 
Bonnie Cordes.129  Although less technical in nature than the work by Dewar and 
Gillogly, and Dewar, Gillogly, and Hammer, it is a useful guide to the organisation of 
the RAND terrorism chronologies and databases in the early 1980’s and details the 
variables coded in the data sets as well as a brief synopsis of each data set.130 
Updated formats of the RAND and RAND/St-Andrews data sets continued to be 
published on a periodic basis.131  
Also in terms of early technical literature, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security 
within The United States Department of State provided terrorism research staff 
within the Threat Analysis Division with TADMIS (Threat Analysis Division 
Information Management System). This was a user manual published by the 
Management Information Systems Division of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security at 
the State Department, and gave guidance to analysts entering data on incidents and 
threats of terrorism. The manual provided a comprehensive range of information on 
operating the database. Of particular value was the fact the manual had been 
written to deal specifically with the needs of terrorism analysts working directly in 
the field. From a design angle the TADMIS manual provided researchers with 
documentation from a ‘live’ example of a terrorism database system in operation, 
which was of benefit in understanding the strengths and weaknesses at an 
operational, functional and variable level. 
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 Op cit. 
130
 For further research work on relational database research at RAND see Hobbs paper [move this footnote] 
131
 See Description of the RAND Low-Intensity Conflict/Terrorism Databases, published by RAND and the 
RAND/St.Andrews Terrorism Research Database Categories. These are occasional descriptors issued giving an 
outline of the RAND and RAND/St.Andrews terrorism data sets. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the very earliest research in the terrorism database field. 
As this thesis will demonstrate 9/11 changed the landscape regarding the number 
and variety of databases available, as well as the scope of their use. As this chapter 
has demonstrated however, there is a significant history of the use of database 
technology, and it is fair to say that a number of the databases that have achieved 
particular prominence in the 9/11 world, have their foundation in this very early 
work. What is important to recognise is that even in this early work there were 
issues regarding the variety and sources of terrorism date such that to generalise can 
be difficult given that the published literature base has been created with differing 
remits in mind, something that remains the case in the post- 9/11 world. There 
remains a scarcity of specialised literature dealing specifically with the role of the 
modern computer as both a tool and an area of academic study within terrorism 
studies. More than this, there remains a significant need for a published literature - 
both in academic and policy terms - to assess current databases. There is also a 
paucity of literature relating to the potential benefits of information technology in 
the counter-terrorism field. It is to these questions that this thesis now turns. 
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CHAPTER III 
DESIGN AND DEVELOPENT ISSUES IN TERRORISM AND 
COUNTER-TERRORISM DATABASES 
 
3.1  Introduction 
In the post-9/11 world, an array of complex issues effect the design and on-going 
development of terrorism and counter-terrorism databases. The sourcing, collection 
and filtering of terrorism data, its codification into a database, and eventual 
operation, requires serious commitment and substantial financial resources, 
including specialist subject expertise, technical knowledge, and a sound 
understanding of the terrorism field. Moreover, the subject of terrorism, by its very 
nature, is a sensitive political issue.  As a result, definitional issues, the remit of the 
database, the integrity of the data, the choice of database system, security and its 
on-going operation all have an important influence on the design and development 
of terrorism databases. Further factors include the type of host organisation 
developing the database. These can include government agencies, university 
research centres, businesses and private organisations. By their very nature each 
organisation will have their own agenda: one that will impact upon the design and 
development of the database. Added to the many challenges of designing and 
developing terrorism and counter-terrorism databases is the stark reality that not all 
projects will succeed. From failure can come reflection and insight that might 
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otherwise not have proved possible. The pre-9/11 world allowed terrorism and 
counter-terrorism databases to operate in isolation. That era has come to an end. 
Major advances in internet technology, networking, and the creation of fusion 
centers, have presented opportunities unforeseen only a few years ago. The political 
demands that information be shared and used for the common good to both protect 
and inform now require that many terrorism database projects share, collaborate, 
and develop in partnership with other government agencies and institutions. Added 
to this is the fact that in the post 9/11 world legislation has impacted even more 
upon database design and development.  
With this in mind, this chapter will examine the following three key 
questions: what are the significant issues that effect the design and on-going 
development of terrorism and counter-terrorism databases?; what impact does the 
organisation hosting the database have upon its design and development?;  and, 
what lessons can be learnt from not only successful terrorism and counter-terrorism 
database projects, but also from projects that have failed?. In attempting to answer 
these questions, this chapter will examine a series of academic and government 
database projects established since 9/11. These will be used to illustrate the many 
challenges involved and will include, amongst others, the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD), the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) and MIPT’s Terrorism 
Knowledge Base (now disbanded). The chapter will also begin to assess the overall 
impact of policy and legislation on the design and on-going operation of terrorism 
and counter-terrorism databases post 9/11, something that will be examined in 
more detail in chapter 5. 
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3.2 Data Definition: Defining Terrorism 
The issue of defining what constitutes an act of terrorism has remained a constant 
point of debate for many years. Regardless of whether within the context of a 
narrative discourse on terrorism, or in the codification of terrorism data into a 
database system the desire for, and realisation of, perfection in defining an act of 
terrorism has eluded all interested parties. Pre and post-9/11 the problem remains 
the same. Narrative discourse on terrorism allows writers the chance to explain and 
expand upon their arguments using the richness of language the boundaries of 
which can be almost limitless. Such freedom cannot be enjoyed when designing 
terrorism and counter-terrorism databases. By their very nature they are ‘systems’ 
and have to operate within both conceptual and operational boundaries – and the 
kernel of any terrorism and counter-terrorism database  - indeed the fundamental 
foundation from which the database is designed and populated - is the definition of 
what an act of terrorism is. 
These issues are hardly new. Nearly thirty years ago, Fowler highlighted many 
valid definitional problems in designing terrorism databases that hold just as much 
resonance today: 
“Virtually every researcher we interviewed expressed concern about the 
difficulty of defining a set of consistent criteria for inclusion of incidents in 
terrorism databases. The problem is one of balancing the desire for 
comprehensiveness with the necessity for rigor and relevance of the data. 
Databases that apply clearly defined criteria were criticised for being overly 
restrictive – in some cases the restrictions are imposed by law … in others 
they are dictated by mission … or by the desire to achieve methodological 
rigor … On the other hand, some data bases include information that might 
be excluded under a strict interpretation of data-based definition … The data 
bases are clearly divided on this issue: those used for basic research strive 
for more rigorous definitions and operationalization of concepts, while those 
used mostly for intelligence estimates contain data that seem more directly 
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related to policy questions, whether or not this results in consistent data 
selection”. 132 
 
Fowler highlights the many tensions and demands made upon terrorism database 
designers. Whilst purists could craft and present a ‘near perfect’ definition of 
terrorism, the narrative may not translate easily into a credible, fully operational 
database system.  
Almost like a piece of elastic stretched in many directions, the demands on designers 
can be onerous. On the one hand requirements to have ‘…consistent criteria for 
inclusion of [terrorist+ incidents…’ have to be off-set with expectations of 
‘…comprehensiveness…rigor…and relevance…’. Add to this formula legal constraints, 
potential political influence, government policy and institutional mission 
requirements, and any designer is left with a very complex matrix of demands that, 
in the end, may not please or satisfy anyone. In addition, the type of organisation 
hosting the database places further definitional constraints upon designers as 
government agencies such as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the FBI, 
and the Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) have a remit that is set out 
in legal statute.133 Moreover organisations such as these have much wider 
responsibilities than solely hosting and operating terrorism and counter-terrorism 
databases. Often terrorism definitions are established prior to the creation of the 
database, raising the issue of whether to fit the definition to the database or vice 
versa?  
                                                          
132
 William Warner Fowler, Terrorism Data Bases: A Comparison of Missions, Methods, and Systems. (Santa 
Monica CA: RAND Corp.,  N-1503-RC. 1981.  www.rand.org/pubs/notes/2005/N1503.pdf  [Accessed 18/02/10] 
133
 There is no such legal requirement is imposed upon academic or private organisations. This is not to say, of 
course, that these organisations enjoy a free reign. Academic funding bodies, institutional policy and private and 
commercial financiers may well have an input into how terrorism databases are to be designed and developed, 
based upon definitional criteria.  
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Definitional variations have implications in database design not purely from a 
semantic point of view. Problems can occur too in the translation from a political 
interpretation to workable definitions in variable coded and text format. In other 
words the transformation of variables into a computer-coded format that is 
operationally viable requires considerable thought if accuracy and meaning are to be 
maintained. Fowler highlights this very problem at both a conceptual level and a 
practical database level: 134 
‘The definitional problem has two aspects: developing conceptual 
definitions that delineate the interests of the researcher and the general 
needs of the application…’ 
 
Further complications can arise, as Alex Schmid illustrates, in the actual elements 
used for working definitions of terrorism given that enormous variations can occur. 
Many databases, for example, include the elements ‘violence’, ‘political’, ‘fear’ 
‘terror’ and ‘purposive; planned, systematic’.  Yet other databases include rarely 
used elements such as ‘publicity aspect’ (RAND and TWEED), ‘criminal’ (PGIS and 
TRITON) and ‘demands made on third parties’ (TWEED). 135  As a further illustration 
of this, and using five major terrorism databases, even a cursory glance at Table 3.1 
illustrates the rich variation in language and terminology used in working definitions 
of terrorism. 
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  William Warner Fowler,  Terrorism Data Bases: A Comparison of Missions, Methods, and Systems. 
(Santa Monica CA: RAND Corp.,  N-1503-RC. 1981)  p.9. 
135
  Alex P. Schmid, Statistics on Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Tends in Global Terrorism. 
Forum on Crime and Society, Vol 4 No’s 1 and 2. December 2004. United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, Vienna.  Source: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Forum/V05-
81059_EBOOK.pdf  [Accessed 03/03/10] 
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Table 3.1 – Working Definition of Terrorism in Five Terrorism Databases 
Database Working Definition 
 
Worldwide Incidents Tracking 
System (WITS) 
 
 
‘Terrorism occurs when groups or individuals acting on political motivation 
deliberately or recklessly attack civilians/non-combatants or their property and the 
attack does not fall into another special category of political violence, such as crime, 
rioting, or tribal violence’ 
136
 
 
 
ITERATE -  International 
Terrorism: Attributes of 
Terrorist Events 
 
 
“The use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political 
purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to 
established governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the 
attitudes and behaviour of a target group wider than the immediate victims and 
when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the 
nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its 
ramifications transcend national boundaries.”
137
 
 
 
Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD) 
 
GTD 1  (1970-1997) 
“The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non state actor to 
attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or 
intimidation." 
138
 
 
GTD 2 (1998-2007)“Based on the original GTD1 definition, each incident included in 
the GTD2 had to be an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-
state actor. In addition, two of the following three criteria also had to be met for 
inclusion in GTD2: 
1. The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or 
social goal;  
2. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or 
convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other 
than the immediate victims; and  
3. The violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian 
Law.”  
139
 
 
U.S. Department of State 
“Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents”. 
140
 
 
Terrorism in Western Europe: 
Events Data (TWEED) 
 
 
‘...terrorism is understood theoretically as a form of violence that uses targets of 
violence in an indirect way in order to influence third parties, audiences’.
141
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  Source: http://wits.nctc.gov/   [Accessed 19/02/10] 
137
 Mickolus, op cit. 
138
  Source: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/  [Accessed 19/02/10] 
139
  “While the original GTD1 employed the definition of terrorism utilized by PGIS, the second phase 
of data collection for the GTD (GTD2: 1998-2007) coded each incident so as to allow users to identify 
only those cases that meet their own definition of terrorism.” Source: 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/  [Accessed 19/02/10] 
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  Source: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122599.pdf  [Accessed 19/02/10] Country 
Reports on Terrorism 2008. United States Department of State. April 2009. 
141
  Source: http://folk.uib.no/sspje/tweed.htm [Accessed 19/02/10] 
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The kernel of any terrorism and counter-terrorism database is designed and built 
upon two key elements: a definition of terrorism and the unit of analysis; nearly 
always the terrorist incident.  
 
 
3.3 – Methodology 
 
Credibility of data within terrorism and counter-terrorism databases is paramount. 
Dubious data not only damages quantitative and qualitative analysis, it can also 
present credibility issues for host organisations. Sophisticated web interfaces and 
advanced querying functionality should not be confused with absolute and total 
integrity of data. During the 1970’s and 1980’s with the development of many 
chronologies on terrorism, a culture of pseudo legitimacy emerged. In other words, 
by virtue that data was logged on computer, this meant that data was valid.  With 
much greater technological literacy, this mindset has all but disappeared.   
Defining the function of a terrorism or counterterrorism database for 
analysis, research and intelligence purposes is relatively straightforward. What 
databases are not to be used for, or where they may be imperfect, is rarely 
acknowledged among designers. One of the few agencies to openly ‘disclaim’ 
features of its database is the National Counterterrorism Center. The NCTC openly 
acknowledges its data sources may be of varying credibility, and that its WITS 
database is not perfect. This admission is both transparent and healthy. The NCTC 
clarifies that data within WITS is for statistical purposes only. By inference, one can 
assume that the WITS terrorism data should not be used for intelligence, counter-
terrorism or any other activity. Part of the NCTC disclaimer is outlined below.  
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‘Any assessments regarding the nature of the incidents or the factual circumstances thereof 
are offered only as part of the analytic work product of the National Counterterrorism 
Center and may not reflect the assessments of other departments and agencies of the 
United States Government. Nothing in this report should be construed as a determination 
that individuals associated with the underlying incidents are guilty of terrorism or any other 
criminal offense’ 
142 
 
Two key points can be gleaned from the above statement.  Firstly, despite the 
NCTC’s interpretation of particular incidents and any factual circumstances they have 
ascribed to the event, one cannot assume that all other U.S. Government agencies 
will interpret such events data in the same way. While the NCTC aims to collect the 
universality of terrorism events data, one cannot assume a collective understanding 
or ‘assessment’ of particular terrorism events by all U.S. agencies.  Secondly, the 
NCTC abrogates itself from being the judge and jury in potential litigation against 
individuals, leaving that task for the courts. This illustrates the fine balancing act 
agencies have to make when running open source, publicly accessible terrorism 
databases. Do they provide, within reason, as much detail as possible on a particular 
terrorist incident, or is vague but accurate data acceptable? 
In addition to defining what constitutes an act of terrorism, database compilers 
are often presented with a less than complete picture of events. Where traditionally 
hard copy documents such as ITERATE and Patterns of Global Terrorism committed 
facts to print, the great beauty of database systems is their ability to be updated 
when required. Terrorism incidents are often complex and messy events and change 
in nature over time. For example, the amount of injured may increase, bodies may 
be discovered at a later point and responsibility for a particular attack may be 
immediate, delayed or never established. The fine line between rigorous objectivity 
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02/03/11] 
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and subjectivity can be testing for analysts attempting to discern between what 
some might deem to be an act of terrorism and what others would classify as 
political violence.  Subjective judgments need to be kept to an absolute minimum 
when coding terrorist incidents. The NCTC acknowledges this essentially human 
dilemma:  
‘Users of this database *WITS+ should therefore recognize that reasonable 
people may differ on whether a particular attack actually constitutes terrorism 
or some other form of political violence.’ 143 
 
This element of ‘reasonable people’ presents the potential for a labyrinthine 
discourse on what one would consider ‘reasonable’. At some point a coding decision 
is required. To improve methodological rigour the NCTC uses a series of detailed 
counting rules. 144  Some of the key exclusions to the database are outlined in Table 
3.2. 
 
Table 3.2.  Events excluded from the WITS database 
Type of Terrorist Attack Entry into WITS 
Failed Excluded 
Foiled Excluded 
Hoaxes Excluded 
Genocidal Events Excluded 
  
Source: - http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/wits_subpage_criteria.html 
 
As with the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), NCTC and previously RAND/MIPT, 
complex codification issues are referred to a specialist panels for final validation.  
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  Ibid. 
64 
 
Many of the large established databases on terrorism and counter-terrorism have in-
house panels and external advisors to offer advice on design and methodology, such 
as the GTD’s Advisory Board 145. An innovative move by the NCTC after the inception 
of its WITS database was the establishment of the NCTC’s Brain Trust on Terrorism 
Metrics.  This highly unusual move by a U.S. Government intelligence agency to 
bridge the security and intelligence divide between ‘insiders’ and those on the 
outside has been ground-breaking. In addition to security vetted intelligence 
officials, the NCTC invited relevant individuals such as academics, security related 
specialists and other government agencies such as the State Department to 
contribute to the on-going methodological refinement and development of the WITS 
database. The easy route for the NCTC would have been to be keep matters internal. 
In seeking external advice and constructive criticism, a maturity of understanding 
was established. Reciprocity of ideas and experiences are to be encouraged.  
Furthermore, the NCTC recognised that not all wisdom resides within its walls. Many 
of the issues that academics have encountered in terrorism database design are just 
as applicable to classified and government databases. These include the generic 
issues of defining an act of terrorism, codifying variables, excluding certain acts and 
providing accurate and fair narrative on each terrorist incident. The mystique of 
classified terrorism data will always be attractive to some, by the nature of its limited 
accessibility. Denial of access to such information has not stopped the creation of 
many extensive and highly credible open-source databases on terrorism and 
counter-terrorism.  Academics are not functionaries of the law. In fact one could 
argue the inverse: they have the freedom to develop exactly the terrorism databases 
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they desire without the accountability of governments and legislation. This allows 
them to create open-source terrorism databases, offering a rich resource of data 
from which quantitative, qualitative and empirical data can further enhance 
terrorism studies. One would be naïve however to assume that all non-government 
databases on terrorism are given a completely free reign. The pride element that led 
in part to a territorial culture of insularity within intelligence agencies such as the 
FBI, CIA and State Department prior to 2001, was paid for at a very high price.  What 
NCTC has demonstrated is that even the highly sensitive issues of terrorism data and 
intelligence can be discussed in a safe forum for mutual benefit.  
Given the nature of the subject, perfection in terrorism data collection will be 
forever be elusive. A realist and pragmatic approach to data collection 
methodologies offers the best solution to this complex area or terrorism research. 
From the earliest development of terrorism chronologies and databases from the 
1960’s onwards, the definition of terrorism, coupled with the unit of analysis, 
determined the universe of data from which the database was populated. This 
fundamental double act remains the cornerstone of terrorism database design. 
However, once these foundations have been set in place they can have serious 
implications for the on-going development of the database. The longevity of 
terrorism and counter-terrorism database projects, many with temporal periods 
spanning decades, necessitates continuity in definitional criteria and the unit of 
analysis.  Flaws within the database methodology and refinements and changes in 
definitions of terrorism can have serious ramifications for quantitative and 
qualitative data.  For example, a change to the NCTC’s WITS methodology in 2005, 
on what was deemed to be an act of terrorism, has meant that retrospective 
66 
 
comparative analysis of terrorist incidents prior to 2004 is not possible.  Thus, data 
from the U.S. State Departments Patterns of Global Terrorism cannot be used with 
the WITS database without considerable qualification.  Many of the well established 
early databases on terrorism were originally based exclusively on acts of 
international terrorism. Given the blurring of the binary divide between domestic 
and international terrorism, database designers have had to re-evaluate their design 
criteria. This rigidity of definitional criteria has some important merit, in that 
continuity of data is maintained, however, continuity of data should not be confused 
with quality, as erroneous data could be consistently entered.  
This mixture of technical limitations and definitional criteria being 
determined by host organisations has meant, for many years, that researchers have 
played an entirely passive role in their interaction with terrorism and counter-
terrorism databases. Books such as ITERATE were referred to, the data was drawn 
from them and they were cited. In other words, the experience was referential not 
interactive. Even with the advent of computerised terrorism databases, the user was 
entirely dependent upon, until very recently, the definitional criteria as defined by 
the host organisation. A subtle, but important innovation in database web 
technologies has changed this situation, however. While definitional criteria remain 
static, users are now, in some cases, able to access multiple definitional criteria 
within a database, such that users can retrieve data with finer granularity. One of the 
few open source terrorism databases to offer this facility is the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD), START, at the University of Maryland. Table 3.2 below presents 
three optional definitional criteria by which the GTD can be queried. 
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Table 3.3.  Terrorism Definitional Criteria  - Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
Criterion I: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or 
social goal. Would you like your search results to require Criterion I to be met? 
Yes. Require Criterion I be met. 
Criterion II: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey 
some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. 
Would you like your search results to require Criterion II to be met? 
Yes. Require Criterion II be met. 
Criterion III: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, 
i.e. the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian 
law (particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-
combatants). Would you like your search results to require Criterion III be met? 
Yes. Require Criterion III be met. 
 
One could argue that the next logical step would be to offer researchers the 
possibility of multiple definitions of terrorism from which data could be queried. 
Edward Mickolus, for example, produced a typology of terrorism that identified four 
different types: interstate, international, state and domestic.146 These classifications 
were not mutually exclusive, however they did add another angle to design 
considerations of terrorism data sets and their consequent codification. Multiple 
definitions would, in theory, permit researchers to model their informational needs 
around their own understanding of what an act of terrorism was deemed to be. 
Almost like a piece of clay, one could shape the database to ones own agenda.  The 
great beauty of clay is its manipulative quality. Mapping this analogy onto the design 
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of a terrorism database, could mean in theory, that anything goes. Such a simple 
analogy is, however, fraught with dangers at both the design and theoretical levels, 
as designers could then simply generate the definitional criteria for what constitutes 
an act of terrorism that meets their needs, ignoring the overall integrity of the 
database, and altering the perception of the terrorist threat. Thus, for example, in 
1980 the CIA revised its figures on terrorism incidents to include ‘threats’ and 
‘hoaxes’, citing in as their reason the fact that established data sources were too 
narrow. The ramifications of this change were serious in that reported terrorist 
incidents rose by nearly fifty per cent in one year.147 
 Of course not all terrorism data sets are accompanied by working definitions. 
This is particularly the case for some terrorism data sets produced on the internet, 
such as the MILNET database of terrorism incidents,148 whilst other selected 
chronologies on terrorism such as ‘Save Our Sri Lanka from Terrorism’ do not provide 
working definitions either.149 This lack of definitional criteria in the interpretation by 
some organisations of an act of terrorism does not necessarily imply that there is a 
problem with the data set, e.g. that they are inaccurate in their reporting of terrorist 
incidents or that the quality of sources are dubious, but when a government does 
not make any provision for defining an act of terrorism this is something entirely 
different.  
As a final example of the significance of definitional issues, John Wigle’s 
introduction of the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System offers a rare ‘insiders’ 
perspective on the National Counterterrorism Center’s WITS database.  Wigle’s 
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paper outlines some of the key methodological challenges at both its inception and 
on-going development. Patterns of Global Terrorism, the predecessor to WITS, was 
terminated in 2003. Consequently a ‘zero-based review’ of terrorism data collection 
and analysis methods was undertaken by the USG.150 The end result was the 
establishment of the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) to be hosted by 
the National Counterterrorism Center. This review, as Wigle notes, not only included 
key methodological challenges in developing rigorous data sets, but was seen within 
a wider context of business processes, information technology and staffing 
requirements. Wigle’s paper illustrated a fundamental challenge facing analysts: 
inconsistencies in the NCTC’s definition of terrorism and the operation of inclusion 
filters for terrorist incidents. As a result of such concerns, these filters were dropped, 
such that from 2004 onwards, the WITS database tracked both international and 
domestic acts of terrorism.151 Moreover, Wigle highlighted the difficulty with having 
dual criteria (terrorist incidents had to be both international and significant) for 
inclusion in the Patterns of Global Terrorism database. Again these were 
subsequently dropped.152  
A particularly valuable section of Wigle’s paper is devoted to a discussion of 
computers, those who use them, and their relationship to decision-making theory. 
Wigle points to the human ability to categorize and recognize discrete objects, yet 
their weakness in determining effective aggregate judgements. The author notes: 
‘Humans often include bias and emotion in their aggregate judgement process, 
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which hampers their ability to make factual conclusions’.153 To minimise such 
potential issues a computer algorithm is used by WITS to maintain objectivity as far 
as possible. Wigle’s paper is a reminder that not only does terrorism data and 
collection methods require challenging methodological rigor, but also that the 
human element of bias and emotions are ever present.  This theme was originally 
presented in the hypothesis of this thesis. Soft qualitative data deals with the many 
situations that are not always easy to codify into a database system.  While codifiers 
can adhere to rigorous coding schemes, it is almost impossible at times to eradicate 
totally the presence at some stage of emotions, anger, frustration, tiredness and any 
other qualitative emotion than cannot be quantified in hard numbers. 
 
 
3.4. Sourcing Data 
Regardless of their remit all organisations or individuals have to adopt certain data 
collection methods to maintain and build a data set, this requires professional 
judgements and an adherence to some form of pre-defined criteria. Two principle 
factors affect the collection method: financial resources and availability of source 
material. Without appropriate resources to pay for skilled research staff and access 
to data collections this can be an expensive and time-consuming effort. Even with a 
respectable financial budget many agencies and organisations absorb large amounts 
of revenue and time on such data collection efforts. In spite of dedicated resources 
many terrorism and security analysts are required to undertake other professional 
duties in addition to the maintenance of terrorism data sets. Analysts at the State 
                                                          
153
 Ibid. 
71 
 
Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, as part of their responsibilities, enter 
on a daily basis terrorism data into TADIMS and the Overseas Security Electronic 
Bulletin Board (EEB) an on-line database dealing with security related incidents 
overseas. The culmination of overnight sources and daily news items from CNN, 
news wire services, National Public Radio as well as classified intelligence data can 
present a huge volume of data to be analysed and entered into the database. The 
nature of this data tends to be in a narrative format and often lengthy, twenty or 
thirty pages for example. In addition the format of newspaper reports varies 
considerably from that of radio or newswire information. This can add to problems 
of consistency when translating source material into data set format. A particular 
issue faced by government agencies is the practical decisions involved in separating 
classified data on terrorism from unclassified. Where data is used by external users 
such as the Electronic Bulletin Board compliance with security regulations is a 
paramount.154 The amount of terrorist data received and handled at any one time 
can be substantial. To avoid or keep to a minimum duplication of events data a 
method called ‘cross talk’ is employed. This allows analysts to communicate 
electronically with colleagues to avoid unnecessary duplication of work. This has two 
advantages: it performs at a basic level some form of data integrity and allows 
subject specialists to handle their own relevant data.155  Subject and regional 
specialists often maintain there own ‘private’156 chronology or database on a specific 
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terrorist topics; this data where appropriate is entered into the main database 
systems.  
A large amount of funding, however, does not guarantee the quality of the 
terrorism data set. The choice, availability of source material and methods of coding 
raw data all play an important role in the quality and validity of the data set. Sources 
of information for terrorism data sets can vary in quality and quantity depending 
upon the type of information required. Perhaps more importantly, as Jodice and 
Taylor note: ‘The quality of sources used *in data sets+ invariably has an effect on the 
quality of specific conclusions drawn from the analysis’.157 In their wide coverage of 
the practical problems encountered in the development of data sets, Jodice and 
Taylor outline some of the often more subtle problems with source reliability when 
compiling data sets. These include issues of prior restraint, and self-censorship in 
newspapers that can affect the quality of terrorism source data. Editorial prior 
restraint on the reporting of events and self-censorship of topics dictated from 
powerful management’s or government can inhibit the availability of potentially 
good source material. Other factors such as regional biases in coverage of North 
America for example, over sub-Saharan Africa, also affect the availability and quality 
of terrorism data. 158  
 
3.5.  Data Validity 
The issue of validity of terrorism events data adds further to source problems. It is 
important to differentiate between the validity of data from that of reliability and 
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consistency of data. The impression that these terms all have the same general 
meaning can be misleading. The work of Cordes, Jenkins et al, A Conceptual 
Framework for Analyzing Terrorist Groups is among few terrorism data sets to 
devote some attention to this issue. 159  The authors clearly explain the issue: 
‘Reliability in data collection may be defined as the consistent coding of a 
single item by more than one coder. Validity is the ability of an item to 
measure what it was intended to measure. Reliability is necessary, but not 
sufficient, for validity.’ 160 
 
Furthermore, the authors recognise that validity can take several forms including 
content, construct and predictive validity. To test out the predictive validity element 
the authors assessed terrorism data and created a scheme for attaching 
responsibility to for an act of terrorism to a certain group.161  The results of the tests 
showed that research staff can consistently code data wrongly but achieve reliable 
methods for doing so. The cumulative effect of this can create serious integrity 
problems for terrorism data sets. Perfection is desirable but impossible. As the 
authors note: 
‘Absolute reliability is impossible to achieve in collecting data on terrorism, 
because even the most precisely defined concepts in political conflict are 
subject to judgements when applied to empirically derived information. 
However, the level of reliability can be estimated and compared with that of 
similar data-collection efforts.’ 162 
 
The often cited RAND/CIA example, in which the RAND Corporation registered 40 
bombings by the same group on the same night, coding this as a single event, 
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compared to the CIA’s coding of 40 incidents for the same event, presents further 
dilemmas as to how to treat source data.163  Often an oversight, but a serious 
concern is the issues of updating data set files particularly where the number of 
causalities have risen or responsibility for terrorist actions are attributed to the 
wrong group or individuals. The ITERATE chronologies have recently inserted an 
update section for those very purposes.164  
One of the most basic functions of a modern database system is its ability to 
offer ‘validity checks’165 or integrity constraints166 upon the data set.  These validity 
checks are purely functional operations and do not strictly relate to Cordes and 
Jenkins definition of validity being the  ‘.. ability of an item to measure what it is 
intended to measure.’ 167  The Cordes and Jenkins definition relates to a researchers 
interpretation of terrorism events data and whether it meets a pre-defined criteria 
as to be valid for input into a data set.  Validity or integrity constraints are a series of 
pre-defined functional criteria that are invoked when certain declarative rules are 
broken.168 Database systems can offer a wide variety of validity or integrity 
constraints. For example minimum and maximum entry values can be placed upon 
numerical variables. Other constraints such as entry defaults on a field can insure 
that a particular entry such as target country, or terrorist group will appear in the 
data set unless coded otherwise. Validity checks requiring the exclusion of specific 
words such as ‘conflict’ or ‘guerrilla’ can be used to maintain definitional data 
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specifications. Even more powerful integrity constraints could set criteria that 
terrorism variables entered into one database matches exactly the same variable(s) 
in a related database. This gives data sets consistency in entry procedures. The 
repetitive task of bulk data entry whereby mistakes occur can in part be reduced by 
well-designed systems and appropriate training of coders. Despite the sophistication 
of many systems and the availability of in-built integrity constraints errors in coding 
does occur. For example, where an integer between 1 and 10 has been set, 
erroneous entry of figures even within the pre-defined criteria can occur without 
being detected. Absolute perfection is desirable but unrealistic when dealing with 
the entry of terrorism data. Minimisation of potential errors through correct coding 
procedures can help to reduce integrity problems. 
The validation of terrorism event sources through primary source corroboration 
is one method of ensuring the validity of actual events. Financial and time restraints 
can often hinder this method of ensuring the quality of source data. An over reliance 
on using the same source data as a result of familiarity with presentation and out of 
habit may present some problems. Continual use of the same sources of data 
without double-checking data from other potential sources may hide potential 
inconsistencies or inaccuracies of reporting.  Although not perfect, easy accessibility 
on the Internet to almost all major and regional newspapers and news services as 
well as specialist Web pages such as The Terrorism Research Center can help to 
provide at least some form of corroboration.169 One such data set to include a 
double checking system is the chronology Terrorism in Canada 1960-1989 170 by 
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Kellett et al.  The author’s set out what they deemed to be three essential criteria 
before any data could be entered into their terrorism chronology. These were: 
‘..corroboration by at least one primary source’, ‘..sufficient .. information to 
classify the event’ and ‘conformity to the components of terrorism..’. 171 
 
The authors used as a minimum, one primary source from a selection of local 
newspapers in Canada, or other officially recognised primary sources such as 
Canadian Criminal Cases, Dominion Law Reports or international newspaper and  
wire services. 172  What makes this case slightly different from other chronologies on 
terrorism is the authors decision to create an ‘Excluded Events Chronology’, this was 
compiled from terrorism events data that could not be validated or did not have a 
primary source. Almost as a bonus in this strict procedure, was the discovery of 
other terrorist incidents that would otherwise have been missed. Not every primary 
source can provide researchers with all the required details to code in detail a 
terrorist incident. The most common details, type of attack, target, location, date 
and number of casualties are relatively easy to obtain in comparison to other 
important facts. Motivation for an act of terrorism, group or individual responsibility, 
intended and actual target of terrorism form a much more difficult set of variables to 
obtain and may require further time and secondary sources to complete data set 
entries. Non-governmental terrorism data sets do not have the privilege of classified 
source material that may or may not enhance the qualitative value of the data set. 
The fact a piece of data may be classified does not necessarily diminish the value of 
non-governmental data sets. The intrinsic value of classified information may only be 
relevant to the government agency at hand adding little value to other data sets. The 
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nature of intelligence data is based upon a mixture of known facts and unconfirmed 
evidence. For the majority of terrorism data sets criteria and variables are 
established on the basis of known facts. The data set is not built upon suspected 
evidence or gut instinct about facts. Sources of information for non-governmental 
terrorism data sets tend to come from a wide variety of publicly available sources. 
Several forms of terrorism source data can be identified. Traditional and fairly 
credible sources such as the New York Times or Foreign Broadcasting Information 
Service (FBIS) are complemented by electronic news wire services such as Reuters 
and Associated Press (AP). In addition a vast selection of Internet news services 
including CNN, the BBC, a the major daily and many smaller newspapers world-wide 
are published on the Internet.173 Other established specialised sources including The 
Middle East Journal, The East Asian Recorder the Africa Diary can redress the 
geographic Western biases that can occur in the literature from time to time. 
Ironically with such choice comes a saturation of information making good selection 
criteria paramount. Even the impressive capabilities of modern computer systems 
cannot transform questionable source data into quality information.  
The ITERATE terrorism data sets have used such sources as the Washington 
Post, ABC, NBC, the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS), FBIS Daily 
Reports, the New York Times and Reuters. 174 Assuming the source is of a credible 
nature there are some advantages in using publicly available sources. Where 
possible cross-checking of sources can help to validate terrorism events data. A 
complete picture of events may not be possible from one particular source coverage, 
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thus necessitating a wider coverage of sources. Publicly available sources can be 
susceptible to inaccuracies. Even allowing for this they do provide a forum for 
comparative analysis of events data. In addition the investigative nature of the 
journalist may well uncover data that might well have remained unreported.  
Without a strategy, the sheer volume of terrorism information available on a 
publicly accessible basis can potentially overwhelm research staff. Early 
development of the RAND and RAND-St.Andrews terrorism data sets was based 
upon the manual collection of source material. This involved the selective cutting 
and copying of articles from newspapers, academic journals, and news services to be 
retained in a hard copy format or entered into the CODA system.175 This is both a 
time consuming and expensive effort. The potential for backlog in such a process is 
high unless research staff are able to process all sources of information on a timely 
basis. To alleviate this problem in part, the RAND-St Andrews research staff use the 
on-line database services of Lexis-Nexis.176  This subscription based service, although 
a relatively expensive product, offered several advantages to the Centre for the 
Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV). Lexis-Nexis contains in excess of 
10,000 news publications held in computer format. This offers a far more 
comprehensive coverage of potential terrorism source material than would be 
obtainable in a hard-copy format. The cost of purchasing such a broad range of 
articles would be prohibitive.  Its ‘clipper’ facility is able to return to research staff 
relevant terrorism articles from previous days events. The RAND-St.Andrews data 
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sets received on average 300 articles every morning. The information offered to 
research staff is on the basis of key word identifiers stipulated by research staff. A 
further selection criteria is applied to the source material. Relevant data was then 
saved in a local P.C. for eventual coding and entry to the appropriate terrorism 
chronologies or databases. 177 Real time searches for source data on the Internet and 
other networked services allowed CSTPV staff to maintain an up-to-date and 
responsive service for researchers. 
The apparent wealth of source material on terrorism does not always, of course, 
satisfy researchers needs. Particularly where data is sought for project-specific 
terrorism data sets.  Jeffrey Ross notes his concern over the lack of statistical 
information on violence in Canada.178 The lack of statistical data that, if available, is 
both inaccurate and out of date is reflective of wider problems in source data. The 
temptation to abandon such projects can be tempting. Ross suggests however that 
another approach may be to derive where possible information from non-
governmental organisations, independent researchers, police departments and 
other existing chronologies and newspaper coverage. This process can be a lengthy 
and at time frustrating process. As Ross notes his experience of collecting source 
data on right wing organisations was not always a pleasant experience: 
‘These supplementary sources, however were not free from drawbacks. First 
researchers (e.g., academic, journalists, and private) who have conducted 
research or collected material on one or many right-wing organizations were 
a mixed lot. They were generally extremely difficult to track down, unco-
operative, had confusing political agendas, and mistrustful’. 179 
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By its very nature the subject of terrorism and political violence research is an 
emotive issue. Suspicion as to the researchers motive for collection of terrorism 
source material can at times result in an uncomfortable experience. Accreditation to 
an institution and a professional approach by individuals or organisations can help to 
minimise the more negative aspects of core research.  
One of the most widely used sources for terrorism data sets is newspapers. 
They offer the advantage of regularity of information on a daily basis and depending 
on editorial judgement provides balanced reporting of events. Neither of these 
benefits however can guarantee absolute accuracy in statistical data. Coverage of 
acts of terrorism can be an attractive news story for editors. Their willingness to 
cover what many would be deem to be an act of atrocity is justified on the grounds 
of public responsibility to report important news events, and at its most basic level 
to sell newspapers. Newspapers have not always been a major source for terrorism 
data. Crelinstein notes that not until 1970 were any articles in the The New York 
Times indexed under the heading of terrorism.180 And as such this only amounted to 
four articles. A substantial growth to sixty-seven articles by 1972 was indicative of 
the increasing interest in the subject area. The Times of London also saw substantial 
increase in articles from 128 in 1972 to 443 by 1977; this in part parallels terrorism 
activity in Northern Ireland at the time.  
The assumption that all terrorism source data can be derived from an English 
language newspapers overlooks other potential sources. The French Polemological 
Institute which collected data on political violence used sources such as Le Monde 
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and Neue Zurcher Zeitung among its principle sources.181  For any researcher 
language can be a barrier and events can be missed. The attraction of local 
newspapers is their potential for covering events that may have been ignored by 
larger national international English speaking newspapers. Language problems are 
not only restricted to hard copy newspapers. Until very recently key-word searches 
for terrorism source data on the Internet very much limited to English language 
pages. This is in part due to the historical development of the Internet in English 
speaking North America. During 1997 the Internet search engine Alta VistaTM 
introduced facilities to permits key word searches in over twenty languages. For 
researchers the problems remains constant: the language barrier. Overcoming this 
hurdle opens up researchers to an as yet limited, but increasingly developing 
research base. Many of the established foreign newspapers such as The Washington 
Post, The Australian, The Times of India, and The Cape Times are available on the 
Internet and offer potential primary source and selective translations of events.  The 
Jordanian Intelligence Service182 opened an English language version of their own 
Jordanian site, with a dedicated terrorism page, and other sites such as the Japanese 
Intelligence Agency website only offer information in their native language. One of 
the most highly regarded sources for terrorism data is the Foreign Broadcasting 
Information Service (FBIS) reports on terrorism. Information is derived from 
television and radio broadcasts, periodicals, news agencies and books. In addition to 
the daily service, periodic reports on terrorism are published. One factor FBIS is 
noted for is its over-reporting of events data in Africa. Prokop cites several reasons 
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for this slight over emphasis of events.183  The repressive nature of some African 
regimes that run the state owned media organisations may tend to suppressive true 
figures. Furthermore, as FBIS provides intelligence information to U.S. government 
agencies on foreign government policies, and actions, the requirement to over-
concentrate on a generally underreported region in the daily American broad-sheets 
in part redresses an imbalance in reporting. 
Source terrorism data for American federal agencies such as the FBI can 
come from an even wider pool of resources than that of publicly available sources. 
The very remit of the organisation is in the creation and handling of intelligence 
data. Established networks of legal attaches based in American embassies permit the 
generation of terrorism source data.184 Reciprocal arrangements with foreign 
counterparts and involvement in the Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, Violence 
International (TREVI) group also provide a forum for co-operation in data exchange. 
In addition the F.B.I  also works closely with agencies such as the United States 
Secret Service, Immigration and Naturalisation Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF). Some criticism of the F.B.I’s data collection methods 
have been voiced however. Jeffrey Handler’s concern over the methods by which 
agents attempted to collect source arose when he asked for specific data from the 
FBI. He found some of their data collection methods lacked ‘..any systematic effort 
to create uniformity in the type of background data..’ that was sought.185  The lack of 
a pre-determined pro-format when questioning suspects resulted in many variations 
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of style in terrorism source data. The type of questions asked by agents was very 
much left to individual personalities styles and manner at any one particular time.  
For intelligence agencies the collection of source data on terrorism is based 
on a different agenda to the more focused requirements of academics coding 
terrorist data sets. Longer-term projects with sporadic availability of data and the 
need for timely information can place considerable pressure on desk officers. The 
need to evaluate source data in ‘real-time’ requires considerable professional 
judgement that can differ quite markedly from source collection methods out-with 
the intelligence field.186  
Sources of terrorism data are not exclusively restricted to events data methods. 
Alternative approaches can be employed; this is very much dependent upon the type 
of data sought and the end requirements for the data. In his study on political 
terrorism in Canada, Ross identifies four main methods for collecting and empirically 
analysing terrorism data. These are direct observation, content analysis of terrorist’s 
self reports, survey research and aggregate data analysis.187 As Ross notes there are 
problems associated with all these techniques. The direct observation method of 
terrorists and their activities can present problems with personal security, ethical 
issues, trust, and comprehensiveness of data. The content analysis method 188 may 
encounter problems in obtaining legitimate written material by actual terrorist’s 
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relevant to the research at hand. Survey research approaches to collecting terrorism 
data can appear an attractive option. As Ross notes: 
A well-designed survey can provide five types of information about 
respondents: facts, perceptions, opinions, attitudes and behavioural 
reports....[however] The survey method is not without its problems, 
especially with access and reliability. It is very expensive and can produce 
highly biased data because of the features of the interview process itself. 
Difficulties stemming from the mutual suspicion of terrorists and 
governments are inevitable.’  189 
 
Despite its many potential flaws the events data approach for terrorism data sets 
sources remains the most popular method.   
Terrorism data comes from an eclectic mixture of sources. No one depository 
meets the requirement needs of all terrorism researchers or analysts. With differing 
agenda’s such as government/intelligence, academic and commercial operations, 
generalisations on source data can be difficult. The format can be complex: a mixture 
of formal and informal publications, classified and publicly available, electronic and 
hard-copy format. This array of sources forms only the first step in the design 
process of computerised terrorism data sets.  Collected data requires coding. This 
transformation requires careful consideration if original source data is to be truly 
represented in the computerised data set. The codification of terrorism data into 
either a text based system or a database requires some established procedures if 
accuracy, validity and consistency of data is to be maintained. Jodice and Taylor offer 
advice on maximising inter-coder-agreement in data set compilation. These include 
good managerial supervision, thorough and substantive training, periodic testing of 
data and a recognition that where data does not meet specified criteria it is disposed 
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of. 190 These factors although appearing to state the  obvious  are worthy of  some 
consideration. Poor managerial supervision of large data set projects can seriously 
undermine the quality of work undertaken. 
The profile of coders in academically run terrorism data sets tends to be 
graduate research students who are familiar with the source material and are 
pursuing research themselves in related disciplines. The background of other coders 
can vary depending upon the organisation operating the terrorism data set. Input 
into U.S. federal terrorism databases such as the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist 
Organisations File (VGTOF) is carried out by police and other personnel. Often the 
coder of data is the analysts as well. This is particularly the case in smaller 
commercial operations. 
The translation from original source to computerised data set format while 
still maintaining the data’s validity can be a challenging task.  The format of the 
original source material can come in varying styles. For example, short newspaper 
clippings, press communiqués and longer narrative reports, these all have to be read 
and interpreted for relevant data.  
The advantages of a truly modern database system are its capability to offer 
researchers a whole range of functional capabilities that text based system cannot. 
These include arithmetical operators such as aggregate totals of terrorist incidents, 
numbers of casualties or provide powerful querying facilities including ‘LIKE’ ‘NOT’ 
and ‘OR’ operators as well as providing links between relevant data sets.  The 
generation of forms and reports based upon chosen terrorism data is another 
extremely useful function of the database system.  
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3.6. The Codebook 
The powerful potential of modern computerised systems should not overshadow 
some of the fundamental design considerations of terrorism data sets. Codification 
of terrorist variables requires some form of agreement for data entry. To maintain 
the integrity of the data set a codebook or coding rules should be established. 
Although difficult to obtain at times, there are several conflict/political 
violence/terrorism data sets that have published rules and procedures for coding 
data. 
Several terrorism data sets have produced varying forms of codebooks. 
Edward Mickolus’s ITERATE data sets provides a codebook detailing a summary of all 
the variables used in the data set.191 This is an extensive codebook clarifying where 
appropriate reasoning behind coding procedures. For example in the data set each 
terrorist incident is given a unique event-type code. The codebook clarifies problems 
where an event may have the characteristics of more than one event such as an 
airline hijacking that turns into a ‘barricade-and-hostage seizure’.192 Explanation of 
the numbering of transnational terrorism events assigning an eight-digit code 
number is also given. Kellet’s Terrorism in Canada 1960-1989193 also contains a 
detailed methodology and coding procedures for the data set. Variables such as 
‘level of event’ pertaining to international or domestic terrorist incidents in addition 
to the standard date/time, location, targets and casualty variables are included.  
Apart from detailing factual information on variables used in a data set the codebook 
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provides other useful information. It gives researchers the opportunity to explain 
methodological issues that effect the coding of terrorism information. With many 
data sets containing hundreds of variables this necessary. Certain codebooks provide 
additional information on the file structure of the data set. This gives an indication of 
the design of the data set and its operability. The sheer volume of terrorism data 
entered into either a chronology or database system could potentially cause serious 
operational problems in the long run. From a software and hardware angle the 
retention of large amounts of coded variables and narrative text in single file format 
could cause a system to crash 194 or effect the functioning of the data set file. The 
ITERATE data sets are coded into four files as part of its file management.195 
Codebooks contain relevant information not just for the researcher compiling the 
data set but also provide a background and context to users in the creation of the 
data set. While codebooks provide variable information and methodological criteria 
they give the user little information on the development and history of the data set. 
Although terrorism data sets may differ in content William Fowler has identified the 
four most common types of variables that are entered into terrorism data sets. The 
date of the incident as Fowler notes is usually mandatory. Precision on exact dates 
can be difficult at times as incidents occur over time. The other key variables - 
location, target and type of act or incident - generally from the core information 
base for the data set. 196 
3.7. Error Rates 
                                                          
194
  Problems related to limited hard disk space, Random Access Memory (RAM) problems and an inefficient use 
of file management are among potential problems that could be encountered. This is particularly the case for 
relational database management system whereby a series of files are linked together, offering efficient use of 
the systems facilities and powerful functioning  capabilities.  
195
  The main file for the ITERATE data set is the COMMON file containing most terrorism incidents. The FATE, 
HOSTAGE and SKYJACK files are supplementary files. 
196
  Fowler (note 16) p.17. 
88 
 
Few terrorism data sets contain detailed discussion on error rates when coding data. 
The work of Cordes, Jenkin’s et al, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Terrorist 
Groups, discuses in some detail their attempts to measure error rates in the data 
set.197 The authors ask if there is an acceptable error rate? Ideally, the answer is no. 
Their realist approach recognises that errors can and do occur.  For their analysis of 
terrorist groups an acceptability rate of 80 per cent was selected for ‘lead’ questions 
used in compiling the data set. Randomly selecting eight terrorist groups the 
researchers carried out ‘blind recoding’ of the original questionnaires on the terrorist 
groups by coders who had not dealt with the original coding. The authors identified 
two main areas of concern. These were ‘individual errors’ and ‘comparative errors’. 
The ‘individual errors’ were perhaps unsurprisingly such factors as inappropriate 
entries or wrongly coded dates. The ‘comparative error’ took on a more 
sophisticated pattern and content.  Vagueness in responses to questions about dates 
appeared to be a recurring pattern, in addition differences in terrorist group 
numbers was also identified. To complicate matters further problems of subjectivity 
in coding continuous values such as ‘never,’ ‘almost never,’ ‘occasionally,’ ‘almost 
always,’ and ‘always’ arose. As Cordes and Jenkins note: ‘These items typically have 
lower reliability than items requiring discrete or specific responses’.198 A recurring 
problem for this study was in the area of source data. The most common problem 
was identifying the dates of information detailed in original terrorism source data.199 
 
3.8. Other Data Collection Methods 
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Publicly available documentation by police and intelligence agencies on data 
collection and dissemination methods is extremely rare. The sensitive political 
nature of terrorism data and the consequences of information arriving in the ‘wrong’ 
hands limit the availability of such information. The Federal Bureau of Intelligence 
has published some information in this area under its National Incident-Based 
Reporting System (NIBRS). 200  Established procedures for reporting criminal events 
have been in place for over 60 years under the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting 
Program (UCR). The advent of new technologies and the ever increasing information 
requirements of the U.S. law enforcement agencies has seen a thorough re-
evaluation of data collection and dissemination methods during the past decade. The 
NIBRS system is an incident-based reporting system. This differs from the traditional 
summary based UCR program.  
Its scope is wide. As the FBI note: 
‘NIBRS has, in fact, the capability of furnishing information on nearly every 
criminal justice issue facing law enforcement today, including terrorism, 
white collar crime, weapons offences...’  Furthermore ‘The data *is+ available 
from and for all levels of law enforcement - federal, state, and local - 
aggregated at the level and in the manner which best meets the needs of 
the data user.’ 201 
 
Development of the NIBRS was carried out over several years and involved the 
definitio of new data elements (incident details) and an initial pilot project in South 
Carolina. 202  The aim of the NIBRS was to permit individual law enforcement 
agencies to develop computerised systems that suited their own specific 
requirements at a collection and storage level while delivering data to the NIBRS. 
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The actual file structure of the data sets developed at a local or state level i.e. 
relational, network or hierarchical databases do not have to be modelled upon the 
NBRIS system. This gives a certain degree of flexibility among agencies to choose 
additional data elements and data values which have already been developed for 
sophisticated reporting systems.  The NIBRS system is able to detect any common 
data links among the record systems of all the agencies subscribed to the NIBRS. This 
type of cross-checking of variables among different agencies is a powerful facility 
that allows the detection of data on individuals or groups that would have otherwise 
been missed. The difference between this system and the FBI’s Violent Gang and 
Terrorist Group File is that the VGTOF data is contained within one database and 
data is entered directly into the database from various local, state and federal 
agencies. The criteria for entry of data into the NIBRS are strict and must meet the 
UCR’s ‘Data Collection Guidelines’ and ‘Data Submission Specifications’.203 Individual 
agencies are required to submit test data and operate the required hardware and 
software facilities to cope with the NIBRS. Offence categories are classified under 
two main groups. Group A deals with serious and extremely serious offences 
including Violence, Drugs and Narcotic Offences, Homicide, Pornography and Sexual 
Offences. Extensive data is collected on all these areas. The Group B categories 
record only arrest data and includes other lesser offences of drunkenness, liquor law 
violations and disorderly conduct. Coding of data is based upon a number code 
identifier. For example ‘Drive by-shootings (non-juvenile)’ is assigned a code ‘09’.204 
An attractive element of NIBRS is its ability to check certain data entry fields where 
the data value has not been fully completed with the required information. The 
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assignment of an entry ‘XX’ for example would indicate that a drugs quantity data 
element has not been coded. The ‘XX’ coding is an interim entry pending laboratory 
confirmation. The FBI conducts periodic checks upon these type of fields to ensure 
that exact details have been entered.  This type of facility is particularly useful in 
terrorist activities when a bombing has occurred, casualties have been reported and 
may be rising and no confirmation of group or individual responsibility has yet been 
determined.  
The coding of data on terrorist activities by government agencies often 
contains a wider set of coded variables. The data requirements of law enforcement 
agencies can differ from academic or commercially based terrorism data sets. The 
principle differences are their agendas are based upon differing needs. The type and 
level of coded variables required by government agencies tend to be more 
intelligence based in their format. The inclusion for example of coded fields or 
narrative text detailing personal profiles and histories of individuals used in the 
Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) 205 or the State Department’s Consular 
Lookout Support System (CLASS)206 differs markedly from chronological data sets 
such as ITERATE. Legal issues over retention of computerised data on profiles of 
individuals by academic centre’s or commercial organisations such as Pinkerton’s or 
Kroll Associates may leave them open to potential litigation. 207  
 
3.9. User Manuals 
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Dedicated manuals written specifically to operate terrorism data sets are extremely 
rare.208  This is for two main reasons. Firstly, security agencies such as the CIA or FBI 
hold terrorist data that is classified in nature and as result they are not willing to 
make available information that could compromise security. Secondly reluctance to 
divulge functional capabilities of computerised systems and more importantly the 
type of terrorist information held results in these type of documents being classified. 
An increasingly computer literate population is much more conformable with the use 
of technology than ever before, a point the FBI has noted. 209  Manuals obtained by 
non- legitimate users could open up a system to potential violation. Almost as 
important, while manuals can indicate the functionality of a database system they 
also point the shortcomings of a system that security agencies are reluctant to 
admit. 
For commercial organisations producing terrorism data sets such as 
Pinkertons, Kroll Associates or Mizell & Co. there is a general reluctance to divulge 
too much information about computer systems. Security is an understandable 
concern, however the generation and sale of reliable information to clients is the 
bread and butter of some of these organisations. Competition can be fierce and 
divulgence of computerised operations could cause potential security risks. A small 
but important point to note is that terrorism data set manuals are not necessarily 
the same as the aforementioned date set ‘codebook’. Code-books generally relate 
specifically to the criteria set and variables coded within the data set, whilst manuals 
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are usually written to help researchers and analysts operate the given software to its 
maximum functionality.  
The RAND Corporation is one of few organisations to have published 
documentation on the system and software used to hold its terrorism chronologies 
and databases in Santa Monica until their transfer to the University of St. Andrew’s 
Centre for Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) in 1994. A slightly modified 
version of the same system operates at St. Andrews.  Dewar and Gillogly the authors 
of CODA: A Concept Organization and Development Aid For The Research 
Environment 210 outline their thinking behind the development of CODA the software 
used to operate the RAND terrorism data sets. The main philosophy behind their 
project in 1982 was driven by the thought of how computers could help as a tool in 
policy research, in particular their use in the storage of large amounts of text based 
data combined with the specific needs of policy researchers. Dewar and Gillogly 
were sensitive to the fact that policy research is not a straightforward process. As 
they note: 
‘The key seemed to be that the research process of an individual was 
essentially an iterative process characterized by both a growing data base 
and a series of failed attempts at organising the data into a coherent whole 
(followed ultimately by successful attempt, of course).  This led us to an 
hypothesis about the utility of computers “optimized” for the policy research 
process and from there to a list of desired characteristics for the associated 
computer aid.’ 211 
 
 
The resultant ‘Desiderata’ was a series of functional operations that were explicitly 
related to the experiences of the policy researcher. The use of quick Boolean tag212 
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searches such as AND, OR, and NOT could help minimise distracting time delay in the 
researchers thought processes. Other such functions as powerful tag changing 
capabilities could allow part or complete text documents to be changed by tags or 
the recall of information by data capability were suggested. As much of terrorism 
data is based upon date entry this facility was particularly useful. A point worth 
noting: CODA is not a fully based database management system with large numerical 
processing capabilities.213 The software was written with policy researchers in mind, 
with the emphasis being upon text-based information. The vast majority of the 
RAND and RAND-St.Andrews data sets is in a narrative format. Numbers are used in 
the data sets for three main purposes: as unique incident identifiers,214 date 
identifiers for incidents and the recording of individual, and aggregate details of 
injuries and fatalities.  CODA was written in 1982 under a UNIX based operating 
system in the software language C to run on a VAX 11/780. The relevance of this 
technical detail lies not so much in exact software and hardware specifications but in 
the context and time period in which CODA was developed and its subsequent use. 
The early 1980’s saw the advent of what is commonly known as the personal 
computer or P.C.  With limited application packages, processing capabilities, and the 
operating system MS-DOS  still in its infancy,215 the P.C. was unable to offer the 
powerful database facilities of modern systems. The vast majority of work was 
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carried out by large mainframe computers similar to RAND’s UNIX system. The 
system that the RAND and RAND-St.Andrews terrorism data sets are held was 
specifically tailored to policy researchers needs.  The RAND corporation did not 
intend to sell the software system for commercial purposes which meant that the 
software could be tailored to users needs more accurately.216 The value of Dewar 
and Gillogly’s work is twofold. Firstly it offers a rare insight into the thoughts behind 
the development of the CODA system. This is not purely from a programming point 
of view but from the more subtle user requirements of the policy analyst and 
terrorism researcher. Some of the most basic research techniques used by analysts 
were considered by the developers of CODA - the need to retain large amounts of 
narrative text and manipulate it to suite users needs. All too often data is forced to 
comply with existing database systems and as a result it is not a true reflection of the 
original data and does not meet the functional requirements of analysts.  Secondly, 
Dewar and Gillogly offer an honest evaluation of some of CODA’s shortcomings; this 
is refreshing and rare.  One of its main limitations is the amount of users that can 
operate the data sets at any one time 
Unlike large terrorism data sets such as the State Department’s TIPOFF 
database on counter-terrorism217 or the U.S. Federal Administrations Airline Incident 
Reporting System (AAIRS)218 CODA was not designed for a large user audience. As 
the RAND and RAND-St.Andrews terrorism data sets are used for internal policy and 
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research purposes external access to the data sets has not been made available.219  
Concern over the time in which CODA took to load are noted by the authors. Even in 
the late 1990’s this is still a valid concern among relatively modern systems. The 
length of time it takes for CODA to carry out truncated searches was another 
concern. They cite the example of a truncated search on the word ‘bomb’. This 
would return records containing the entries bomb, bomber, bombing, 
bombardment,  bombast,  bombazine.220 The method by which CODA searched the 
data set took quite a considerable amount of time. Despite these and other concerns 
a genuine attempt was made to meet the needs of policy researchers. Dewar and 
Gillogly’s ‘wish list’ of other feature are just applicable today for terrorism 
researchers using modern computerised database systems. These included 
bibliographic facilities, thesaurus and optical data entry tools.221  This paper and the 
accompanying CODA User’s Manual 222  although a little dated, offers theoretical 
context and sound practical guidance on the operation of the RAND/RAND-
St.Andrews terrorism data sets. 
One of the most common type of searches undertaken in database systems is 
the use of the Wild Card search. This is a powerful search facility that allow analysts 
to search any records in TADIMS for words that begin with ‘Bomb?’   or  ‘Kid?’  The 
use of the unspecified suffix in lieu of full words offers a potentially wider set of 
records containing for example the entries Bomb, Bombers, Bombing Bombed.223  
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One of the most important benefits of a true database management system is its 
ability to offer analysts the facility to explain in a narrative format the circumstances 
or context in which an act of terrorism occurred. The codification of detailed 
variables can only explain in part sometimes the background or consequent events 
following an incident. The TADIMS system permits analysts to enter narrative details 
on an incident to give a more rounded picture of an event. Complex issues such as 
ideology or political violence are notoriously difficult to define let alone code within 
a database. The narrative report within TADIMS allows analysts to explain in greater 
detail issues that are have not been programmed to be coded or require further 
detailed description or explanation.224 As with any well=designed terrorism database 
TADIMS provides a series of ‘Validation Tables’ to ensure consistency of data entry 
on certain key fields. The fields requiring validation are Target Type, Incident Type, 
Nationality and Country/Region fields. Without some form of established standard 
on these type of fields the integrity of the database could be undermined. These are 
core variables in any terrorist data set and some form of pre-defined criteria should 
be established by the organisation operating the data set.  
It would be naive to assume that all database are designed and populated 
with complete objectivity. Complete objectivity may be an impossible task, especially 
when compiling data on acts of political violence. Many project-driven data sets such 
as the Global Jewish Information Network or the National Council of Iran’s 
chronology have by their very nature a political motivation behind their creation. 
Other databases such as the National Transportation Safety Board’s Aviation 
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Accident Database Safety which contains data on civil aviation accidents is designed 
to perform a more functional role under U.S. Federal laws and regulations.225   
 
3.10. Database Management Systems (D.B.M.S) 
A recurring problem in the field of terrorism data sets has been the inter-
changeability of the terms terrorism chronology, database and database 
management system. Clarity over both their theoretical definition and practical 
application would serve terrorism researchers well as part of the design process. This 
concern does not arise purely from worries over semantics. Inappropriate 
classification of terrorism data sets can misrepresent their functionality. 
Furthermore, the design of a terrorism chronology such as the NewsPage’s daily 
chronology of world terrorism is likely to be a much simpler process than that of a 
database holding terrorism data with linked entities and  relational in nature such as 
the FBI’s National Incident Based Reporting System.226 A large section of published 
literature on terrorism data sets uses a broad palette of words to describe 
computerised terrorism data sets. These range from terrorism data banks, terrorism 
databases, terrorism data bases, terrorist databases to terrorism chronologies and 
political terrorism database. 
In its simplest form chronologies on terrorism such as the Iterate or Rand-
St.Andrews chronologies on international terrorism present a sequential coded data 
of terrorism events. Most chronologies on terrorism have a minimum of field 
definition or variable coding. These chronologies do not necessarily have to be held 
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on a database system. Chronologies can operate on a text based system. Their ability 
to carry out more sophisticated requirements is often limited. The benefit of a 
computerised database or database management system lies in their ability to offer 
the researcher a multitude of different facilities.  
Elmasri and Navathe define a database as ‘a collection of related data. By data 
we mean known facts that can be recorded and that have implicit meaning’.227 This 
tight definition although useful requires further exposition. ‘A database is a logically 
coherent collection of data with some inherent meaning. A random assortment of 
data cannot be referred to as a database.’ Elmasri and Navathe further expand on 
this notion by explaining: 
‘A database is designed, built and populated with data for a specific purpose. It 
has an intended group of users and some preconceived applications in which 
these users are interested. A database represents some aspect of the real world, 
sometimes called the mini-world. Changes to the miniworld are reflected in the 
database’. 228 
 
 
Arguably the terrorism chronology could meet all of the above criteria. To attribute a 
terrorism chronology with such definitional criteria would be to present it in an 
overly sophisticated schema. In its simplest form terrorism chronologies are meant 
to represent ‘known facts’ on terrorism in an arranged order of occurrence. Some 
confusion can arise in the classification of terrorism data sets as chronologies can be 
operated on from software such as a word processor or a spreadsheet, alternatively 
they can be designed and generated from within a database management system. 
Chronologies generated from within database management systems can be derived 
from purpose built databases or generated from existing terrorism databases.  
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3.11. Alternative approaches to terrorism data set design 
Although several academics have voiced their concerns over the design and content 
of terrorism data sets and the constant referral to the same research base, few have 
offered an alternative approach to the current unsatisfactory situation. An exception 
to this general malaise has been some thought provoking ideas by Ted Gurr. His 
article ‘Empirical Research on Political Terrorism: The State of the Art and How it 
Might be Improved’ 229  presents some alternative approaches to improving 
empirical research and traditional terrorism data set design. Gurr notes that the 
majority of quantitative and empirical research is based upon the researcher 
consulting an established terrorism data set. This ‘data first’ situation Gurr argues 
can constrain the type of questions that can be asked of the data set and also limit 
the type of methodology used.230 An over- reliance, Gurr argues, on the two major 
publicly available terrorism data sets, RAND and ITERATE, limits the research base to 
international terrorism events and excludes incidents of domestic terrorism. As Gurr 
notes: 
‘I am convinced by a review of the empirical literature on political terrorism that 
many, perhaps most, of the important questions being raised cannot be 
answered adequately with the kinds of information now generally available to 
scholars’.231 
 
To remedy such a situation Gurr suggests that the analytic question is placed 
logically prior to the design of a methodology and the consequent collection of data. 
There would appear to be some sense in this approach. The attraction for the 
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terrorism analyst is that a relevant data set is established and can be finely tuned to 
meet the researchers methodological requirements. Furthermore, as Gurr notes the 
‘question first’ approach ‘ maximises the likelihood that the researcher will get valid 
answers to the question.232  The slight downside to this data design approach is a 
reminder of the effort and resources required to establish, design and maintain a 
credible terrorism database. The temptation to use ‘off-the-shelf, ready-made’ 
terrorism data sets with their acknowledged imperfections appears to many 
researchers a more attractive option.  
 
3.12. Database Organisation and Structure 
The structure and organisation of terrorism databases can take on many forms. The 
relationship between entities, variables, values and relations defines the structure of 
the terrorism database at its most basic level. An entity within a database can be a 
field such as terrorist group or the most common entity such as the actual terrorist 
incident. A variable is an empirical property that takes two or more values. 233 
Variables are values that represent an entity within the database. For example 
where an entity is defined as a ‘Source of Ransom’ payment the variables could be 
Government, Corporate, Family, Other, including public collections or private 
sources. Variables can also be quantifiable, such as number of hours duration of an 
incident where the entity is duration of incident in hours.234 Values are 
representations of a variable and generally take on a numeric format, for example 
number of people killed. The most powerful component of this structure is the 
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relation. Relations within a database are groups of identified entities that are related 
in some recognised form. Relations must have some inherent meaning, a random 
cluster of entities or variables is not a relation.  
The organisation of databases is divided into three main types: hierarchical, 
network and relational. The hierarchical database structure or tree structure is based 
on a hierarchy of entities with pre-defined subordinate entities. The network 
structure is a complex link of entities with subordinates or superior entities. The 
relational database structure comprises of one or more two dimensional tables, 
these are referred to as relations. With the relational data structure data can be 
stored in multiple tables these tables can then be linked together. 
The choice of database system to adopt for holding terrorism data for many 
researchers will be outwith their control, particularly analysts working for police and 
intelligence agencies. As part of ‘best practice’ computer systems departments 
should always consult their end users to ascertain their particular needs.235  The past 
twenty years has seen a gradual shift towards the adoption of relational database 
management systems, operating at both mainframe level and personal computer 
level. Research staff operating the RAND-ST. Andrew’s database developed a 
prototype relational database system as part of its on-going policy of technological 
development. The attraction of adopting a relational system is the relative simplicity 
of its structure and the powerful functional capabilities it can perform. The relational 
table comprises of a two way tables with a series of rows and columns. The table 
contains information about a single type of entity. The table has records which has 
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data about a single occurrence of the entity. The attraction of this approach lies in its 
relative simplicity. The complex structure of hierarchical and network database 
structures does not make a particularly easy system for users to understand.  With 
the relational model tables are presented in two=dimensional format. Several other 
features of the relational design make it a particularly powerful database tool. Apart 
from the ability to enter terrorism data and query the tables, with correct design 
procedures it is possible to establish relationships between two or more linked 
databases and query the linked tables. This is a powerful facility, and addresses 
Gurr’s challenge of  linking or merging terrorist information from two separate 
databases to provide specific data on domestic and international terrorism.236 Links 
are established between tables through the creation of common entities or fields. 
The rigidity of a pre-defined set of relationships as part of the database structure is 
not required thus allowing the user to establish relationships that meet their own 
requirements. Furthermore with relational database structures designers are not 
required to meet narrow informational requirements restricting researchers use of 
the database.  
The move from mainframe to personal computer held terrorism data sets is 
the result of several factors. Firstly the advent of relatively cheap but extremely 
powerful personal computers, with the ability to operate sophisticated relational 
database management system and general application packages is now a reality.237 
                                                          
236
 Gurr , op cit, (note 126), p.118.   While it would be perfectly feasible to join (link) a domestic and 
international terrorism database together the design of both data sets would require very careful 
consideration to ensure the relationships between the tables have integrity.  Gurr mentions both linkage and 
merging information from separate terrorism data sets. The linkage of two terrorism data sets to establish a 
relationship between them  using a common field e.g. Country is different from merging two data sets. The 
merger of data sets involves  combining one data set  (source) with the other  (target) data set. 
237
 Direct transfer of terrorism data sets from mainframe software to P.C. based applications is not always a 
simple task. For example the CODA system holding the RAND-St. Andrews terrorism chronologies cannot be 
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An ever-increasing base of computer literate analysts requiring ever-more 
sophisticated information has undoubtedly increased the demand for P.C. based 
systems to hold terrorism data. Communication between mainframe and P.C. based 
systems has developed at a frenetic pace in the past few years. The advent of 
network technologies and subsequent explosion of internet use and accessibility by 
P.C. has added to the on-going momentum. Not all terrorism data sets or databases 
operate on a P.C. system alone. More powerful mainframe systems that required to 
provide large user requirements among federal and security agencies need more 
than a P.C. to carry out their security and operational requirements. For example, 
restricted access database systems holding terrorism data such as IBIS (Interagency 
Border Inspection System), the FBI’s Terrorism Information System (TIS) database or 
the Australian Bomb Data Centre’s database of bombing incidents operate from a 
mainframe, mini-computer and P.C. basis, and are operated on Local Area Networks 
(LAN’s) and Wide Area Networks (WAN’s). 
The move towards P.C based networked systems, backed up by mini or 
mainframe computers appears to growing. The Jafee Center for Strategic Studies at 
Tel-Aviv University have recently adopted a new computer system running on a 
series of Pentium P.C.’s under Window’s 95© networked to a Windows NT server, 
using Lotus Notes©. The system operated by JCSS’s Information Center will enable 
the establishment of an integrative approach to its information management needs 
in the areas of International Relations (including terrorism and political violence), 
Politics, Middle Eastern studies. The University of St. Andrews’s Centre for the Study 
                                                                                                                                                                      
directly transferred onto a P.C. database application without a large amount of development work. The 
RAND-St. Andrews system operates however, from a P.C. based interface. The work involved in transferring 
and  re-coding all the terrorism variables would be considerable. 
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of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) have recently carried out a feasibility 
study with the possibility of upgrading its existing computer operations to a 
Windows based environment, operating its terrorism chronologies under and 
databases in P.C. based application software. 
For terrorism database designers the issue of hardware and software is an 
important consideration in the daily operation of databases if they are to satisfy 
researchers and analysts needs. The type of hardware and software adopted is 
particularly vital if they are required interface with external computer systems, 
networks or the Internet. Compatibility is the key point. The need to access terrorism 
data not only locally but perhaps from remote locations, such as police use of the 
Violent Gang and Terrorist Organisations File require some form a compatibility and 
standardisation in design. Even among research institutes and agencies holding 
terrorism data with limited public availability, the need internally for compatibility of 
systems appears to be growing. 
 
 
3. 13. Advantages and disadvantages of database management systems 
Historically many analysts and academics designing computerised terrorism data sets 
have had little choice as to the software used in the development of the data sets. 
Lack of availability of appropriate software and limited knowledge of design 
procedures resulted in a large variety of differing systems holding terrorism data. 
Among some of the earliest terrorism data sets to be computerised were the CIA’s 
File on International Terrorist Events - FITE (1968), the BDM Corporation’s Terrorism 
Data Base (1965) and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Significant Terrorist Incident 
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File - STIF (1970). 238 All of these data sets were coded and took the form of 
chronologies. Even Mickolus’s chronologies on terrorism, one of the few enduring 
computerised data sets on terrorism is still maintained on a text based system with 
coded ancillary files.239 There are several advantages for researchers from a design 
angle in choosing to hold terrorism data in a chronological format. Firstly, the 
application software required to hold and maintain the chronologies is relatively 
inexpensive to purchase. Many modern WindowsTM based text editors, word 
processors, spreadsheets and HTML (Hypertext Mark-up Language) format for 
Internet are able to adequately operate terrorism chronologies.240 Secondly, the 
expertise required at both design and maintenance level is minimal compared to the 
operation of a fully fledged database management system such Interpol’s Criminal 
Information System (CIS) or the FBI’s Violent Group and Terrorist Organizations File 
(VGTOF). However the design and maintenance of terrorism chronologies should not 
be completely underestimated. The apparent simplicity of entering incident data 
into a chronology should not overshadow the basic requirement of any credible data 
set on terrorism: integrity. Definition, source data and agreed coding procedures all 
have to be adhered to in the operation of a terrorism chronology. Fowler, Gurr and 
Ross have voiced about the abundance of chronologies at the expense of other 
                                                          
238
  For further information on these data sets and others see William Folwer, op cit, Appendix, pp.33-40. 
239
  Mickolus, op cit. 
240
  For an example of terrorism incidents stored in spreadsheet format or imported as a tab delimited text file 
into database see the Southern Regional Critical Issues Forum Student Database of Violence and Terrorism. 
This data sets was compiled by Southern Regional CIF students searching the CNN Internet Website archives 
and lists acts of violence and terrorism. Http://www.tocomplete. For examples of terrorism chronologies held 
in HTML format on the Internet see the FBI’s Terrorism in the United States 1995. 
Http://www.fbi.gov/publish/terror/terrorin.htm  Alternatively the United States Department of State 
Counter-Terrorism Rewards program details  a chronological list of  terrorism incidents in HTML format at 
Http://www.heroes.net/pub/heroes/index.html  For other terrorism chronologies in HTML  format see Save 
Our Sri Lanka from Terrorism at Http://www.case.cioe.com/~sos/terror.html or the Emergency Response & 
Research Institute’s Bomb Threat Chronology 1997 at Http://www.emergency.com/bomb0197.htm 
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forms of terrorism data sets, in many respects they have valid points.241  However, 
computerised terrorism chronologies will never be a ‘glamorous’ tool in the league 
of sophisticated software development.  By their very nature they offer data on 
terrorism incidents in order of occurrence. The maintenance of accurate, up-to-date 
terrorism chronologies as an on-going process over a consistently long period of 
years is a task not to be underestimated. Their basic usefulness outweighs the 
temptation to opt for overly sophisticated systems for holding basic terrorism data. 
The alternative choice by intelligence agencies and academics of designing and 
operating a terrorism database or database management system requires very 
careful thought and a considerable amount of resources if the data sets are to be 
maintained on an on-going basis and have integrity.  Database management system 
offers terrorism researchers several advantages over traditional chronologies on 
terrorism. In a traditional file approach terrorism chronologies are designed to meet 
the needs of the researcher or analyst working on certain defined tasks, such as the 
Deutsch and Magowan’s Northern Ireland, 1968-1973: A Chronology of Events or 
Kohl and Litt’s Urban Guerrilla Warfare: Argentina: Chronology.242 Traditional file 
formats also serve general terrorism chronologies such as Mickolus’s ITERATE data 
sets or McGuire’s Security Intelligence Report.243 Researchers using these data sets 
are generally restricted to the framework provided by the software. Multiple 
terrorism chronologies or data sets created in this format produce a certain amount 
of wastage or what commonly is referred to as redundancy. The need to maintain 
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  Fowler (note 16),  Ted Robert Gurr, ‘Empirical Research on Terrorism: The State of the Art and How it Might 
be Improved’, in Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl (eds.), Current Perspectives on International Terrorism  
(London: Macmillan, 1988)  p.144.  Ross , op cit, p.49.  
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  Schmid & Jongman, op cit, p.158, p.164. 
243
  Mickolus , op cit, McGuire , op cit, 
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and update duplicate incident records can cause inconsistency and requires vigilance 
when comparing data sets. As Fowler notes:  
‘Most current data-collection efforts are devoted to the development of 
chronologies of terrorism. Everyone seems to be collecting the same data over 
and over again.  …*W+e are suggesting that the data-collection movement has 
matured to the point that the development of different kinds of data bases 
would be worthwhile’. 244 
 
The advantage of the database schema for terrorism data is that only one single 
repository of data is established and maintained. Data definition of variables and 
meta-data on terrorism variables requires only to be defined once. Furthermore 
several users can access the database for individual needs and requirements. The 
FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organizations File (VGTOF) operates on such a basis 
providing every U.S. law enforcement agency with access to, and where permitted, 
to add, delete and modify the database. 245   
The adoption of a database system to hold and manipulate terrorism data 
provides analysts with several benefits that are not attached to more traditional file 
handling systems. These benefits include the creation of a system catalogue, 
insulation between the DBMS and data, data abstraction, powerful querying facilities 
and the ability to provide users with multiple views of data.  
As part of the overall database schema a terrorism database should also 
provide accompanying documentation describing the design of the database, 
variables used and any other relevant information of use to database designers and 
terrorism analysts. Commonly known as the system catalogue, it will detail the file 
structure of the database e.g. relational, hierarchical or network. The catalogue 
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  Fowler , op cit,(note 16) p.28. 
245
 U.S. Department of Justice , op cit. For Further information on the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organizations 
File see Chapter 4. of this thesis.  
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provides the DBMS with information as part of its operation. The catalogue will also 
include details on variables within the database. For example, a variable [field] such 
as number of casualties from a bombing/terrorism incident would normally be 
assigned as a numeric field within a terrorism database.246  The catalogue would 
detail this. In addition to a description of the data types used within the database the 
catalogue permits designers and analysts to store more detailed narrative as to why 
certain variables have been chosen as part of coding criteria used by agencies or 
terrorism researchers. This type of data - data about data is called meta-data. The 
value of meta-data is often underestimated by academics and others when designing 
databases. Much time and effort is spent on the collection of terrorism data, its 
coding and eventual operation. The creation of a system catalogue and meta-data is 
either ignored or regarded as a time consuming luxury. This is unfortunate as many 
terrorism data sets (chronologies and databases) have undergone considerable 
change since their original inception. The Pinkerton Risk Assessment Service 
database on terrorism was originally operated by Risks International, Inc. The Rand  
Chronologies and Databases on International Terrorism were transferred in 1994 
from their original base at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica CA. to become the 
RAND-St. Andrews Chronologies on International Terrorism at the University of St. 
Andrews  Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence. In August 1997 
Kroll Associates a major U.S. provider of risk management and corporate intelligence 
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  Terrorism databases contain many data types that should be documented within the catalogue.  
 
Common Data Types used in Terrorism Databases and Data Sets  
Data Type: Text Memo Number Date/Time 
Variable 
Type: 
Incident  
description 
Lengthy narrative on  
incident or other terrorist  
details 
Number of  
casualties, 
injuries, cost of  
incident 
Confirmation of exact  
date and time of  
incident(s) if  
available. 
  
For further details on data types used within computerised  terrorism databases see Chapter 4 of thesis. 
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(including Country Risk ChronologiesTM on terrorism and political violence) 
announced its intention to merge with the O’Gara Company to become The Kroll-
O’Gara Company. The need for documentation and meta-data on terrorism data sets 
is essential not only for professional documentation, software execution and archival 
reasons. Over a period of years organisations change, computer systems change, 
methods of coding terrorism incidents change and professionals working on 
terrorism data set move on.247  Without such information the task of computer and 
terrorism analysts operating databases is made much difficult. Publicly available 
systems catalogues and meta-data on terrorism databases are often difficult to 
obtain. Classification restrictions with intelligence agencies, non-publication, or a 
general reluctance to release such information particularly among commercial 
operators of terrorism data sets has resulted in a paucity of data. Similar-like 
catalogues and meta-data on terrorism are however not without precedent.  
Terrorism data sets such as Domestic Terrorism: Assessment of State and 
Local Preparedness in the United States, 1992 and Political Violence in the United 
States 1819-1968  available through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and 
Social Research (ICPSR) are accompanied by data collection descriptions and 
codebooks.248 Although these are note strictly systems catalogues they offer an 
excellent example of some of the core type of data elements and meta-data that 
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  The responsibility for publishing data on international terrorism was given to the U.S. State Department by 
the CIA  in 1981 as part of its policy of pursuing a lower public profile. The entire data set was back dated and 
re-coded from 1968 onwards. This re-coding of data is a classic example of changes that should be noted in 
the system catalogue. The change of calculations brought with it allegations that the Reagan Administration 
had re-designed the coding of the database for foreign policy purposes, at the expense of true definitional 
integrity. See: Charles Mohr, “Data on Terrorism Under U.S. Revision,” The New York Times, 24
th
 April 1981, p 
A17 also George Lardner, “CIA Report Adds Thousands of Incidents to Statistics on International Terrorism,” 
Washington Post, 16
th
 June 1981, p A10. 
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 Kevin Jack Riley and Bruce Hoffman, Domestic Terrorism: Assessment of State and Local Preparedness in the 
United States, 1992 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation [producer], 1992. 
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor] 1996.  ICPSR 6566. 
Many  ICPSR data sets provide an abstract, codebook, and data set in File Transfer Protocol (FTP) via the 
Internet. Large data sets tend  to be sent in a compressed Zip format.  
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should be contained within a terrorism database’s system catalogue. Available 
through user registration and Internet access the ICPSR study description provides a 
template that all data sets being registered with ICPSR must strictly adhere to. The 
ICPSR Study Description Manual requires core details on the data set to be recorded 
in addition to more detailed elements. These fields include: citation, data source and 
format, date of collection, funding agency, investigators, variable count, universe 
and time period. 249 The work on entering details into a system catalogue may 
initially be a lengthy process and is often a distraction to the purpose: the creation of 
a terrorism database.  Researchers benefit in the long run in that standard 
information on terrorism data sets and databases is established; a situation that until 
now, except for the efforts of Fowler, has been sorely lacking. 250  From a research 
angle it would be unrealistic to assume that meta-data on terrorism data sets 
provide all the required answers for a comparative analysis of such data sets. 
Differing definitional criteria on what constitutes an act of terrorism, variance in 
sources used and a diversity of variables make it difficult to establish standard 
comparative figures. Furthermore, a multitude of remits from project-specific 
terrorism data sets such as ATIC to general purpose chronologies and databases such 
as INTER, add to the complexities of comparing data sets.251  Despite problems over 
quantitative comparative analysis of terrorism data sets the system catalogue 
provide useful detail on software and hardware systems used in terrorism data set. 
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  For a fully detailed list of information required by ICPSR when lodging data sets see: 
Http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/template.html#INVESTIGATOR 
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 Fowler (note 16). For a summary of terrorism databases see Appendix: Description of Individual Data Bases. 
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  Jeffrey Ian Ross, ‘Attributes of Domestic Political Terrorism in Canada, 1960-1985’, Terrorism, Vol. 11 pp.213-
233. INTER International Terrorism in 1987 (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post 1987). 
112 
 
Information on time-periods for data sets, changes in coding procedures, geographic 
spread of terrorism data sets and institutional or individual origins of the data set 
provide a more holistic view.  Furthermore, aside from the functional operation of 
the database, what systems catalogues do offer is standards, consistency and 
integrity. The requirement for terrorism database designers to adhere to providing 
at least a minimum amount of information would provide a benchmark and 
standard. From this point, consistency can be maintained offering researchers some 
meta-data with integrity.  
The move towards co-ordination and some form of standard in the 
development of computerised terrorism data sets would be a welcome 
development. Reluctance particularly on the part of security agencies and 
commercial providers of terrorism data to do so, is, in part understandable. National 
security concerns or commercial competition among private organisations collating 
and selling intelligence and terrorism data has made the issue of co-operation a 
sensitive issue.  Security agencies have in recent years been encouraged and appear 
more willing to co-operate on the exchange of terrorism information. Initiatives 
promoting the exchange of ‘basic information concerning persons or organizations 
suspected of belonging to or being connected with terrorist networks’ were 
presented at the G7 (P8) ministerial meeting in Paris in the summer of 1996.252 
Equivalent exchanges of information on system catalogues, meta-data and design 
methodologies used to retain terrorist data appear less apparent. With the proposed 
development of a forensic science database, which would act as a clearinghouse for 
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  United States Department of State. Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism, Paris. Statement by U.S. Attorney 
General Janet Reno at Ministerial Meeting in Paris, France, July 30
th
, 1996. For full statement see: 
Http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/reno.html  For further discussion on co-operation and 
exchange of terrorism data see Chapter VI. of this thesis pxx-xx. 
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evidence on terrorist crime, initiated by the FBI and to be used by all G8 members 
common entry and system procedures will be required.253 
No attempt so far has been made among terrorism analysts or data set 
designers to create a computerised database of terrorism databases, chronologies or 
data sets. Such as task however is not without precedent in the field of international 
conflict.  In his Handbook of Datasets on Crises and Wars 1495-1988AD Cioffi-Revilla 
demonstrates a standard format for conflict data set profile using the Interstate 
Conflict Datasets Catalog  (ICDC) standard. 254 The template presented in table 3.3 
below offers terrorism researchers a framework from which a standard profile could 
potentially be established.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4.  Codesheet Model for ICDC International Standard 255 
Data Set  Name:    
DDIR  ID: 256 Event Type: Info.Update 257 IHCD  ID: 
Principal Investigator(s):    
Generic Event: Historic   Era  Begins: Ends: 
Event Definition: 258    
Source of Event Definition:    
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 United States Department of State. Combating Terrorism: The Paris Ministerial. Fact sheet released at the 
Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism in Paris, France, July 30
th
  1996.  p.2. For full statement see: 
 Http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/fs_achievements.html  
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 Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, The Scientific Measurement of International Conflict: Handbook of Datasets on Crises 
and Wars 1495-1988
A.D.
 (Boulder Colorado: Lynne Reinner 1990),  pp.13-17. 
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 Ibid. For a complete explanation of the field descriptors see pp.14-p17. 
256
  This is the official ID number of the data set. 
257
  This refers to the most recent update of the data set profile. 
258
  Event Definition is the operational definition of the basic event unit, derived if possible from the data sets 
codebook. 
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Number of Events:    
Actor(s):     
Target(s):    
Event Fields: 259    
Event Source(s):    
Published Data Sources: 260    
Applied Publications: 261    
Access to M.R.-Format: 262    
Remarks:    
References:    
 
The documentation of terrorism data sets in some form of standard profile is 
beneficial for four principle reasons. Firstly a standard would be established and 
integrity maintained. Secondly, classification of the data set is established, for 
example terrorism chronology, database or true-database management system. 
Thirdly, the content of the data set is understood i.e. data on terrorist group profiles, 
incidents or tactics. Fourthly, accessibility of terrorism data sets could be made 
available to other social scientists or researchers via such mediums as CESSDA 
(Council of European Social Data Archives) on the Internet.263  Furthermore, the 
benefits of computerised data set profiles compared to traditional hard copy printed 
references takes on yet an additional dimension as Cioffi-Revilla argues: 
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  This refers to the ‘List of the variables coded or measured for each event contained in the dataset.’  
Revilla, op cit, p.16. 
260
  This is ‘Printed publication(s), if any, where the raw dataset may be found’. Revilla (note 140), p.16.) 
261
  The ‘Applied Publications’ field refers to ‘A selection of research publications that have used the dataset’. 
Cioffi-Revilla , op cit, p.16. 
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  This refers to the machine readable or computerised format in which the data set can be viewed.  When 
available, ICPSR file numbers are detailed. These data sets are available via the Internet. Terrorism data sets 
are available in various formats including  HTML format and PK. ZIP format. See: 
Http://www.fbi.gov/publish/terror/terrusa.htm for the FBI’s Terrorism in the United States 1995.   It should 
be noted the available machine readable format of such terrorism data sets is not always a  true indicator of 
the software used in the original data set or database.  
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  The Council of European Social Science Data Archives (CEESDA) promotes the acquisition, archiving and 
distribution of electronic data for use by social scientists  within Europe for research and teaching purposes. 
Data sets are accessible through a common interface entry point on their Web page. Internet access to North 
American archives and other social science data sets world-wide is also provided.  
Internet Web site:  Http://www.nsd.uib.no/Cessda/IDC/  For further discussion on Internet access to social 
science data sets see Chapter 6 of this thesis page xx. 
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‘… for a book (even in the case of a famous work) most scientists will not be 
interested in the names and references of others who have used such a 
book… in the case of a dataset such information on previous uses and 
applications can be very useful, indeed vital, in learning about ways in which 
the dataset in question has been used, or it may be critical for obtaining 
direct practical advice on the analytic potential and limitations of the 
dataset’. 264 
 
The lack of a well developed literature base on the rôle of information technology 
vis-à-vis terrorism studies, and in general within the wider field of international 
relations, highlights an evolving problem that needs to be addressed.  As Cioffi-
Revilla notes: 
‘Simple descriptive problems such as the ones just mentioned (choosing a 
proper descriptive structure of information) may often be compounded in 
new interdisciplinary areas of research such as this - at the nexus between 
international relations, world politics, conflict and peace research - where 
there is no professionally set scientific standard for describing electronic 
media such as datasets, computer programs and graphic files’. 265 
 
Several other factors make the choice of adopting a database approach to retaining 
terrorism data more attractive than that of the traditional filing systems. The 
D.B.M.S. offers users insulation between the database program and the actual data.  
In a traditional file the structure of the data file is embedded in the programs that 
access that file. A change in the structure of the file will need to be reflected in all of 
the programs that access the file. In a DBMS program the access programs are 
written independently of the actual database file. This is known as program-data 
independence.266  The benefits are twofold: changes to the database structure needs 
only to be made once, integrity and consistency is maintained across all access 
programs to the database. Computerised terrorism chronologies such as ITERATE 
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  Ibid.  
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  For a fully detailed explanation of these concepts see Elmasri & Navathe , op cit, p.8. 
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which is not supported on a database management system would have to ensure 
that changes to one part of the chronology were reflected (where relevant) in other 
parts of the data set. 
Multiple access to databases such as the U.S. State Department’s Tipoff 
database, or the FBI’s VGTOF database which is accessed by multiple users requiring 
different forms of data such as reports summaries, individual profiles of terrorist or 
statistics benefit from program-data independence. The databases are not put at risk 
from ad-hoc adjustments to its structure by analysts or law enforcement officials 
using the database. 
Many of the benefits of holding terrorism data on a database management 
system such program-data independence will appear to be rather abstract and 
irrelevant to most analysts needs. Such functions of the database management 
system however provide a seamless service in the background that would quickly be 
noticed if they were not available. Of particular benefit to terrorism researchers and 
analysts adopting a DBMS system to hold terrorism data is the databases ability to 
support multiple ‘views’ of data. These multiple ‘views’ of the same or different data 
can take many forms including simple views of tables (databases), input forms for 
data entry or reports generated from the database. There facilities particularly 
benefits intelligence agencies and academic organisations, where multiple users of a 
database have differing data requirements that would not be satisfied through a 
simple chronological or text based presentation. Advanced systems such as 
Interpol’s Automated Search Facility (ASF) database permits National Central 
Bureau’s (NCB’s) to request various forms and ‘views’ of information such as a 
suspect individual’s phonetic criteria, date of birth, known aliases passport 
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documents.267 The system can also transfer an individual’s photograph and their 
fingerprint’s with related intelligence detail in a variety of languages from English, 
French and Spanish to Arabic. Such sophistication and detail will tend to be beyond 
the remit or legal boundaries of academic terrorism data sets. The ability however to 
generate simple and complex ‘views’ of terrorism data in the form of summary 
statistics of terrorist incidents, subsets of data, chronological data, reports and 
graphics such as pie and bar charts or photographs all derived from the same 
database or relationally linked databases is an attractive option.  
 
3.14. Conclusions 
The post 9/11 era has witnessed the development of many terrorism databases. All 
of these databases offer insight into some of the key challenges presented to 
academics, government and private organisations. The issues involved in the design 
and maintenance of terrorism data sets are often complex and should not be 
underestimated. A sound understanding of the area of terrorism and political 
violence combined with computer literate skills, particularly data analysis and 
database management systems, would be an ideal profile for anyone developing and 
maintaining a terrorism database. Despite this rare profile, many computerised 
databases on terrorism operate reasonably well. Requests by researchers and 
analysts for improved systems are understandable, especially if they are to meet the 
demands of ever increasing information on terrorism data.  
A note of caution however should be sounded. The speed and sophistication 
of modern computerised systems should not blind analysts to more fundamental 
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  Interpol, The machinery for international police co-operation.  
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118 
 
issues that need to be addressed by designers, researchers and analysts. A sound, 
intuitive knowledge of the area of terrorism, combined with the adherence to 
professional standards should be a guiding principle in the development and 
maintenance of terrorism databases. The fact that something is entered on 
computer neither makes it legitimate or true. Integrity must be maintained. The rush 
towards newer, faster systems at the expense of integrity and validity would render 
any terrorism database system useless. Adoption of a more professional approach to 
the design of terrorism databases would serve both database designers and 
terrorism analysts well. With increased documentation, such as systems catalogues 
and user manuals, the potential for databases that move closer to meeting the 
needs of terrorism researchers and analysts will hopefully be achieved.  
The eclectic issues involved in the design of computerised terrorism 
databases requires not just a generic approach to database design. Complex and 
sensitive political issues combined with an appreciation of database operations 
provide a challenge to researchers of some considerable degree. An appreciation of 
the many issues involved in the design of terrorism data sets provides a stimulus for 
assessing the actual current availability of computerised terrorism data sets. 
Knowledge of other terrorism data sets can often be a valuable benchmark from 
which to assess standards. The next chapter will provide such a comparative analysis.  
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CHAPTER IV 
POST 9/11: AN ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM AND COUNTER-
TERRORISM DATABASES: THE PUBLIC, THE PRIVATE AND THE 
IN-BETWEEN 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
A multitude of terrorism data sets with disparate backgrounds and varying remits 
have evolved in the field of terrorism research over the past thirty years. The 
majority of data sets on political violence however, are based mainly in North 
America and Western Europe. This imbalance has left knowledge on political 
violence data sets in the southern hemisphere scattered and incomplete. Moreover, 
with very little descriptive and comparative information on computerised terrorism 
data sets, our understanding of the field has been somewhat limited. The work of 
Fowler, and Schmid and Jongman on terrorism data sets has provided useful early 
guidance; however, both time and technology have moved on.268 
This chapter will assess the variety of elements that are associated with the 
operation of computerised terrorism data sets. These include factors such as 
definition, aggregate data comparability, types of data set, and the scope and 
content of terrorism data sets. The almost anarchic development of terrorism data 
sets has left their classification ill-defined. Technological advancement in hardware 
and software systems coupled with increasing computer literacy among terrorism 
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 For further details on early analysis of terrorism data sets see: William Warner Fowler,  Terrorism Data Bases: 
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researchers has increased the demand for information on databases that will allow 
comparison to take place. Furthermore, terrorism analysts increasingly require 
detailed information on hardware and database software issues, as a basis from 
which informed decisions can be made on the operation of data sets. 
Moreover, this chapter will provide a detailed analysis of the terrorism 
databases that are currently available. These have different levels of accessibility, 
from fully publicly accessible, to private subscription-based, to government classified 
databases. This chapter will examine each of these in turn, with particular reference 
to publicly accessible databases, given that these are the ones where more 
information is available. Despite this accessibility, however, there remains no up-to-
date comprehensive listing of these, and this chapter will provide one before 
examining the nature of private and government information in more detail.269 
 
4.2 Examining Terrorism Data Sets 
Examining computerised terrorism data sets is complex task, requiring at times many 
qualifiers to explain a less than coherent subject field. A simple comparative analysis, 
for example, of existing computerised data sets, based on such factors as aggregate 
number of terrorism incidents recorded or the number of terrorist variables used, 
can provide terrorism researchers with little, if any information on the type of data 
sets appropriate to researchers needs.270  Careful thought as to the type of elements 
that are compared will provide more appropriate answers to researchers needs. The 
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The most recent inventory was the report prepared in November 2003 by the Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress, titled ‘Inventory and Assessment of Databases Relevant for Social Science Research on 
Terrorism’, by Alice R. Buchalter and Glenn Curtis. 
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 Differing definitional criteria on what constitutes an act of terrorism makes cross-aggregate comparisons of 
terrorism data sets a less than exact science. For a comparison of comparative aggregate totals of terrorist 
incidents over a series of data sets see: Jongman, A. J. ‘Trends in International and Domestic Terrorism in 
Western Europe, 1968-1988’ Terrorism and Political ViolenceVol 4. No. 4. Winter 1992. pp.26-76. 
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most common type of comparisons made of terrorism data sets is aggregate data 
analysis.  Research by Jongman illustrates the usefulness and potential difficulties 
involved in such analysis.271  Other comparative factors include definition of 
terrorism incidents, data selection, geographic spread, scope of the data set and 
time frames used. All of these techniques provide useful information, however other 
comparative approaches need to be addressed.  The need for additional comparative 
information has been driven by technological development, accessibility to data, and 
an increase in different types of computerised terrorism data sets.  New and 
established data sets can be analysed at two further levels. The first is at an 
operational level, such as information on the type of chronology, database, 
hardware and software used. The second level is classificatory, for example 
government, academic or privately operated data sets. With increasing global 
communications, Internet access, and co-operation between governments, 
academics and industry within the terrorism field, relevant, up-to-date and 
standardised comparative data is crucial. In analysing public databases, this analysis 
will assess the following elements: the official name of the data base, the host 
institution/organisation, the website, contact details, accessibility, unit of analysis, 
the scope of the database, the temporal period covered, the principle source 
material, and the key variables analysed. Early comparative analysis of computerised 
terrorism data sets in the 1960’s and 1970’s tended to be somewhat limited, due to 
the relative infancy of the field and the small research base of data sets from which 
to work from. Post- 9/11, a large array of computerised data sets on terrorism exist, 
with diverse remits, and varying quality and accessibility that is often conditional or 
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restricted. Moreover, in recent years a new and critical remit for computerised 
terrorism data sets has been promoted: their use as ‘real-time’ terrorism incident 
response tools.  
 
Functional classification and description of data sets, chronologies and databases. 
Given the large amount of data sets, chronologies and databases discussed below, it 
is worth providing a simple classificatory description of the differences between each 
system. 272 
Table 4.1  Simple Functional Description of Data Sets, Chronologies and Databases 
Classification Data Type Notes 
Data Set Numerical, Textual Variables Data can be imported into 
spreadsheets, statistical 
packages and database 
systems. 
Chronology Numerical, Textual Variables Generally restricted in 
functionality, presenting 
data in chronological 
format 
Database Numerical, Textual Variables, 
Graphics, Hyperlinks, Sound, 
Film Media 
Sophisticated software 
that allows complex 
storage of data with 
powerful manipulating 
features. For example, 
input of data, deletion, 
update, querying of data, 
relational links to other 
databases, generation of 
reports, arithmetical and 
statistical reporting as well 
as form generation. 
Sophisticated database 
software can also host 
generic data sets and 
chronologies.  
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  A full definition of the term ‘Database’ is outlined in Section 1.5 of this thesis, Chapter 1, page 12. 
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4.3 The Public Profile 
By  their very nature, and because of their accessibility, the design and practicality of 
publicly available databases is particularly significant. Detailed below is an 
examination of the principal public databases currently available. An analysis of 
these will allow a wider examination of the current state-of-the-art in terrorism 
database provision. Each will begin with meta-data, before a more extended 
narrative. Table 4.2 below classifies each of the 20 public profile databases. 
Table 4.2 Classification of Public Profile Data Sets, Chronologies and Databases 
 Name Classification 
1.  Global Terrorism Database (GTD) Database 
2.  Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) Database 
3.  ITERATE -  International Terrorism: Attributes of 
Terrorist Events 
Chronology/Data Sets 
4.  MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base Database 
5.  RAND – Worldwide Terrorism Incident Database 
(RWTID) 
Database 
6.  Country Reports on Terrorism – United States 
Department of State 
Narrative Report 
7.  Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED) Data Sets 
8.  South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) Narrative Report/Data Sets 
9.  The International Policy Institute for Counter-
Terrorism (ICT) – Terrorist Incident Database 
Database 
10.  Political Terror Scale (PTS) Data Sets  
11.  The American Terrorism Study Data Sets  
12.  Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-
SAT) 
Narrative Report 
13.  Global Pathfinder Database 
14.  The Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) 
Database 
Database 
15.  Monterey WMD Terrorism Database Database 
16.  Armed Conflict Database Database 
17.  Iraq Body Count (IBC) Database 
18.  Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB)  International 
Atomic Energy Agency 
Database 
19.  Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Database/Data sets 
20.  The Minorities at Risk (MIR) Project Data Sets 
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Name: Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
Parent Host National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START), University of Maryland, United States. 
Website: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
E-mail: infostart@start.umd.edu 
Access: Free 
Unit of Analysis Terrorist Incident 
Scope: Domestic and International Terrorism 
Period Covered: 1970-2007 and on-going 
Principle sources Publicly available open-source material 
Key Variables Incident date, region, country, state/province, city, perpetrator 
group name, tactic used in attack, nature of the target. (See GTD 
website for other variables) 
 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
 
Introduction 
The University of Maryland’s National Consortium manages the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD), publicly launched in 2007, for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism (START). The GTD forms part of a new generation of web-based 
terrorism databases.  It differs from some of its counterparts in that it records 
domestic, transnational and international incidents of terrorism. The database is 
Open Source and records processed and structured information on more than 
80,000 terrorist attacks.  
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Historical Background and Database Development  
The original source data for the GTD came from data collected by Pinkerton Global 
Intelligence Service (PGIS) from 1970-1997. Serving the United States private 
business sector, Pinkerton’s original database was designed for risk analysis advice. 
Its aim was ambitious: to code every terrorist occurrence worldwide, over time. A 
variety of multi-lingual news sources were used. Pinkerton’s definition of terrorism 
was broad: ‘The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state 
actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or 
intimidation’.  
In 2001 Pinkerton’s donated their entire data sets to START. Initially funded 
by the National Institute of Justice, START researchers refined, added to, and coded 
the original Pinkerton data into a new database system, completing the task in 
December 2005. Additional funding in 2006 from the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) allowed the START team, in collaboration with the Center for 
Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS) to update the GTD to 2007. This process 
was completed by August 2008. In the spring of 2008 a new partner joined data 
collection efforts with START on the GTD. Researchers at the Institute for the Study 
of Violent Groups (ISVG) at the University of New Haven CT. began contributing data 
for integration into the Global Terrorism Database. 
An unusual feature of the early version of the GTD was that it was split into 
two data sets: GTD1 and GTD2. The rationale for the split was historical. The original 
Pinkerton data covering the period 1970-1997 had a limited set of around 45 
variables. This data set was named GTD1. Using the original Pinkerton’s generic 
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incident cards, a web-based entry system was devised to code the 61,637 events 
(weighted 68,986) into a database system. Data verification was undertaken. Auto-
fill fields were also generated to provide additional data where required. Key 
variables within GTD1 included: group name, type of terrorist incident, date of 
incident, country, region, city and location. Other main entries included: nature of 
target, identity of the target, e.g. corporation, nationality of target, weapons used, 
incident success and damage sustained. GTD1 also coded specific damage to United 
States interests. Further variables detailed information on kidnappings, hostages, 
ransoms and hijackings. Despite extensive searches, the 1993 data for GTD1 was 
found to be missing; this was due to the loss of data in an office move by Pinkerton. 
START is retrospectively attempting to generate the 1993 data from other sources. 
With improved data collection methods and the addition of new types of data, the 
codified data from 1998 onwards was named GTD2. This second database was built 
and developed on behalf of START by the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence 
Studies (CETIS).The eventual aim was to codify the GTD1 data set to be compliant 
with GTD2; thus providing a unitary longitudinal database of terrorist incidents from 
1970 until the present day. In the autumn of 2008 the START team completed the 
synthesis of GTD1 and GTD2; the database simply being referred to as the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD).  The new GTD database contains over 120 variables of 
which approximately 75 variables can be used for quantitative and statistical 
purposes.  
 
Sources 
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Whereas GTD1 (1970-1997) used single open-source reports collected by Pinkerton, 
GTD2 and the newly synthesized GTD used an array of independent open source 
material, or, where available, a single “highly credible” source. These sources 
included books, electronic archives from news and media organizations as well as 
legal documentation and journals. The source material for the 1998-2007 element of 
the GTD was collected by CETIS in association with START. Other material 
incorporated into the GTD includes data from the University of Ulster’s Conflict 
Archive on the Internet (CAIN), and the National Abortion Federation Researchers 
among others. START retains all source materials used in relation to a coded incident 
in an electronic format called a Reference Source Document (RST). The GTD 
codebook, containing the database coding scheme and the criteria for the inclusion 
of a particular incident is available from the START website.  
 
Definition 
Both GTD1 and GTD2 worked under their own respective operational definitions. 
Pinkerton’s definition of terrorism was adopted for GTD1. In addition to standard 
named terrorist groups, generic variables such as “student protesters” and “rebels” 
were also included in Pinkerton’s broad definition of terrorism. GTD1 data required 
that incidents ‘substantially concur’ with the pre-defined criteria.   
The GTD2 data set was not restricted to a set definition. The START team did 
however stipulate minimum criteria. ‘Based on the original GTD1 definition, each 
incident included in the GTD2 had to be an intentional act of violence or threat of 
violence by a non-state actor’ (Source GTD website).  GTD2 avoided the contentious 
issue of a universally accepted definition of terrorism. The rigidity of any single 
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definition of terrorism and its association with a particular data set has implications 
for the design, long-term content and empirical findings derived from the data. The 
resultant effect, that particular incidents are contained within one database and not 
others, compounded cross-comparison difficulties. Aware that a universally accepted 
definition of terrorism is still elusive, designers of GTD2 took advantage of new web 
based technology, to allow users to configure the database to alternative definitions 
of terrorism - depending on the researcher’s choices from three given criteria, of 
which two must be included. Within certain constraints, users are now able to filter 
out data that does not comply with their preferred definition of terrorism, taken 
from the GTD2 menu. In designing GTD2, researchers coded data covering a variety 
of definitions of terrorism; therefore offering selective definitions of terrorism within 
GTD2. This allowed researchers to work with definitions of terrorism that they 
appealing to a broader group of users. The criteria for inclusion in GTD2 were more 
rigorous: a minimum of two necessary criteria and two out of three sufficient criteria 
needed to be met prior to inclusion in the database. This facility is now available with 
the newly released unitary GTD. The criteria are: 
Criterion I: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or 
social goal. 
 Criterion II: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey 
some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.  
Criterion III: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, 
i.e. the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian 
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law (particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-
combatants).  
The newly synthesized GTD was launched in the summer of 2009.  The scope of the 
data within GTD is extensive. The GTD holds in excess of 27,000 bombings, 12,000 
assassinations and 2,900 kidnappings.   START engages over 75 data collectors, with 
expertise in six language groups to build the GTD collections. Source material 
reviewed for the GTD is substantial. START researchers assessed over 3,500,000 
news articles as well as 25,000 news sources for the GTD for 1998 to 2007.  
The newly developed GTD website provides users with an extensive array of 
interactive functionalities. Users are able to search the database in a basic and 
advanced format. The database can be queried using a browse facility, utilizing 
either keywords or the advanced search wizard. The resultant information is 
presented in a tabular format and displays key variables such as date, city country, 
perpetrator, fatalities and injuries. This is accompanied by narrative descriptions of 
incidents and, where relevant, graphical data. Users are able to print and e-mail 
queried results. Further features include the GTD Data Rivers. This allows users to 
visualize key terrorist variables in the form of stack charts. In addition the website 
provides a ‘This Date in Terrorism’ section and a rotating ‘Features’ web page on 
news, current research and developments at START. To conclude, here are some 
sample figures from GTD: 
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Figure 1: Number of Incidents of Terrorism Worldwide, 1970-2007 (GTD) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of Terrorist Incidents Worldwide, 1992-2008, attributed  
to  Al-Qaeda, according to GTD 
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Figure 3: Number of Incidents of Terrorism in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, 
former USSR & the Newly Independent States (NIS) 1997-2007 (GTD) 
 
 
 
Name: Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) 
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Parent Host United States National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 
Website: http://wits.nctc.gov/ 
E-mail: N/A 
Access: Free 
Unit of Analysis Terrorist Incident 
Scope: Domestic and International Terrorism 
Period Covered: 2004-2009 and  on-going 
Principle sources Open-source material and unclassified data 
Key Variables Incident date, region, country, state/province, city, event type, dead 
count, wounded count, perpetrator characteristics. (See WITS 
website for other variables) 
 
 
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) 
The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) is a database of terrorist incidents 
operated by the United States National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The WITS 
database is presented in a Web-based user interface. The database, publicly unveiled 
in 2005, contains terrorist incidents from 1/1/2004 to 3/31/2009 and is on-going. 
 
Context and Definition 
The National Counterterrorism Center, under Section 2656f of Title 22 of the US 
Code, provides the United States Department of State with support in meeting the 
legal requirement to provide annual statistics on incidents of terrorism. This data is 
held within the U.S. Governments repository of terrorist incidents called the 
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) database. 
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The NCTC defines terrorism as follows: ‘when groups or individuals acting on 
political motivation deliberately or recklessly attack civilians/non-combatants or 
their property and the attack does not fall into another special category of political 
violence, such as crime, rioting, or tribal violence’. Based on these criteria that 
terrorist incidents are deemed eligible for entry to the WITS database. As a result of 
methodological changes to the definition of terrorism, only the 2006 NCTC data is 
directly comparable to the 2005 data. The 2004 data sets were coded on the basis of 
a narrower definition of terrorism. 
 
Searching the WITS Database 
The WITS database offers both simple and advanced searches of terrorist incidents 
using basic and complex query menus. Searches can be executed using an interactive 
region/country map, by keywords or simple and more complex query commands. 
The map facility filters all countries relating to a specific region.  The keyword facility 
allows researchers to ask for specific words: for example ‘British Airways’, ‘Insurgent’ 
or ‘Letter Bomb’. Alternatively, wildcard or fuzzy logic searches can be used within 
keywords, where uncertainty over spelling occurs.   
The Simple Search facility queries the WITS database for terrorist incidents by 
category. These include the date(s) of the incident(s), geographic region, country and 
characteristics of the perpetrator. For example, secular/political, anarchist or Hindu 
extremist. Other key fields include characteristics of victims and type of facility 
targeted. More complex combined searches can be undertaken. Some fields can be 
queried using exact or multiple values. For example, exact, minimum and maximum 
values can be placed within the hostage’s field. Results are presented in a tabular 
134 
 
report format. This data can be re-ordered on all fields based on 
ascending/descending order. The data can be exported to spreadsheet for further 
analysis or transformed into PDF format. 
The Advanced Search facility within WITS permits users to specify specific 
incident criteria from any of the pre-defined fields within the database. The system 
offers seven different methods for selecting search criteria. The database can be 
queried by Incident Control Number (ICN), text, date ranges, number values 
pertaining to specific terrorist incidents, single selection (yes/no/either), multi-
selection lists, e.g. arson/firebombing and multi-selection popup screens offering 
extensive variables. Searches can be undertaken for terrorist incidents by “event 
type”. These include such variables as armed attacks, bombings, arson and fire-
bombings.  
Included within the Advanced Search facility of the WITS database is the field 
“defining characteristics”. The idea is to record, where possible the issues that 
motivate individuals or groups to carry out a terrorist attack. From this, users are 
able to retrieve incidents conducted by similar types of groups or individuals, e.g. 
Sunni extremists. The database also allows users to query terrorist incidents based 
on victims. Groups or individuals victims can be identified in relation to their ethnic, 
religious and cultural identities. The system is even designed to identify victims who 
could have been targeted as a result of their religious, cultural or ethnic identities. 
Detailed information on numbers of individuals killed, wounded and kidnapped can 
be retrieved from the WITS database. Where events are on-going, such as 
kidnappings and the release of hostages, or the status of critically injured changes, 
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the database is updated. The WITS database also classifies monetary damage as the 
result of an incident as light, moderate and heavy. All estimates are in U.S. Dollars. 
In addition to query driven data, the WITS website provides access to several 
“.PDF” publications produced by the NCTC. These include ‘NCTC Report on Incidents 
of Terrorism’ (2006) and ‘A Chronology of Significant International Terrorism for 
2004’.  The database is also able to generate a series of pre-defined analytical 
reports. For example, the database will generate a report ‘Number of Damaged 
Facilities by Targeting Characteristic’ based on user input dates. The WITS database 
can then store, e-mail or distribute the reports to other interested parties. 
 
Methodology 
The NCTC acknowledges that gathering data and coding incidents of terrorism is not 
an exact science. Incidents occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven especially 
challenging, in terms of the ability to collect complete data on all incidents. Added to 
this is the difficulty of differentiating between forms of violence, such as criminal 
acts and violent sectarian incidents. The NCTC highlights coding challenges e.g. 
whether a particular incident can be defined as an act of terrorism or insurgency. In 
certain circumstances, the differences are both complex and subtle.  
The WITS website publishes a series of basic ‘counting rules’ used in the 
compilation of the database. For an incident to be recorded, terrorists must have 
initiated and carried out an attack. Incidents such as hoaxes and failed or foiled 
attacks are not included within the database. The WITS data does not include 
genocidal acts.  
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The NCTC makes clear that the data derived from its WITS database of 
terrorist incidents needs to be viewed in a much wider context than the narrower 
universe of data coded within the system. Among many challenges facing analysts is 
that data can often be vague or incomplete. The NCTC cautions against crude 
comparisons of annual aggregate data in efforts to test assumptions about the 
efficacy of counter-terrorism policies. For the NCTC, the general purpose of the 
database is to allow users to track terrorist incidents, and provide data and 
information on the location of the incident, its victims and the individuals/groups 
responsible for such acts. As a result, researchers may be able to discern trends in 
the nature of attacks. 
The complete WITS data set can be downloaded to other application 
software including spreadsheet and database (Oracle). The exported “.Zip” files 
contain all terrorist incident data and related  information. Also incorporated within 
the WITS website is a comprehensive and detailed on-line help facility, allowing 
users to familiarise themselves with the functionality of the WITS database. 
Accompanying this is a list of acronyms, and an extensive glossary of definition of 
terms used within the database. For example, the glossary defines what ‘Near 
Miss/Non Attack Incident’ means, as used within the context of an incident. A 
detailed set of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ’s) explains the rationale and criteria 
behind some of the most common queries relating to the design and methodology of 
the WITS database. 
 
WITS NextGen Database 
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In the Spring of 2010 the National Counterterrorism Center released a completely 
new interface for the WITS database called  WITSNextGen. The WITS NextGen 
provides researchers with enhanced database functionality coupled with 
sophisticated reporting and visual presentation tools.    
The WITS NextGen provides users with an extensive selection of pre-defined 
reports which can be generated by selecting an inclusive set of dates. Some of the 
many pre-defined reports include: incidents [dead, wounded, hostage, total] 
grouped by country as well as country fatality ranges [e.g. 0, 2-4, 5-9, 10-19]. Other 
available reports include the number of damaged facilities by targeted characteristic, 
number of victims by defining characteristic and victim counts grouped by victim 
type and incident date. Results can then be presented by chart presentation, by a 
display of individual records, or in a summary format, available for export to 
spreadsheet. Aggregate totals are detailed within reports and throughout the 
database where pertinent.  Reports can be generated from data derived from 
searches. Advanced functionality within the WITS NextGen database permits users 
to create sophisticated report generation of incidents using a series of metric 
criteria, groupings, ‘drilldown’ facilities and  advanced query editing. 
The WITS NextGen allows users to carry out key word searches on specific 
incidents. To aid users, an incremental suggestion menu of place names, victim types 
etc. appears, allowing users to choose from an extensive list. Searches can also be 
refined by date and numeric range. A history of current searches and current reports 
can also be viewed and saved. Users are also able to apply their own defined filter 
searches to all or various parts of the database. A further series of extensive tabbed 
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filters provide detailed search criteria. These include: event type, incident filters, 
location, victim, perpetrator and facility. 
The methods by which users can visualise terrorist incident data within the 
WITS database has changed radically from the original WITS database. Users view 
incidents in standard record format, by concept cloud, map, charts and report 
format.  A detailed breakdown of individual incidents is available within the standard 
record format. In addition to the incident number (ICN) and narrative summary of 
the incident, an extensive array of variables relating to the incident is provided. 
Many of these variables are hyper-linked to other related parts of the WITS NextGen 
database. The concept cloud (restricted to the attack tab in the database) presents 
users with an alphabetical list of words and phrases that have been used within the 
narrative summary of each terrorist attack. The more frequently a word or a phrase 
is used within the narrative summary of selected incidents, the larger the word (font 
size) will appear on screen. Thus, allowing users to quickly ascertain the frequency of 
words and phrases that may have some baring, link, impact or theme on their 
research. The Map function (restricted to the attack tab only) allows users to view 
terrorist attacks over a geographical area. This facility is available in both Google 
Map form and Google Earth (requires plug-in). Coloured clusters on the maps display 
single and multiple attacks and attack counts.  With the new WITS NextGen system 
users are able to create their own customised line charts, pie charts, 3D Bar charts 
and stacked bar charts. In addition to viewing results by screen, data can be 
exported in .CSV, .XML and to Micosoft Excel format. The WITS NextGen website also 
provides a comprehensive and detailed user guide. 
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Figure 4: Trends in Person-borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED) vs. Suicide Vehicle-borne 
Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) attacks for Pakistan (NCTC 2008 Report on Terrorism) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Trends in Person-borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED) vs. Suicide Vehicle-borne 
Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) attacks for Rest of World.   (NCTC 2008 Report on Terrorism) 
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Figure 6: Comparison of Terrorism Fatalities and Incidents by Region (NCTC 2008 Report on Terrorism) 
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Figure 7: Comparison of High-Fatality Sunni Attacks in Iraq (IZ) and Afghanistan (AF) versus Rest of 
World (RoW), 2004-2008 (NCTC 2008 Report on Terrorism) 
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Figure 8: Comparison of Terrorist Attacks and Victims by Region (NCTC 2008 Report on Terrorism) 
 
 
 
 
 
Name: ITERATE - International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events 
Parent Host Vinyard Software Inc., Dunn Loring VA. United States 
Website: http://www.vinyardsoftware.com/ 
E-mail: info@vinyardsoftware.com 
Access: Commercial Purchase 
Unit of Analysis Terrorist Incident 
Scope: International and transnational terrorism 
Period Covered: 1968 onwards 
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Principle sources Open-source material 
Key Variables Date of incident, group initiating action, number of victims, total 
individuals wounded, terrorist logistical success. 
 
ITERATE - International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events 
Introduction 
The ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) data sets is one 
the longest established chronologies on international and transnational terrorism. 
Produced in the United States, the data set files are available for purchase from 
Vinyard Software Inc., Dunn Loring, VA. Hard-copy versions of the chronologies have 
been published periodically by Ed Mickolus, Todd Sandler, Jean Murdock, Peter 
Flemming and Susan Simmons (Greenwood Press and Iowa State University Press). 
The ITERATE data sets provide both quantitative and qualitative data and 
information for use by analysts and researchers within the terrorism and counter-
terrorism fields. The data sets can also be used as indices in wider cognate areas of 
social, political, geopolitical and economic research. 
 
Definition  
The ITERATE project defines international/transnational terrorism as: “the use, or 
threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes by any 
individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental 
authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behaviour of a 
target group wider than the immediate victims and when, through the nationality or 
foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human 
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victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its ramifications transcend national 
boundaries.”  
 
Format and Source Data 
The ITERATE data sets records contemporary international terrorism incidents from 
1968 up to present day events. The ITERATE data sets are available in two formats: 
textual and numerical. The textual files, based on a chronology of international 
terrorism incidents from 1968 onwards, can be uploaded using MS Word or 
WordPerfect. The numeric data sets (uploaded using MS Excel) are coded into four 
related, but separate computer files: COMMON, FATE, HOSTAGE and SKYJACK. The 
coded variables are derived from the data in ITERATE’s textual chronologies of 
international terrorism. Codification of variables from the data sets inception has 
been consistent. New attributes are coded with the emergence of new terrorist 
groups and events. The data sets are updated on a daily basis. The files can operate 
independently of each other or can be used in association with each other. 
The source data used to compile the ITERATE data sets is eclectic. Information is 
drawn from government agencies, scholars, news media, information services and 
individuals. Chronologies and databases on international terrorism compiled by the 
FBI, US Department of State, the CIA and NCTC are all used by ITERATE staff to 
compile the data sets.  
ITERATE derives information from extensive searches of the world’s main 
news and media organisations, as well as information and research services. Some of 
the key media outlets used include: Agence France-Presse (AFP), Reuters, Associated 
Press (AP), CNN, United Press International (UPI), al Jazeera, CNN, the New York 
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Times, Washington Post and Newsweek. Other source information comes from 
academic publications and related documents. 
 
In addition to established news media services, the ITERATE staff also 
compile source information from interviews with academics and government 
officials working within the terrorism and counter-terrorism field. Where possible, 
former hostages and individuals with direct experience of particular terrorist 
incidents have also been interviewed. 
 
The ITERATE files 
The files can be cross-referenced with each other based upon a unique incident code 
for each event. This permits researchers and analysts to link quantitative data to 
narrative information on terrorist incidents.The vast majority of international 
terrorism incidents within the ITERATE data sets are contained within the COMMON 
file. The COMMON file codes the nature and type of incident, the terrorist group(s) 
involved, if known, and details relating to victims of incidents. This, the largest file, 
covers the period 1968-2007. The data set is continuous from 1968. At the beginning 
of 2010 the files held 13,087 cases relating to acts of international terrorism. The 
COMMON file contains 42 variables. The key variables include: fatalities, victims’ 
wounded, immediate victims of an incident, nationalities of terrorists and terrorist 
groups as well as the nationalities of victims. Victims attachment to a sovereign 
states, NGO’s and IGO’s are also coded. Other variables include type of venue and 
the location of an act of international terrorism, for example territories, 
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protectorates and states. Success or failures of particular terrorist logistics are also 
catalogued. 
The FATE file details the post-incident fate of the perpetrators, if established. 
This could include outcomes such as death, arrest (including numbers arrested) 
escape, prison term, extradition or asylum. The nationalities of individual terrorists 
are also recorded. Requests for extradition, the country requesting extradition and 
the outcome of the request are coded. 
The HOSTAGE file details an array of 41 variables relating to hostage 
situations. This involves such incidents as hostage taking, kidnap, skyjacking and the 
seizure of land-based transport systems (trains, buses, trucks, cars). The key 
variables include the nationalities of the individuals involved in the terrorist incident, 
the duration of the incident and its outcome. Behavioural aspects of terrorists are 
coded. These include demands for press/media attention, the release of certain 
prisoners, requests for political change and requests for ransoms, amounts, and 
ransom sources. Other behavioural traits coded include terrorist’s behaviour 
towards deadlines being met or passing and their relationship towards hostages. 
The SKYJACK file contains 27 variables related to terrorist hijackings and 
includes hijackings undertaken by non-terrorists. These data are also contained 
within the COMMON file. The key variables include the airlines and aircraft involved 
in a particular incident along with the incident location, the number of victims 
involved and any casualties. Negotiating success is recorded. The file also codes the 
type of weapons used in an incident and the duration of the incident. The flight plan 
and embarkation point for the hijacker, if known, can also be coded within the 
SKYJACK file. Further variables within the SKYJACK file include: intended flight 
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destination, the desired destination of the hijackers, stopovers, and refuelling and 
actual end point. The logistical success of a particular hijacking incident is recorded 
and includes such variables as: incident stopped by authorities, aborted by hijackers, 
apparently completed as planned. 
 
DOTS (Data on Terrorist Suspects) 
A recently compiled data set DOTS (Data on Terrorist Suspects) produced by Vinyard 
Software Inc. complements the ITERATE files by recording biographic details of every 
terrorist coded in the ITERATE chronologies on terrorism. Biographic data within the 
database includes information on terrorist leaders, perpetrators, financial backers, 
detainees and defendants. The DOTS database covers the period 1968 until present. 
Vinyard Software Inc. has recently opened a website:  www.vinyardsoftware.com .To 
conclude, some illustrative graphs from ITERATE. 
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Figure 9: International Terrorism Casualties, 1968-2007 (ITERATE) 
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Figure 10: International Terrorist Activity of Three Major Terrorist Groups,  1968-2007 (ITERATE) 
 
 
 BSO = Black September Organization; PIRA = Provisional Irish Republican Army; ETA-M = Basque Liberation 
Movement – Military Wing 
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Name: MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base 
Parent Host Oklahoma City NationalMemorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism (MIPT) 
  
Website: http://www.mipt.org/ 
E-mail: webmaster@mipt.org 
Access: Access was free. Terrorism Knowledge Base has  ceased operation in 
March 2008 
Unit of Analysis Terrorist Incident 
Scope: Domestic and International Terrorism 
Period Covered: 1968-2008 
Principle sources Open-source material 
Key Variables N/A 
 
 
MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base 
(NB: The MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base ceased operation on the 31st March 2008. 
However, old MIPT files up to March 2008 can still be seen using the  
www.archive.org website).  
 
Introduction 
The MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) launched in 2004, provided public access 
to a large collection of information on terrorist groups and their leaders, terrorist 
incidents and terrorist related court-case information. The TKB was free and 
completely Internet-based. The knowledge base provided information on both 
domestic and international terrorism. 
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Data for the TKB came from four key sources: the RAND Terrorism Chronology 1968-
1997; the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database (1998-2008); the Terrorism 
Indictment Database at the Universities of Arkansas and Oklahoma; and DFI 
International, a research, analysis and consultancy organisation. 
The TKB portal provided a fully integrated array of textual, graphical and 
multimedia terrorism data and information. In addition to providing core data on 
terrorist leaders, groups and incidents, the knowledge base provided contextualised 
in-depth background material on terrorist group histories, their affiliations, tactics 
employed and their geographic locations. The format also included biographical 
details, summaries, interactive maps and the ability for users to generate statistical 
data and dynamic graphs.  
 
Definition 
The TKBs defined an act of terrorism as: ‘Terrorism is violence, or the threat of 
violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are 
designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or 
refrain from actions they desired to take. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would 
also be violation of the rules of war if a state of war existed. This violence or threat 
of violence is generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists 
are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve 
maximum publicity. Unlike other criminal acts, terrorists often claim credit for their 
acts. Finally, terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate 
physical damage of the cause, having long-term psychological repercussions on a 
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particular target audience. The fear created by terrorists may be intended to cause 
people to exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist and the importance of the cause, 
to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate 
and thereby enforce compliance with their demands’. (Source: TKB’s Glossary). 
RAND verified all terrorist incidents entered within the TKB. 
 
Functionality and TKB Maps 
The TKB provided researchers with a wide range of search functions. Users were able 
to conduct basic searches by keywords or use an advanced search facility. Using 
drop-down menus, the advanced function allowed users to cross-query all elements 
of the knowledge base including location, terrorist groups, leaders, terrorist 
incidents and any related legal cases.  In addition, the TKB also contained an Image 
Archive of terrorist groups, leaders, and attacks. This could be searched by keyword, 
name of individual or group name. 
Another graphical feature of the TKB was TKB Maps. This allowed researchers 
access to a series of interactive maps giving satellite imagery of relevant geographic 
areas. Temporal and spatial map images could be generated indicating the location 
of group attacks, the volume of attacks and the type of targets attacked. Data could 
be filtered and overlay functions also allowed users to display major infrastructure 
such as highways, pipelines and airports. 
 
Knowledge Base Directory and TKB Profiles 
The Knowledge Base Directory of the TKB provided researchers with the ability to 
search for information using several variables. For example searches by terrorist 
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group, their location and ideology. Other search functions permitted a breakdown of 
terrorist information by country, date or legal cases, ideology and tactic. 
TKB profiles offered researchers an eclectic collection of terrorism related 
information dating back to 1968.  Drawing together information on a particular 
incident and related case data the profiles function of the TKB provided a one-stop 
dossier for terrorism analysis. 
The terrorist incident profile provided factual information relating to the 
terrorist group, dates, location, targets, tactics and statistical data on numbers 
injured and killed.  Complementing this was the TKB’s case profiles. This facility 
provided legal data and information pertaining to terrorism investigations 
undertaken by the FBI. This information collected by TKB analysts included 
indictment data and court documentation.  Where available, details of charges, 
evidence presented within cases and sentencing results were made available. In 
more complicated court cases cross-referencing of terrorist group connections were 
indicated. A further search tool gave access to detailed group, leader and 
membership profiles. This provided researchers with historical background on 
terrorist groups and their affiliates, as well as information on a terrorist group’s 
philosophy and goals.    
 
Analytical Tools 
Using web-based technologies the TKB provided terrorism researchers with a series 
of flexible analytical tools that could generate a series of tables, charts and graphs 
derived from terrorism incident data and legal data based upon the indictment and 
prosecution of terrorists. Pre-defined statistical data on terrorism incidents could 
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also be accessed. Its rivals and successors have so far not matched the user-
friendliness of MIPT’s database.  
The Incident Analysis Wizard enabled a step-by-step process for users to 
generate a series of pie-line-bar-and 3-dimensional graphics based upon specific 
criteria. For example, comparative terrorism trends over time or more detailed data 
and graphics on injury and fatality ranges. 
The Statistical Incident Reports generated a series of interactive reports 
providing statistical data on terrorist incidents, including such variables as date of 
attack, target group, perpetrators, incident location and tactics employed.  Statistical 
data taken from indictment data sets and outcome statistics of legal cases could also 
be compiled using TKB’s software. The group comparison function of TKB was even 
able to compare and present on screen side-by-side statistical analysis of up to a 
dozen terrorist groups. 
 
Reference Material 
The MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base provided links to a comprehensive collection of 
terrorism related data and information held within the MIPT Library. In addition to 
hard-copy and “PDF” documents a large array of CD-ROM, audio/visual material, 
proceedings, books and governmental documentation could be obtained via the 
TKB’s website. This included Country Reports, Patterns of Global Terrorism, the FBI’s 
Terrorism in the U.S. and MIPT’s Terrorism Annuals. Some of the TKB data have been 
transferred to the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database.  
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Figure 11: Worldwide Terrorist Incidents by Year, 1999 - 2005  (MIPT) 
 
 
Figure 12: Top Twenty Countries in terms of Terrorist Fatalities per Million People       
               1968-2006 (MIPT)* 
1.Iraq………………………………………………………………….439 
2.Lebanon……………………………………………………………..329 
3.Israel…………………………………………………….…………..229 
4.Westbank ………………………………………….………………..228 
5.Colombia……………………………………………………………..32 
6. Cyprus……………………………………………………………… 32 
7.Algeria………………………………………………………………..30 
8.Angola………………………………………………….…………….30 
9.Afghanistan………………………………………….………….…….29 
10.Uganda……………………………………………………………….19 
11.Chad………………………………………………………………….18 
12.Jordan………………………………………………………….……..15 
13.Kuwait…….………………………………………………………….14 
14.Greece ………………………………………………………………. 14 
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15.Saudi Arabia………………………………………………………….12 
16.Mauritania…………………………………………………………….12 
17.Somalia………………………………………………………….…….11 
18.Georgia…………………………………………………………..……11 
19.United States…………………………………………………….……11 
20.Canada…………………………………………………………….…..10 
Weighted average for135 countries………………………….………..…….14 
*Excluded from his list were five small countries: Barbados (261 per million), Gibraltar (107 per million), Djibouti (25 per 
million), Bahrain  (18 per million) and East Timor (10 per million). It should be kept in mind that victims of domestic terrorism 
are counted by MIPT only from 1998 onwards. Source: MIPT as processed by 
http://www.nationmaster.com/red/graph/ter_ter_act_196_fat_percap-1968-2006-fatalities-per-capita&b_printable=1 
(accessed 27 June 2010). 
 
Name: RAND – Worldwide Terrorism Incident Database (RWTID) 
Parent Host The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. United States 
Website: http://www.rand.org/ise/projects/terrorismdatabase/ 
E-mail: http://www.rand.org/ise/projects/terrorismdatabase/about/contact.
html 
Access: Partly free; partly subscription-based 
Unit of Analysis Terrorist Incident 
Scope: Domestic and International Terrorism 
Period Covered: 1968-2008 
Principle sources Open-source material 
Key Variables Search term, start date, end date, region, country, perpetrator, 
tactic, weapon, target 
 
 
RAND – Worldwide Terrorism Incident Database (RWTID) 
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Introduction 
The RAND Corporation is a non-profit institution with headquarters based in Santa 
Monica, California. The aim of RAND, which works closely with the US defence 
establishment is to improve policy and decision-making through research and 
analysis.  
For nearly forty years the RAND Corporation has collected data on terrorism. 
This was initiated by two key events: the Japanese Red Army’s massacre at Lod 
Airport, Israel, and the Black September terrorist attacks on the 1972 Munich 
Summer Olympic Games. As a result of these terrorist incidents, the RAND 
Corporation was asked by the U.S. Government’s newly formed Cabinet Committee 
to Combat Terrorism to examine recent trends in terrorism. As part of this project 
the RAND Terrorism Chronology was established in 1972. Some card/index system 
recording international terrorism incidents are thought to have been recorded at 
RAND before that. The temporal period for the chronology dates from 1968 until the 
present day. Until its joint venture in 2004 with the Memorial Institute for the 
Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), the RAND Chronology dealt exclusively with 
international terrorism incidents from 1968-1997. From 2004 onwards RAND-MIPT 
began to record both domestic and international terrorist incidents worldwide, 
covering the period 1998 to 2008. 
The RAND Terrorism Chronology has developed and evolved over the years 
into what is now a terrorism database system. The core ownership and stewardship 
of the database has always remained with RAND. However, joint operational running 
of the chronology and database has periodically been shared with other institutions. 
What was originally for many years the RAND Terrorism Chronology, became the 
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RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism (1994-1998) when Bruce 
Hoffman became director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political 
Violence in St. Andrews, and then, after the return of Hoffman to the US, the RAND-
MIPT Terrorism Incident Database (2004-2008). With the cessation of the Memorial 
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT)Terrorism Knowledge Base® (TKB®) in 
2008, the RAND component of the data reverted back to RAND. Incorporating the 
original RAND Terrorism Chronology and the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident 
Database the new database is now known as the RAND Worldwide Terrorism 
Incident Database (RWTID), covering both domestic (in-country) and international 
(cross-border/trans-national) terrorism. 
Overview of RWTID 
The RAND Worldwide Terrorism Incident Database (RWTID) now holds in excess of 
36,000 terrorist incidents. Full access to the database is via a Web subscription 
service, established in January 2009. RAND defines terrorism for the purposes of the 
RWTID as: ‘.... violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm to 
coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from 
actions they desired to take. Acts of terrorism are generally directed against civilian 
targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally 
carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity’ (Source: RAND Website). 
On a functional level the RWTID is operated by users selecting and filtering 
variables from a series of menus. The key variables the database can be queried on 
are: start date, end date, region, country, perpetrator, tactic, weapon, and target. 
Other filters allow users to query additional discrete variables: suicide attack, 
international incident, domestic incident, attacks claimed, coordinated, fatalities 
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(numbers) and injuries (numbers). The database can also be queried on keywords 
that could be contained within the narrative description of a particular incident. 
The output for the RWTID comes in three formats: incidents lists, pie charts 
and chronological graphs. The incident lists contain core variables such as date of 
attack, location and perpetrator, if known. Accompanying this is a narrative 
description of the incident. The resultant data can also be exported into a 
spreadsheet format. The pie chart output allows users to generate charts based 
upon filtered variables from the database. This is presented in a graphical pie format 
with accompanying statistical data in a table format. For example, this could be the 
percentage of incidents undertaken by a terrorist group over a particular period of 
time and a total count of incidents by each respective group. The chronological 
graphs come in to two forms: cumulative graphs and incident frequency graphs. The 
cumulative graph is generated in a bar chart format and relates to the injuries or 
fatalities incurred in any particular incident(s) over a specified time period specified 
within the database. The incident frequency chronological graphs are generated 
based upon matches occurring from the users search criteria and display aggregate 
totals based upon a choice of three time intervals: days, months or years. 
 
RAND’s Voices of Jihad Database 
The RAND Voices of Jihad Database project allows researchers access to a large array 
of interviews, speeches, statements and publications by jihadist leaders and their 
supporters. The information is sourced from publicly accessible websites, with the 
vast majority of material available in English translation form. 
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The database covers a broad range of areas of what RAND identifies as 
‘Jihadist ideology’. These include worldviews, for example, on democracy or the role 
of women. Other areas include the justification of terror, grievances (against the 
West) as well as strategy and tactics. 
Access to the material is via a simple query box. Users are then presented 
with links to original material and, dependent upon availability, full-text documents. 
To conclude, here are some sample figures from the RAND-MIPT database: 
Figure 13: Terrorist Incidents by Weapon, RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident  Database, 1 Jan. 2005  - 31 
Dec. 2005 (MIPT Terrorism Annual 2006) 
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Figure 14: Terrorist Incidents by Target, RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, 
                  1 Jan. 2005  - 31 Dec. 2005   (MIPT Terrorism Annual 2006) 
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Figure 15: Domestic Incidents of Terrorism by Region, RAND-MIPT Terrorism  Incident Database, 1 
Jan. 2005  - 31 Dec. 2005    (MIPT Terrorism Annual 2006) 
 
 
Name: Country Reports on Terrorism – United States Department of State 
Parent Host United States Department of State 
Website: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/ 
E-mail: Via website: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/ 
Access: Free 
Unit of Analysis Terrorist Incident 
Scope: Domestic and International Terrorism 
Period Covered: First published 2004. Yearly report 
Principle sources Government sources, unclassified and open-source material 
Key Variables Country by country overview 
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Country Reports on Terrorism – United States Department of State 
Introduction  
The Country Reports on Terrorism were first published in 2004, replacing the annual 
Patterns of Global Terrorism publication. The United States Secretary of State is 
legally required to present to Congress annually, by the 30th April each year, the 
Country Reports on Terrorism. The report covers groups and countries as stipulated 
in legislation.  
 
Historical Background 
The United States Government’s (USG) publication of an annual report on 
international terrorism dates back to 1977.  Published by the CIA, the first report was 
titled “International Terrorism in 1976”. In brief, the key aims of the report were to 
outline the scope and nature of international terrorism within a historical context 
and to discuss trends in international terrorism and their likely bearing upon the 
United States in the coming year. Numerous modifications to the publication 
occurred over the years. These ranged from changes of definitions of international 
terrorism, expanded narrative, addition of statistical appendices, to changes in 
statistical criteria. Other developments included the introduction of a chronology of 
significant terrorist incidents, the transfer of the publication to the State Department 
(1982) and a title change to “Patterns of Global Terrorism” (1984). Over the years 
the annual report evolved into the United States Governments key publication on 
statistics, trends and developments in international terrorism.  
The final Patterns of Global Terrorism was published in 2004. The reports 
termination was the result of series of complex data integrity issues questioning the 
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accuracy of the statistical data in Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003.  As a result of 
academic questioning and media and political unease, the U.S. State Department 
radically overhauled their annual report on international terrorism. Re-named as 
“Country Reports on Terrorism”, the annual report is confined to narrative 
commentary. The statistical element on terrorism incidents is now produced by the 
National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) and can be accessed via their website: 
www.nctc.gov. 
 
 Country Reports on Terrorism 
The annual Country Reports on Terrorism, published by the U.S. Department of 
State, provides a comprehensive assessment worldwide of terrorism incidents, 
commentary on terrorism related issues, factual data and legal requirements.The 
first chapter of the Country Reports on Terrorism – 2007 is titled “Strategic 
Assessment”. This offers a backdrop to the overall report. It discusses trends in 
terrorism for the particular year of publication, as well as highlighting continuing 
areas of concern.  Chapter Two provides an initial overview of the following 
geographic regions: Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Europe, Middle East and North 
Africa, South and Central Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. A detailed breakdown 
of developments within each country is provided. These include, for example, 
information on government action, counter-terrorism initiatives, new legislation, co-
operation agreements and terrorist trials and outcomes. Other information includes 
combating terrorism finance, terrorist group activity and introduction of new 
technologies to counter acts of terrorism. 
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Chapter Three of the Country Report on Terrorism is dedicated to state 
sponsors of terrorism. The State Department cites five countries that meet their 
criteria: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. An overview of state sponsored 
terrorism is given, accompanied by four key sanctions applied to the above states. In 
summary these are: 1) The banning of arms-related exports and sales. 2) Controls 
over the exports of dual-use items. 3) Prohibition on economic assistance. 4) 
Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions. Detailed narrative 
explaining respective countries sponsorship of terrorism is provided. 
Chapter Four addresses the global challenges posed by Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) and danger that any of them might fall into the hands of non-
state terrorists.  An outline of how the United States approaches the issue of WDM 
on a diplomatic and strategic level is given. Several other areas are discussed. This 
includes the types of material that may be used by terrorists in WMD attacks, such 
as chemical, nuclear, biological and radiological substances and agents. The chapter 
also highlights concerns that either a state or the resources of a state may be used to 
conduct a WMD attack. Conversely, worries over emerging non-state facilitators 
acting knowingly or un-knowingly as a channel for access to resources and expertise 
that could potential lead to a WMD attack are also raised. Finally, a series of bilateral 
and multilateral partnerships with the United States, aimed at combating Weapons 
of Mass Destruction are discussed.  
Chapter Five provides updated information on terrorist safe havens. This 
relates to the requirement by Congress, that the Country Reports on Terrorism 
provides an update of information on what the U.S. State Department identifies as 
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terrorist safe havens or sanctuaries, as stipulated in the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), section 7120(b). 
A list of what the State Department identifies as “U.S. Government 
Designated Foreign Terrorist Organisations” (FTO) is provided in Chapter Six. An 
explanation of the terrorist group’s names and their aliases is given. In addition, a 
series of brief narratives provides a description of the groups, their activities, 
strength, location/area of operation and any external aid received.  The final chapter 
of the Country Reports on Terrorism provides U.S. legislative requirements relating 
to the report and key terms used. An annex attached to the report provides 
statistical information used in the compilation of the document. Discussion includes, 
how, with support from the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), statistical 
information for the reports are developed. Other areas covered include data 
interpretation, methodology, and an academic perspective on the statistical data 
used in the reports. 
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Figure 16: Total International Terrorist Attacks, 1982-2003 
(Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003) 
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Figure 17: Incidents of Terrorism Worldwide  (Country Reports on Terrorism 2008:  
National Counterterrorism Center: Annex of Statistical Information) 
 
 
 
 
Name: Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED) 
Parent Host Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Norway 
Website: http://folk.uib.no/sspje/tweed.htm 
E-mail: jan.engene@isp.uib.no 
Access: Free 
Unit of Analysis Terrorist Incidents in Western Europe 
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Scope: Internal terrorism within 18 designated Western European Countries 
Period Covered: 1950-2008 
Principle sources Keesing’s  Record of World Events 
Key Variables Date, month, year, country, type of agent, acting group 
 
 
Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED) 
 
Introduction 
The Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED) was designed and compiled 
by Dr. Jan Oskar Engene of the Department of Comparative Politics, University of 
Bergen, Norway. The function of the data set is to allow researchers to analyse 
patterns of terrorism in Western Europe, whereby these are specifically related to 
historical and structural pre-conditions (Engene, 1994, 1998, 2004) and 
(Engene&Skjølberg, 2002). The key unit of analysis within TWEED is the terrorism 
event, as well as any action undertaken against terrorists or terrorist groups. 
The TWEED data set, covering the period 1950-2004, codes data and 
information on terrorism events covering 18 countries in Western Europe. The data 
set records only internal (domestic) terrorism events and does not include acts of 
international terrorism.  
 
Definition 
For the purposes of the TWEED data set ‘...terrorism is understood theoretically as a 
form of violence that uses targets of violence in an indirect way in order to influence 
third parties, audiences’ (Source: http://folk.uib.no/sspje/tweed.htm). Given the 
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theoretical and abstract nature of the definition for practical/operational running of 
the data set, the definitional criteria for an act of terrorism is used with reference to 
concrete terrorist events like bombings, shootings, sieges, explosions, kidnap and 
armed attacks.  
 
General 
Only acts of internal terrorism are coded within TWEED, and only incidents carried 
out by individuals or groups originating from the designated 18 Western European 
countries are used within the data set. There are occasional exceptions, whereby an 
agent from another Western European country perpetrates an incident in one of the 
18 countries.   
The sole source used for the TWEED data setis Keesing’s Record of World 
Events (formerly Keesing’s Contemporary Archives). Keesing’s longitudinal coverage 
of news events worldwide, dates back to 1931. However, Dr. Engene established 
1950 as the start date for his data collection. In comparison, most other terrorism 
data sets have covered the temporal period 1968 onwards.   
 
The TWEED data set records a total of 2,959 deaths attributed to terrorist 
agents. A total of 11,026 terrorist events are coded within the data set. The TWEED 
code-book (as PDF) and data set (SPSS) are both available for download from the 
TWEED website. 
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Figure 18: Internal Terrorism in Western Europe, 1950-2004 (TWEED at 
http://folk.uib.no/sspje/tweed.htm ) 
 
 
 
Name: South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) 
Parent Host Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, India 
Website: http://www.satp.org/ 
E-mail: icm@satp.org 
Access: Free 
Unit of Analysis Terrorist Incident 
Scope: Domestic and International Terrorism in the South Asia regions 
Period Covered: Varying years dependent upon country 
Principle sources Open source material 
Key Variables Date, incident 
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South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) 
Introduction 
The Institute operates the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) established in 2000, for 
Conflict Management, New Delhi, India. The Institute is a registered non-profit, non-
governmental organisation. Geographically the SATP covers: Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In addition, the Select States of India are 
included: Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab and 
Tripura. 
The SATP is entirely Web-based.  The portal provides a comprehensive 
mixture of detailed narrative, chronological listings, statistical data, graphs, maps 
and documentation on terrorist incidents and events in the South Asia regions. 
Information can be accessed via a series of hyperlinks or by using the search facility 
within the website.The SATP is organised into a series of sections: 
Assessment and Backgrounder 
The Assessment section of the SATP provides a yearly in-depth review of the political 
climate within each country, and details terrorist events and activities over the year. 
Statistical data and tables from the SATP database are also included within the 
Assessments. 
The Backgrounder section provides an historical context to political conflict 
and terrorism within regions and countries covered by the SATP.  Detailed narrative 
is provided on the genesis of terrorist groups and the origins of particular conflicts. In 
addition, developments such as counter-terrorist operations, peace accords and 
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negotiations between particular parties and their outcomes are discussed. The 
Backgrounder also includes statistical data on terrorism injuries and fatalities and 
provides hyperlinks to in-depth information on particular terrorist groups and other 
related material. 
 
Bibliography and Data Sheets 
The website also provides a two-part bibliography listing books and articles for each 
country covered by the South Asian Terrorism Portal.For each respective country, 
the SATP Data Sheets provide an eclectic mixture of data including: chronological 
listings of bomb blasts, terrorist attacks, fatality statistics, insurgency activities, 
assassinations, conflict maps and elections results. The temporal period covered 
varies between each country and region. Data is sourced from local news reports. 
 
Documents and Timelines 
The Documents section provides terrorism researchers with primary source 
documentation relating to respective SATP countries and regions. These include legal 
documentation such as acts and ordinances, treaties and regulations on terrorism 
related matters. Additional papers are provided in the form of political speeches, 
statements and committee reports dealing with security, terrorism and conflict.  
 The Timeline provides a chronological format, broken down by day, month 
and year, detailing terrorist incidents, arrests of individuals, police/security force 
action, trials and outcome of trials. The Timeline covers information for the past 
seven or eight years. Summary information on key historical terrorism and political 
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events within each country is also provided. Dependent upon the country or region, 
this covers between the past fifty and a hundred years. 
 
Terrorist Groups 
The Terrorist Group section provides a comprehensive list of terrorist groups 
associated with a particular SATP country or region. Further in-depth information is 
provided with some of the groups listed. This includes the origins of a particular 
terrorist group, their objectives and ideology, leadership and group size and 
organisation. Where available, information is also provided on terrorist group 
funding, type of weaponry used in incidents, and details of specific terrorist attacks 
carried out by the group. 
 
The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) 
The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly publication produced by the 
SATP and provides a mixture of news and assessments on terrorism and counter-
terrorism related activities within the South Asia region. Further assessment and 
analysis on insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare is also discussed. In addition, 
the SAIR also covers terrorism policy and response issues as well as social, political 
and economic topics related to the region. Advance copies of The South Asia 
Intelligence Review (SAIR) are available via e-mail subscription. 
The South Asia Terrorism Portal does not offer systematic aggregate annual 
data. A typical weekly assessment looks like this: 
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Figure 19: Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia, 9 -15 March, 2009  (SATP, Weekly 
Assessments & Briefings, Vol. 7, No. 36, 16 March 2009) 
  Civilian 
Security Force 
Personnel 
Terrorist/Insurgent  Total  
INDIA    
Arunachal 
Pradesh 
0 0 3 3 
Assam 1 0 0 1 
Jammu and 
Kashmir 
1 0 8 9 
Manipur 1 0 6 7 
Left-wing 
Extremism 
  
Bihar 5 0 1 6 
Chhattisgarh 0 0 2 2 
Jharkhand 1 0 3 4 
Total (INDIA)  9 0 23 32 
PAKISTAN   
Balochistan 2 1 0 3 
FATA 8 0 42 50 
NWFP 14 0 37 51 
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Total 
(PAKISTAN) 
24 1 79 104 
SRI LANKA* 89 NA 360 449 
*The Ministry of Defence, Sri Lanka Government, has suspended release of casualty figures. 
Media access to areas of conflict is also denied, and no independent sources of data are 
now available. Civilian data is based on information published by the pro-LTTE Website 
Tamil Net. -  Provisional data compiled from English language media sources. 
 
Name: The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) – 
Terrorist Incident Database 
Parent Host International Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT), Interdisciplinary 
Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel 
Website: http://www.ict.org.il/ 
E-mail: Via website 
Access: Access status currently unknown 
Unit of Analysis Terrorist Incident 
Scope: Primarily, but not exclusively, terrorist incidents in the Middle East 
Period Covered: 1975-2008 
Principle sources Open-source material 
Key Variables Organisation, method used, target type, location, date range, 
casualties 
 
 
The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) – Terrorist Incident 
Database 
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Introduction 
The Terrorist Incident Database, is operated by the International Institute for 
Counter Terrorism (ICT) at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel. The ICT, 
an independent think-tank, is a non-profit organisation. The ICT provides specialist 
advice and expertise in a broad range of security related fields, including terrorism 
and counter-terrorism, homeland security and intelligence analysis. The ICT’s 
Terrorist Incident Database is an interactive web-based database focusing primarily, 
but not exclusively on terrorism incidents in the Middle East.  
 
The Terrorist Incident Database and Terrorist Organizations 
The original Terrorist Incident Database dates back to 1975 and now contains in 
excess of 31,000 incidents. The database is divided into three key areas: Terrorist 
Organisations, International Terrorism and Arab-Israeli Conflict. This section profiles 
over fifty terrorist organisations and their national affiliations. Links to each group 
provides in-depth information on a particular terrorist organisation. This includes an 
explanation of the group’s name, a historical background to the group’s 
development and its ideology and strategy. Detailed narrative on a terrorist group’s 
organisational structure is also given, including leadership, hierarchy and the military 
arm (if existing) associated with a particular group. If available, information on 
terrorist group financing and operations to counter-act funding of groups is 
provided. The terrorist organisations section also displays terrorist group insignia, 
and provides a chronological listing of terrorist attacks associated with each group. 
An extensive selection of primary and secondary source articles and documents 
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relating to each individual terrorist group are also made available within this section 
of the database. 
The Terror Attack Database permits researchers to query international 
terrorist incidents from 1986 onwards. The ICT updates the database monthly; 
however, the database is not exhaustive. Using a series of drop down menus, the 
Terror Attack Database can be queried using a combination of up to six fields: 
Organisation (name of terrorist organisation), Method Used (tactics – for example, 
bombing, chemical attack, hijacking, incendiary device), Target Type (for example, 
embassy, school, airport), Location (worldwide), Date Range (1986 onwards) and 
Casualties (numbers).   
The Arab-Israeli Conflict database allows researchers to search for incidents 
and casualties related specifically to the Middle East conflict. A combination of six 
drop-down fields can be searched: Type of Incident (for example, terror attack, 
internecine violence, violent clash), Terrorist Organisation Involved (these are 
restricted to Middle East Groups within the menu), Method Used (tactic – letter 
bomb, suicide car bomb, mortar attack), Targeted (type of place or person targeted), 
Location (Gaza Strip, Israel, Palestine, West Bank, unknown), Date Range (1986-
2006) and Casualties (numbers). 
 
OSINT (Open Sources of Intelligence) 
In recent years ICT has expanded its terrorism monitoring systems with the 
development of OSINT (Open Sources of Intelligence). Based upon open source 
intelligence the OSINT system is linked to ICT’s Incidents and Activists Database.  
Interactively based, the OSINT system allows data to be linked relationally and cross-
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referenced. Holding in excess of 31,000 incidents the database records both foiled 
and completed terrorist attacks as well as counter-terrorist operations. The system is 
also able to provide background narrative detail and follow-up information. 
 
Figure 20: All Israeli Fatalities, Monthly, Palestinian – Israeli Conflict,   2000-2003 (www.ict.org.il) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: All Palestinian Fatalities, Monthly, Palestinian – Israeli Conflict,  2000-2003 (www.ict.org.il) 
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Name: Political Terror Scale (PTS) 
Parent Host University of North Carolina at Asheville, United States 
Website: http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ 
E-mail: mgibney@unca.edu 
Access: Free 
Unit of Analysis Political Violence and Terror 
Scope: Global 
Period Covered: 1976-2007 
Principle sources United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices and Amnesty International’s yearly reports 
Key Variables Region, income level, OECD status, COW# scale (1-5) per year 
 
Political Terror Scale (PTS) 
Introduction 
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The Political Terror Scale (PTS), originally developed at Purdue University in the early 
1980’s, is a data set measuring yearly levels of political violence and terrorism by 
state actors. The PTS covers more than 180 countries with a temporal range 1976 to 
2007.  The data set is updated annually. Since 1984 Mark Gibney, based now at the 
University of North Carolina at Asheville, has managed the PTS. 
 
The Data Set 
The Political Terror Scale uses as a measurement a scale of 1-5 to determine levels of 
political terrorism and repressive human rights practices occurring within countries 
within any one year. The terror scale was originally developed by the independent 
organisation Freedom House. Although the PTS title implies a focus on political 
terrorism, it is essentially a data set on human rights violations by states. The term 
terror used by the PTS ‘.... refers to state-sanctioned killings, torture, disappearances 
and political imprisonment...’ (Source: Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.). The data 
set records primarily levels of state-sanctioned violence. However, some forms of 
non-state violence are included, for example in civil war situations. The PTS emphasis 
is on the measurement of actual physical integrity violations rather than levels of 
general political repression within the state. 
 
Figure  22: Political Terror Scale Levels 
  
Level 5 Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no 
limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological 
goals. 
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Level 4 Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. 
Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, 
on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. 
Level 3 There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. 
Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, 
with or without a trial, for political views is accepted. 
Level 2 There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few 
persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare. 
Level 1 Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and 
torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. 
 Source: http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/about.php 
 
The highest level of political terror (scale 5), ranges from terror that has reached the 
whole population of a country to the lowest (scale 1) where countries have secure 
rule of law, freedom of expression is permitted, and politically motivated murder 
and torture is extremely rare. In addition to the scale rating of 1-5, the dynamics of 
the political terror scales are also based upon more subtle conceptual levels. The 
assumption is that the measurement of state use of violence can also be based on 
the trinity of: scope, intensity and range. The first dimension, scope, would indicate 
the actual type of violence that the state conducts. This could include killings, torture 
and imprisonment. The second dimension, intensity, relates to how often the state 
conducts a particular type of violence within a specified period; for the PTS this 
would be within any one year. The intensity variable also refers to the number of 
individuals targeted by the state. The third dimension, range, records the actual 
segment(s) of society encountering state violence. 
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The PTS uses two sources to compile the data set: the U.S. State Department 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and Amnesty International’s yearly 
report. Both the Political Terror Scale ratings and countries data can be downloaded 
via the web in spreadsheet format. The PTS website provides users with an 
interactive map of geographic regions and country breakdown. This lists the PTS 
scores arrived from both coding Amnesty International and the U.S. State 
Department annual reports. The scores derived from these two sources do not 
diverge as much as one would expect. As an instrument to measure state use of 
terrorism rather than non-state use of such violence, this database is unique. 
However, it has its measurement problems, placing sometimes countries on the 
same level that have quite different levels of democracy and adherence to the rule 
of law.   
 
 
Figure 23: Increasing Human Insecurity, 1976-2008 (Median Scores) 
(www.politicalterrorscale.orghttp://www.ict.org.il). 
 
185 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Decreasing Human Insecurity 1976-2008 (Median Scores) 
(www.politicalterrorscale.orghttp://www.ict.org.il). 
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Name: The American Terrorism Study, 1980-2002 
Parent Host Terrorism Research Center, Fulbright College, University of Arkansas, AR 
United States 
Website: http://trc.uark.edu/index.php/rschProjects/1 See also: 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD/STUDY/04639.xml 
E-mail: bls@uark.edu 
Access: Free via www.icpsr.umich.edu website. Certain identifying information 
within the dataset is restricted. 
Unit of Analysis Administrative records data 
Scope: Indictments from federal "domestic security/terrorism investigations" in the 
United States from 1980 to 2002. 
187 
 
Period Covered: January 1980 - August 2002 
Principle sources United States District Court case records 
Key Variables Demographic information, terrorist group information, prosecution and 
defence data. Count/case outcome and sentencing data 
 
 
The American Terrorism Study, 1980-2002 
The American Terrorism Study (ATS) was established in 1989 by Brent L. Smith of the 
University of Arkansas and Kelly R. Damphouse of the University of Oklahoma. The 
origins of the project were driven by the paucity of data on acts of American 
terrorism. Source data for the study came from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
(FBI) Terrorist Research and Analytical Center. In 1989 the Center released a list of 
individuals who had been indicted following investigation under the FBI’s 
Counterterrorism Program. One of the key aims of the study was to establish an 
empirical database to permit researchers to evaluate criminological theories and 
government policy. The American Terrorism Study comprises of two key constituent 
parts: a statistical database and a series of .PDF files containing case documents. 
These include such items as indictments, judgment orders and sentencing 
memoranda. 
From the list of persons who had been indicted in federal criminal courts, the 
results of  official terrorism investigations, the research team was  able to review 
each case. The review was undertaken at two venues: the federal district court – the 
actual location where the case was tried, and the federal regional records center, 
which held archive records of the cases. 
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The American Terrorism Study consists of five data sets (Parts 1-5). Each 
dataset contains approximately 80 variables. The variables are categorized into four 
key areas: (1) demographic information, (2) information on the terrorist group of 
which the indictee is a member (3) prosecution and defense data, and (4) count/case 
outcome and sentencing data (ICPSR). 
The basic data set Part 1 – Counts Data contains data ‘on every count for 
each indictee in each indictment’. Between 1980 and 2002 there were 7,306 counts. 
Part 2 – Indictees Data contains information on every indictee recorded between 
1980 and 2002. This amounted to 574 indictees. Part 3 – Persons Data contains 
information every person (510 in total) indicted by the federal government as a 
consequence of a terrorism investigation. Part 4  - Cases Data contains data on every 
criminal terrorism case that took place as a consequence of a federal terrorism 
investigation. The final dataset Part 5 – Group Data ‘provides one line of case data 
for each of the 85 groups that were tried in federal court for terrorism-related 
activity’ (Source: ICPSR). The FBI has made subsequent lists of data available to the 
principal investigators. The core ATS dataset is in the process of being merged with 
the geospatial and temporal projects datasets at the University of Arkansas. 
 
Name: The European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 
Parent Host Europol 
Website: http://www.europol.europa.eu/ 
E-mail: Via website 
Access: Free 
Unit of Analysis Terrorist Incidents within the European Union 
Scope: European Union 
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Period Covered: 2006-2008 and ongoing 
Principle sources Government figures and open-source material 
Key Variables N/A 
 
 
The European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 
 
The European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) is published on 
an annual basis by Europol. Its origins derive from the terrorism events of September 
11th 2001. The TE-SAT report is presented to the European Parliament on behalf of 
the Terrorism Working Party (TWP) of the Council of the EU. The remit of TE-SAT is 
to make available basic factual data, and information on terrorism within the 
European Union (EU). The TE-SAT report is aimed at interested law enforcement 
officials, policymakers and the general public. It is a publicly available, unclassified 
publication, and can be accessed via the Internet. Source information for the TE-SAT 
report is mostly provided and verified by recognised EU member state law 
enforcement officials. Additional open source information is also used. As well as 
factual and statistical information, the TE-SAT report seeks to identify trends and 
developments in terrorism within the European Union. The most recent report 
(2010) covers terrorism data for the period 2006-09. 
The format of the report is divided into a series of sections. These are: 
methodology and data collection, a general overview of terrorism in the EU for 2008, 
Islamist terrorism and ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism. The remaining 
sections address left-wing and anarchist terrorism, right-wing terrorism, single issues 
terrorism and terrorism trends in the EU. Each section contains narrative 
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commentary and analysis on terrorist attacks, arrested suspects and terrorist 
activities, as well as data, tables and graphics. Annexes defining terrorist offences, 
legal and definitional issues and basic statistical data for each EU member country 
are provided.  
The Europol database suffers from the use of different definitions of what 
constitutes terrorism in different member states – despite the fact that there is a 
common EU framework definition. It also suffers from the fact that some countries 
provide a great deal of data (e.g. France and Spain) and many others far fewer 
(United Kingdom). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Number of failed, foiled or successful attacks and number of arrested suspects for 
separatist terrorism in member states 2006-2008 (TE-SAT Report 2009). 
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Figure 26: Left-wing and Anarchist Terrorist Attacks by Target, 2006-2008 
(TE-SAT Report 2009) 
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Name: Global Pathfinder 
Parent Host International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research 
(ICPVTR), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. 
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Website: http://www.pvtr.org/ 
E-mail: iskelvinder@ntu.edu.sg 
Access: Subscription 
Unit of Analysis Terrorist Incident 
Scope: Terrorism globally, but special focus on terrorism and political 
violence within the Asia-Pacific region 
Period Covered: N/A 
Principle sources Primary documents and open-source material 
Key Variables Profiles of terrorist groups, individuals, terrorist and counter-
terrorist incident details, terror attack profiles 
 
 
Global Pathfinder 
 
The Global Pathfinder is a terrorism database operated by the International Centre 
for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) within S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies, Singapore.  The Global Pathfinder database collects data on 
terrorism globally. However, it specialises in terrorism and political violence within 
the Asia-Pacific area, concentrating on Southeast Asia, North Asia, South Asia, 
Central Asia and Oceania. Information within the database is open source and 
proprietary. The database is a subscription-based service. 
 
The Global Pathfinder database is divided into five key areas: 1. Profiles of 
terrorist groups and individuals. 2. Support Data – terrorist and CT incident details, 
terrorist attack profiles, information repository, news and sources. 3. Counter-
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Terrorism Security – for example agriculture and food, nuclear issues and 
transportation. 4. Strategic Counter-Terrorism – for example ideology, informatics, 
legislation and terrorist financing. 5. Country of concern.  
The database contains a broad range of documents. These include: primary 
documents, terrorist training manuals, legal documents, interviews with terrorists 
and photographic material. Non-English jihadi website documents within the 
database are translated and analysed by specialists within the ICPVTR. The Global 
Pathfinder database can also generate reports, graphs and statistical tables. 
Name: The Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) Database 
Parent Host Sam Houston State University, TX, in conjunction with the University 
of New Haven, West Haven CT, USA  
Website: http://www.isvg.org 
E-mail: isvg@shsu.edu 
Access: Restricted 
Unit of Analysis Extremism, terrorism and related trans-national crime 
Scope: Global 
Period Covered: 2003 onwards. Currently logging data for previous 20 years 
Principle sources Open-source material 
Key Variables N/A 
 
 
 
 
The Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) Database 
The ISVG database is based at Sam Houston State University, Texas, USA, but is run 
in conjunction with the University of New Haven, West Haven CT.  It is an open 
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source database (using more than 9,000 sources) recording information on 
extremism, terrorism and related trans-national crime. Other data collected includes 
information on terrorist tactics, logistical activities and CT security operations. The 
ISVG began its data collection in 2003. It is currently logged data stretching back over 
20 years. At present, the database is not fully accessible to the public; access is 
restricted to ISVG partners and U.S. Government sponsored projects. The ISVG plans 
from the summer of 2009 to make available web-based access in some format. The 
collection methodology is human-centric rather than machine centric. The database 
is relational in design, providing a broad array of functionality. It contains up to 2,000 
variables.  It lists (as of May 2010) 2471 groups and 27,576 individuals that are linked 
to terrorism and extremism. ISVG collects data on both violent incidents and non-
violent ones  (like hostage releases).  Its inventory of violent incidents covers 47,999 
armed assaults, 4,759 cases of arson, 35,376 bombings and also lists attempted 
CBRN attacks (10 of the nuclear variety, 46 biological ones and70 chemical). 
Individual incidents are coded as well as related tactical and operational information. 
Given the relational design of the ISVG database, it can be used in conjunction with 
analysis and visualisation software. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Sample ISVG OmniscopeDataplayer – Incidents by Tactics,  Philippines 30/12/00 – 13/6/09  
(www.isvg.org) 
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Figure 28: Sample ISVG OmniscopeDataplayer – Incidents by Targets,  Jemaah Islamiya    01/08/00 – 
22/07/08  (www.isvg.org) 
 
 
 
Name: Monterey WMD Terrorism Database 
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Parent Host Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey CA. United 
States 
Website: http://montrep.miis.edu/databases.html 
E-mail: montrep@miis.edu 
Access: Restricted 
Unit of Analysis Sub-state actors who are involved in the acquisition, possession, 
threat and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
Scope: Global 
Period Covered: 1900 to present day 
Principle sources Open-source material 
Key Variables N/A 
 
 
Monterey WMD Terrorism Database 
 
This WMD Terrorism Database is operated by the Monterey Terrorism Research and 
Education Program (MonTREP) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. 
The database records incidents by sub-state actors who are involved in the ‘.... 
acquisition, possession, threat and use of weapons of mass destruction…’ (Source: 
www.mis.edu). In particular, these are incidents involving chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear materials (CBRN). Incidents recorded date from 1900 to the 
present day. Sources used to compile the database derive from a large array of 
open-source materials. These include government documentation, media news 
services, unpublished material, academic journals and Internet sites. Non-English 
source material is also used, including documentation in German, Arabic, Russian, 
Chinese and Korean. The Monterey WMD Terrorism Database holds in excess of 
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1,100 reported incidents. While access to the database is free, there are restrictions 
on the type users permitted access and registration is required. Use of the database 
is normally restricted to United States federal, state and local government 
employees. In addition, current serving members of the U.S. armed forces are also 
permitted access.  
 
Name: Armed Conflict Database 
Parent Host The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) London, United 
Kingdom 
Website: http://www.iiss.org/publications-old/armed-conflict-database/ 
E-mail: Via website 
Access: Subscription 
Unit of Analysis Armed Conflict 
Scope: Global 
Period Covered: 2000-2008 
Principle sources Open-source 
Key Variables World map, country list, conflict list, non-state armed groups 
 
Armed Conflict Database – The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
 
The Armed Conflict Database (ACD) is a web based interactive database providing 
access to information on armed conflicts worldwide. The ACD is maintained by the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), based in London. It is a 
subscription-based service. 
The ACD covers three areas of armed conflict: international, internal and 
terrorism conflict. The international conflict element of the database covers 
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governments that are engaged in armed border and territorial conflicts over 
sovereignty. Internal armed conflict refers to conflict between a government and 
organised group(s). The territory in question controlled either by government or 
organised group(s) must be sufficient enough to sustain military operations. One 
area the ACD compiles data on is terrorism. For the purposes of the database 
‘Terrorism [is]attacks involving one or more factions in significant armed opposition 
to a state. The intensity in violence in such attacks varies. Violence directly 
attributable to organised crime is not included’ (Source: IISS Website). The scope 
covered within the ACD’s database range from information on Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDP’s), historical backgrounds to conflicts, the type of weapons used to 
annual updates and timeline on conflict. The database contains information on 70 
armed conflicts.  Data within the ACD dates back to 2000/2001. Annual and quarterly 
reports based on data from the Armed Conflict Database are produced by the IISS. 
The timelines are updated weekly. 
Access to the Armed Conflict Database is via an interactive world map, and 
clicking on either a continent or a particular country. The Regional Map section of 
the ACD allows access to all current regional conflicts. Researchers can then navigate 
to a specific country’s conflict pages. The conflict page provides a summary 
background to the conflict and factual information on the current status of the 
conflict. This includes the amount of people internally displaced (IDP’s), numbers of 
refugees, fatalities and the type of weaponry used in the conflict. More specific 
sections with the database include: political developments, military and security 
developments, humanitarian developments and historical backgrounds to each 
conflict. A Latest Timeline section provides regularly updated information on conflict 
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developments. Users are also provided with links to related conflict and official 
documents as well as IISS publications and materials. 
The ACD also provides a search engine facility to retrieve data based on 
simple queries or more complex query operators. For example: “ IRA AND 
Assassination”. Users of the ACD are also able to access a series or tailored reports 
sourced from the database. In addition to general queries, the database can 
generate more specific queries on conflicts to be produced in report format. This 
also includes the correlation of reports from different years across regions and 
topics. The database can also query specific variables that can be presented in report 
format, including graphics such as pie-bar-and line-charts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29: Sample Algeria from Armed Conflict Database – The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (www.iiss.org). 
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Figure 30: Sample Myanmar from Armed Conflict Database – The International   Institute for Strategic 
Studies (www.iiss.org). 
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Name: Iraq Body Count  
Parent Host Iraq Body Count 
Website: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/ 
E-mail: analyst@iraqbodycount.org 
Access: Free. Archive data upon request 
Unit of Analysis Solely civilian violent deaths from the post-invasion of Iraq 2003 
  
Scope: Iraq 
Period Covered: 2003 onwards 
Principle sources Open source material, official figures 
Key Variables IBC Incident number, type, deaths recorded, targeted or hit, place, 
date, sources 
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Iraq Body Count  
Introduction 
The Iraq Body Count (IBC) was established in 2003. It is a web-based project that 
records solely civilian violent deaths from the post-invasion of Iraq, as a 
consequence of the 2003 military intervention by the United States. Deaths recorded 
within the Iraq Body Count include casualties resulting from the actions of United 
States led coalition forces. Deaths/crime attributable to paramilitary actions and 
criminal activity are also included. The Iraq Body Count is a publicly accessible 
database. All deaths entered within the IBC database are factually recorded deaths. 
Volunteers operate the Iraq Body Count; they are drawn from a mixture of academic 
and activist backgrounds.  
Overview 
Material used to compile the Iraq Body Count database is sourced from an eclectic 
range of documents. Data is sourced from English-language media reports of deaths 
and bodies being found as a result of violent events. English translations of original 
non-English language reports are also used where standards of translation are 
deemed to be proficient. The vast majority of incidents recorded in the database are 
obtained from journalist’s reports with access to human sources. These include 
emergency service personnel, police, and survivors of incidents, eyewitnesses and 
family members. The incidents are crosschecked for validity and to avoid duplication. 
In addition, supplementary data is also reviewed and extracted from non-
governmental organisations, official figures, and hospital and morgue records. The 
data is used to provide running totals of civilian violent deaths. Two figures are 
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provided: minimum deaths and maximum deaths. Organisation of the IBC data is 
divided into two key areas. Firstly, a digital archive of original press and media 
source material, and secondly, a database with 18 key variables relating to recorded 
deaths. Access to the press and media archive, where deemed appropriate, is 
available to legitimate researchers. The database element of the Iraq Body Count is 
publicly available via the IBC website. The database provides users with two key 
sections: records of each recorded incident and records of individual deaths as a 
result of violent events victimizing civilians. The database codes, where information 
is available, 12 key variables for each incident and 6 key variables relating to 
individual persons. Some of the key incident variables include: date, time, place, 
target and maximum deaths. For each individual, the key variables are: name, age 
and gender.  Criteria for entry of incidents to the database require that at least two 
independent sources be crosschecked and verified. A recent events section provides 
very recent information on deaths (up to the last 48 hours) that still require full 
verification and validity checks prior to entry into the IBC database.The database is 
dynamically searchable and provides data summaries, graphical data and tables as 
well as analyses of events. Data can be exported from the database in .CSV file 
format for upload to a spreadsheet.  
 
 
 
Figure 31: Deaths from non-state forces’ bombings and those killed fifty or more (Iraq Body Count) 
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Name: The IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) 
Parent Host International Atomic Energy Agency 
Website: http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/itdb.htm 
E-mail: Official.Mail@iaea.org 
Access: Restricted 
Unit of Analysis Illicit trafficking among States of nuclear and radioactive material 
and related unauthorised activities 
Scope: Global 
Period Covered: 1995 onwards 
Principle sources State-confirmed information and open-source material 
Key Variables N/A 
 
 
The IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) 
The Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) was established by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1995. It records incidents involving the illicit trafficking in 
and between countries, of nuclear and radioactive material and related 
unauthorised activities. The principal objective of the database is to allow for the 
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exchange of authoritative information on the aforementioned activities. The ITDB 
has since developed into a broader information system generating statistical data for 
analysis, and the publication of Quarterly and Annual Reports. The database is used 
by the IAEA in three key areas: the prevention of nuclear and radiological terrorism, 
as an alert system, and for the enhancement of nuclear security. Membership of the 
ITDB program is based upon State’s voluntarily signing-up. State’s signing up for the 
ITDB program are required to nominate a single national Point of Contact (POC) who 
will liaise between the respective member State and the IAEA.  One hundred State’s 
had joined the ITDB program as of the 1st of September 2008. 
Incidents recorded within the ITDB include the theft, possession, loss, use, 
provision, transfer or disposal of radiological or nuclear materials. These incidents 
can occur within a state and across international borders. Failed and thwarted 
attempts in illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials are also entered 
within the ITDB. Information used to compile the Illicit Trafficking Database come 
from two main sources: state-confirmed information and open sources. Validation of 
open-source information on alleged incidents are always sought from the relevant 
State member(s). The ITDB contained 1340 confirmed incidents as of the 31st 
December 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Confirmed incidents involving unauthorized possession and related criminal activities, 
1993-2008   (www.ns-iaea.org) 
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Figure 33: Incidents reported to the ITDB involving theft or loss, 1993-2008   (www.ns-iaea.org) 
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Name: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
Parent Host Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, 
Sweden. 
Website: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/ 
E-mail: conflictdatabase@pcr.uu.se 
Access: Free 
Unit of Analysis Armed Conflict 
Scope: Global 
Period Covered: 1946-2007 
Principle sources Open-source material 
Key Variables Location, conflict parties, territory, year 
 
 
 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
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Introduction 
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is based within the Department of Peace 
and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, Sweden. The program holds an 
extensive collection of quantitative and qualitative data sets on armed violence, 
some dating back to 1946. Researchers can also use an interactive database on 
organised armed violence and related peace-making efforts. All the data sets and the 
database are freely accessible via the UCDP website. A definitional list of UCDP’s 
conflict terminology explaining the key terms used within the data sets is available 
on the website.  
 
The program allows researchers interested in armed conflict to access relevant data 
sets that could be used in the analysis of the origins of conflict, its dynamics and 
resolution. On-going violent conflict data sets have been coded since the 1970s.   
 
Definition and Datasets 
The UCDP working definition is: ‘An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that 
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two 
parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 
battle-related deaths in one calendar year’.  
(Source: UCDP Website: http://www.pcr.uu.se/ research /UCDP/index.htm). 
 
UCDP/PRIO’s Armed Conflict Dataset  
This project is jointly run by the UCDP and Centre for the Study of Civil War at the 
International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO). The data set has a global 
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spatial domain and covers armed conflict where at least one actor in the conflict is 
the government of a state. It covers the period 1946-2007 and is updated on an 
annual basis. Key variables coded include: location, year, incompatibility, opposition 
organisation and intensity level. In addition, a dyadic data set edition of the 
UCDP/PRIOArmed Conflict Dataset covering 1946-2007 is produced and updated 
yearly. 
 
UCDP’s Conflict Termination Dataset  
The Conflict Termination dataset records the start and the end-dates for each armed 
conflict activity. The dataset covers the period 1946-2007. Termination of a conflict 
is deemed to be non-activity for a minimum of a year. Non-activity refers to the 
criteria not being satisfied for incompatibility, levels of organisation and battle-
related deaths being less than twenty-five. Examples of data held within the data set 
include: date of termination, length of conflict termination and the form of 
termination (e.g. victory, ceasefire or peaceful agreement). The UCDP Conflict 
Termination dataset can be used in conjunction with the UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict dataset. 
 
UCDP’s Peace Agreement Dataset  
The UCDP Peace Agreement dataset records every signed peace agreement 
initiated between warring parties in armed conflicts between 1989 and 
2005. To be eligible for entry into the dataset, a minimum of two opposing 
primary warring parties must have signed a peace agreement. Some of the 
datasets key variables include: name of peace agreement, date of signing, 
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signatories, duration [of peace agreement], third parties and provisions of 
accords. 
 
UCDP’s Non-State Conflict Dataset 
The UCDP Non-State Conflict dataset records communal and armed conflict 
events between a minimum of two groups. The UCDP defines non-state 
conflict as: ‘the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither 
of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related 
deaths in a year’ (Source: UCDP Website). The temporal domain for the dataset is 
2002-2006. It is updated yearly. 
 
UCDP’s One-Sided Violence Dataset 
The UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset collects data on civilians attacked purposely 
by a government actor of the state or formally organised groups. A minimum of 25 
deaths needs to be recorded for eligible entry to the dataset. The temporal domain 
for the dataset is 1989-2006. It is updated yearly. 
 
Database 
The UCDP website provides an interactive database, updated yearly, on organised 
armed violence and related peace-making efforts. Using a series of interactive maps, 
researchers are able to search the database based on three separate criteria: war 
and minor conflict, non-state conflict and one-sided violence. Alternatively, all three 
criteria can be included for search purposes. The interactive map highlights the 
relevant countries and provides a further breakdown of conflict details based on 
212 
 
geographic region and by country. The resultant information provides a detailed 
historical context on each country’s conflicts dating back to 1946. A large array of 
factual data is included within the database. For example: start/end date of conflict, 
type of conflict, intensity and number of deaths. Further links within each country, 
provide, where available, related narrative, statistical data and codebooks on minor 
armed conflicts and wars, non-state conflicts and one-sided violence. Where 
preventative efforts on conflicts have been undertaken and peace agreements 
reached, summaries and full-text agreements can be accessed from the database.  
 
Graphs and Publications 
In addition to the datasets the UCDP also make available a series of pre-defined 
graphs charting data in active conflicts, active dyad levels, warring parties and peace 
agreement levels. The UCDP armed conflicts data sets are partly published in the 
SIPRI Yearbook, the States in Armed Conflict and the Journal of Peace Research on an 
annual basis. Since 2005 the data sets have been published in the Human Security 
Report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34:  Conflicts by Region 1946-2007  (UCDP website) 
 
213 
 
 
 
Figure 35: Peace Agreements in Armed Conflicts 1989-2007 (UCDP website) 
 
 
 
Name: The Minorities at Risk (MIR) Project 
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Parent Host University of Maryland, College Park, MD. United States 
Website: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ 
E-mail: minpro@cidcm.umd.edu 
Access: Free 
Unit of Analysis Conflicts of politically-active communal groups worldwide whose current 
population is at least 500,000 
Scope: Global 
Period Covered: 1945-2003 
Principle sources Open-source material 
Key Variables See: Minorities at Risk (MAR) Codebook Ver2/2009 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data/mar_codebook_Feb09.pdf 
 
 
The Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project 
The Minorities at Risk (MAR) project is based at the University of Maryland, College 
Park. Ted Robert Gurr established the project in 1986. The MAR project examines 
conflicts of politically active communal groups worldwide whose current population 
is at least 500,000. Currently, the project holds data and information on more than 
282 communal groups. The project has developed in a series of five separate phases. 
Phase I (1945-1989) covered 227 communal groups. Phase II (1990-1995) covered 
275 communal groups. Phase III (1996-1998) covered also 275 groups. Phase IV 
(1998-2003) covered 287 groups. The Phase V data, released so far, covers the 
period 2004-2006. The MAR project team monitors each conflict and analyses its 
status. One of the key aims of the MAR project is to provide researchers with 
standardised data, allowing for comparative studies and research across various 
conflicts. A key focus for the project is a data set ‘... that tracks groups on political, 
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economic, and cultural dimensions’ (Source: MAR Website). Access to the MAR 
project is free and is available via an interactive web-site. Researchers are able to 
access a large array of information. This includes the Minorities at Risk Database, its 
codebook and a series of data sets and historical chronologies on conflict. External 
links to relevant websites are provided. In addition to core data the project also 
provides access to summaries of group histories, risk assessments and a chronology 
for each group. Specialist data sets include data on ethno-political organisations in 
the Middle East and North Africa and the The Minorities at Risk Organizational 
Behaviour (MAROB) dataset. 
Figure 36: Post-Conflict Countries that revert to Conflict 1960-2007    (www.cidcm.umd.edu) 
 
 
 
4.4 Case Studies: The Private, Government and Commercial 
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The case studies outlined below is a classificatory scheme for non-publicly available 
systems 
Table 4.3  Classification of Private, Government and Commercial data sets, 
chronologies and databases. 
 
 
 Data Sets/Chronologies/Databases included in Case 
Studies from Section 4.4 onwards 
Classification 
1.  Terrorism Information System (FBI) Database 
2.  Desist Database (CIA) Database 
3.  OSAC Electronic Database (EDB) Database 
4.  Threat Analysis Division Information Management 
System (TADIMS) (US Department of State) 
Database 
5.  TIPOFF (Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), US 
Department of State) 
Database 
6.  Violent Gang and Terrorist Organisations File (US 
National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) 
Database 
7.  Consular Lookout Support System (Class) (US 
Department of State) 
Database 
8.  Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) (US 
Customs and Border Protection Data Center) 
Database 
9.  National Automated Lookout System (NAILS) (US 
Department of Homeland Security 
Database 
10.  Distributed Name Check Database (US Department of 
State) 
Database 
11.  Explosives Reference and Search System (EXPRESS) 
(FBI Bomb Data Center) 
Database 
12.  Political Violence Research Unit Database (University 
of Tel Aviv) 
Database 
13.  Explosives Incident Systems (EXIS) (US Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
Database 
 
Moving away from the issue of those datasets that are publicly available, there are 
an array of other databases both government and commercial with varying levels of 
accessability and scope. In terms of government databases, those used in counter-
terrorism are accorded the highest level of security and secrecy. Their design, 
operation and accessibility is strictly restricted to accredited intelligence employees, 
(including terrorism analysts) and where appropriate, designated government 
officials. They are, therefore, essentially private and classified, and are outwith the 
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intelligence communities. Public domain information on such data sets is extremely 
rare.  
Two such terrorism databases are the FBI’s Terrorist Information System 
(TIS), and the CIA’s Desist database on terrorism.273 Both these databases are used 
for intelligence based activity and project-specific work. The FBI’s Terrorist 
Information System is an extensive database by any standards, holding in excess of 
200,000 records and details on known or suspected terrorists.274 In addition to this 
the TIS system holds over 3000 files on organisations or enterprises associated with 
terrorism. The database is relational in design, permitting intelligence analysts to 
establish links between such entities as known or suspected terrorists, terrorist 
groups, weapons, tactics or events. The database is indexed, allowing FBI analysts to 
search for data on known and suspected terrorist groups. The TIS system can 
conduct queries (questions) about particular on-going terrorism investigations, 
retrieving data on terrorist group activities, information about particular associates 
of a terrorist group, and any contact details that are relevant for intelligence 
purposes. Although the database is primarily designed to hold terrorist details, the 
system also codes information relating to groups or individuals with affiliations to 
terrorist groups such as drug cartels or militia groups. Other public domain 
                                                          
273
 Documentation on the Terrorist Information System (TIS) for obvious security reasons is minimal. Archive 
material however on the TIS data sets is maintained. The Center for Electronic Records at the U.S. National 
Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of six data sets known as the Major Investigative 
Data Base (MIDB), and fourteen data sets known as the Terrorist Information System (TIS), as well as related  
documentation.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation transferred these data sets and documentation to the 
NARA in 1991 as a part of a larger accession of records known as the CISPES files.  These records are security 
classified and are exempt from disclosure under NARA's general restriction covering information related to 
law enforcement investigations.  This latter restriction conforms to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), as 
amended, 5 U.S.C. 552 (b) (7).   
274
 The issue of retaining information on suspected terrorists on database systems is a sensitive matter, requiring 
absolute security and discretion. Intelligence based databases on terrorism such as the U.S. State 
Departments TIPOFF database are permitted to hold suspected names of individual terrorists without 
exposing themselves to data protection violation legislation. Academic databases such as RAND-St. Andrews, 
or  the Political Violence Research Unit  database at the University of Tel Aviv would open themselves up to 
potential litigation challenges were they to hold names of suspected terrorists.  
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information on the Terrorist Information System is virtually non- existent. With the 
exception of a brief acknowledgement of the Federal Bureau’s TIS database, and 
fourteen related data sets (1981-1990) to be found deep in the U.S. National 
Archives - no other public domain sources of information appear to be available. 
The CIA’s Desist database on terrorism, although its existence is barely 
acknowledged, provides analysts at the CIA and their Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) 
with data on a whole series of terrorist information.275 The Desist database is thought 
to have the capability of identifying the geographic locations of terrorists and linking 
this data with related data on their methods of operations. Other entities held within 
the database are details on financial sources of funding for terrorist organisations, 
information on their membership, as well as detailed information on individuals. As 
with the FBI’s TIS database, the CIA’s Desist system also holds data on known or 
suspected associates of terrorist groups as well as data on affiliations with other 
terrorist organisations. The Desist database, with its powerful relational capabilities, 
can offer terrorism analysts information at many linked levels, providing an 
extremely powerful intelligence tool. 
Classified terrorism data sets are not solely limited to the CIA or FBI.  Other 
U.S. Federal organisations such as the U.S. Department of State, The U.S. 
Department of Defense, The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and 
the U.S. Secret Service all have varying types of classified data sets on terrorism.276 
On an international level classified terrorist data sets are held by many other 
                                                          
275
 For further details on DESIST see: Perry, Mark.  Eclipse: The Last Days of the CIA. (New York: William Morrow 
and Co. 1992 ). 
276
 For detailed analysis of the  U.S. Department of State, FBI, FEMA and other U.S. Government terrorism 
databases see later sections of Chapter V of this thesis. 
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national government agencies such as Israel’s Mossad, the United Kingdom’s MI5, 
MI6, the RUC, Scotland Yard’s anti-terrorist unit SO13 and Special Branch.   
The sensitivity of terrorist data requires all the above agencies to maintain 
data in the securest of formats. This is a challenge in itself from within an agency.  
When data needs to be transferred to an externally approved police or intelligence 
organisation through Interpol for example, the risk of interception by illegal means is 
a worrying reality.277 Interpol deals with many types of intelligence data, including 
information relating to terrorism. With 176 members, requiring varying forms of 
data, the challenge is substantial. Interpol transfers classified data in several formats: 
typed texts, texts with graphs as well as diagrams and tables. Their 
telecommunications network can also transfer images, fingerprints and photographs 
and also permits National Central Bureau’s (NCB’s) to consult relevant databases 
from remote centres.278   The rapidity with which Interpol’s X.400 server dispatches 
classified information to NCB’s does not insure that external agents have not 
intercepted and deciphered what is intended to be classified data.279  To combat 
potential violations of security on the transferral of classified data, Interpol have 
adopted two simple, but practical procedures. They have an encryption system that 
has been operational since 1991, which identifies the sender of the data, preventing 
third party access and potential corruption of data. Secondly the encryption system 
prevents data from being intercepted or identified.280 This security system provides 
                                                          
277
 For further details on Interpol’s telecommunications network see:  
http://193.123.144.14/interpol-pr/Machinery.html 
278
 Ibid. Each member country of Interpol designates a police agency to co-ordinate and liaise  with other local 
and foreign law enforcement agencies. These police agencies are known as National Central Bureau’s (NCB’s). 
279
 Ibid. The X.400 standard is an internationally accepted message-handling standard. 
280
 Ibid. 
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what is known as ‘end-to-end encryption’ between the source agency sending the 
data and the target police agency receiving the data.281 
Government (classified) terrorism data sets by their very nature have an 
extremely low profile in public domain sources and literature. Aside from some 
conspiracy theories about their purpose, that reside mainly on the Internet, minimal 
information is available. In many ways their virtual non-existence in published 
literature is indicative of the success security agencies have had in maintaining 
terrorism data sets with what their remit has been all along: classified.   
 
4.5. Government (Restricted and Unclassified) Terrorism Data Sets 
This second category of computerised terrorism data sets is an unusual mixture of 
restricted access data sets, partly classified data, and unclassified public access data 
(i.e. they are ‘in-between’).282Information on these particular terrorism data sets, 
although not extensive is available in public domain sources.283The Government 
(Restricted and Unclassified) terrorism data sets vary from Government (Classified) 
data sets in that they perform both an internal role within respective agencies and 
provide a public service in an external capacity. 
 
OSAC’s Electronic Database (EDB) 
The Overseas Security Advisory Council’s Electronic Database (formerly the 
Electronic Bulletin Board EBB), is an on-line database service administered by the 
                                                          
281
 Ibid. To further prevent violations of security the sender of data is assigned an electronic signature using a 
microchip card that is handled by the X.400 software. 
282
 Restricted access relates to accessibility strictly limited to designated employees of respective Government 
agencies holding terrorism data. For a detailed outline of U.S. Classified National Security Information see: 
Executive Order #12958  The White House. April 1995.  Also at: http://foia.state.gov/eo12958/part1.htm 
283
 Information on these data sets can be found at selective Internet sites including:  the U.S. State Department, 
FBI, U.S. General Accounting Office and the Federal Aviation Administration. 
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U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Established in 1987, it has an 
unusual role in that it serves both the needs of State Department’s analysts and that 
of U.S. businesses overseas. The primary remit of OSAC is to promote co-operation 
on security matters between United States government and U.S. private businesses 
world-wide.284 Registered U.S. companies and organisation which are affiliated to 
OSAC , of which there are over 1500, are able to benefit from an array of different 
security related information.285 The database has a substantial repository of 
information, holding in excess of 57,000 security-related incidents. The OASC EDB 
differs in several respects from traditional terrorism databases. The EDB’s external 
customer base is restricted to officially accredited companies and organisations 
conducting substantial business overseas, and requires approval to register from 
OSAC. These companies include Exxon, BF Goodrich, Proctor and Gamble, The Ford 
Motor Company, American Airlines, IBM and McDonald’s.286 The service provided to 
EDB members is entirely free, except for the cost of operating software provided by 
a designated vendor. The EDB is very much a practical database service, used by its 
clients on a daily basis. Its objective is : 
‘… to provide the kind of nitty-gritty information that will help a corporation 
assess the security climate in a country and determine if it’s safe to travel or 
keep workers there.’ 287 
 
                                                          
284
 Pluchinsky, Dennis. Overseas Security Advisory Council: Electronic Bulletin Board. Informal paper prepared by 
Denis Pluchinsky of The Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. State 
Department. 1994. The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) was established in 1985. In addition to 
dealing with terrorism threats to overseas  businesses   OSAC’s remit also includes promoting awareness of, 
and protection of  proprietary information and technology, as well security awareness and education. 
285
 Ibid.  In addition to registered companies OSAC has over 25 “Country Councils” which co-ordinate security 
and terrorism related information for businesses operating within South America, Central America, Africa, 
the Middle East, Europe and East Asia. The EDB also deals with crime related activity. 
286
 For further details see: ‘Feature: Security Computer Network: Strategic Resources for US Business.’         US 
Department of State Dispatch.  October 29
th
 1990. p.227. 
287
 Ibid. 
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It contains not only standard information profiles on terrorist groups, but also has an 
Anniversary Dates file, with a chronological list of significant dates that may have 
security implications for U.S. personnel working in particular overseas locations.288 
Another practical element to the EDB database is its provision of police emergency 
telephone numbers, addresses and telephone numbers of U.S. diplomatic and 
consular posts overseas. A series of chronologies exist within the database, although 
there is no overall definitive chronology on terrorism with the EDB database. One 
noticeable omission from services provided by the EDB, and for understandable 
reasons, is aviation threat notifications. This is a sensitive issue at the best of times, 
especially after the controversy surrounding threat notifications, before the bombing 
of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. Potential criticism that EDB 
members could benefit from aviation threat notifications over the general public 
would open it up to severe criticism. This emphasis on a ‘real-time’ practical 
database service, differs considerably from traditional government databases on 
terrorism, which normally produces annual chronologies or statistics on terrorism, 
such as Patterns of Global Terrorism,and have no direct contact or liaison with their 
target audience. The philosophy and practicality behind the EDB is based partly on 
reciprocity and mutual co-operation. In other words, a two way process exists. 
Companies act as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the EDB,289 passing on relevant security 
information to the State Department, while benefiting from the vast intelligence 
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 U.S. Department of State, Overseas Security Electronic Bulletin Board Users Manual (Washington D.C. U.S. 
Dept. of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1990) pp.4-5. 
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 ‘Feature: Security Computer Network: Strategic Resources for US Business.’  US Department of State 
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resource and professional advice on offer from subject specialists.290 This differs 
quite markedly from the traditional business customer relationships of commercial 
organisations offering security and terrorism related information. Companies such as 
Mizell, Profiles, Kroll and Pinkerton’s relationship with their clients is based upon the 
premise that clients pay for professional advice, information or consultancy. The 
client expects a service for their payment; mutual exchange of security related 
information is much less apparent. 
Over the years, analysts have build up a good rapport with client companies of 
the EDB.  A two-way process has evolved, whereby both sides benefit and analysts 
provide a central  point from which to receive security related information and to 
dispense it. As Bartley Railing, an Middle East analyst notes: 
 
‘US companies have good contacts and have learned to look out for their 
security….They want us not only as a resource for information but as a 
facilitator to help turn it around’.291 
 
As with most databases of its size and client spread, OSAC’s EDB database is 
operated on a mainframe system, permitting users to access by modem via 
telephone lines or Internet connections. Access is only permissible after approved 
registration by OSAC and passwords have been issued. Companies can access the 
EDB using personal computers.  Although the original EDB system operated by 
analysts in Washington D.C. was a menu-driven system, a window based system is 
now in operation. Among the many benefits this brings (apart from general 
compatibility), is that analysts presented with copious amounts of raw data are able 
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 Sources for the EDB database come from a mixture of unclassified U.S. government reports, the media, 
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to quickly copy, paste and edit information onto the EDB database from other 
sources, saving time and effort. Another unusual, but very useful service on offer to 
EDB members, is the Private Sector Liaison Staff message system (PLPS).292 This 
electronic message system encourages corporate users to voluntarily submit 
information, either in written format or orally by telephone, on security or criminal 
matters affecting their respective overseas business operations.  Incidents that are 
not picked up by regular intelligence means are sometime highlighted by the PLPS 
message system. Even if analysts are aware of particular events, the system can 
often update or supplement information, which helps to add to accuracy and 
validation to events. The types of submission given have included information on 
threats and attacks against American personnel and property. Other details have 
included information on thefts, kidnappings, violent crime and local unrest.293  
Confidentiality is paramount with such information and the Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security adheres to strict procedures to protect sources when posting details on the 
EDB. 
 
 
TADIMS Database 
The Threat Analysis Division Information Management System (TADIMS) database, 
was designed in the late 1980’s to support the Threat Analysis Division (TAD) within 
the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, at the U.S. State Department. Its main remit was 
to handle daily requests for information relating to terrorism, terrorism trends, 
                                                          
292
 U.S. Department of State, Overseas Security Electronic Bulletin Board Users Manual (Washington D.C.:U.S. 
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threat assessment and security briefings.294 Although this system is now only used by 
one division within the bureau, its use and shortcomings merit some brief discussion.  
The TADIMS system, at its time of development, was a fairly modern system. 
It operates by a series of menu-driven screens allowing analysts to enter, delete and 
update terrorism data.295 The software, written for the WANG VS computer, 
produces a variety of reports dependent upon analysts requests. TADIMS search 
facilities for terrorist groups, incidents or other related details, covers most analysts 
basic requirements. These include searches on range values of terrorism incident 
dates between specified periods, list searches on specific coded fields, for example 
BOMB and KIDNAP, and operators such as NOT, and OR. The system can also offer 
limited wildcard searches. TADIMS general demise, although not complete 
redundancy, is due mainly to shortcomings in its functionality. The TADIMS system is 
incapable of producing aggregate totals of numeric variables, such as the total 
number of people killed in an incident. Its ability to handle common statistical 
functions is limited, and has no facility to produce graphs, such as bar charts or pie 
charts. As the TADIMS system does not support a Windows based environment its 
compatibility with other modern software is severely restricted.  
At a fundamental level, the system is not a relationally based database 
system, such as TIPOFF or the Tel Aviv University’s database on terrorism and 
political violence. Other concerns by analysts over the system, is its inability to group 
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together information profiles on terrorist groups, or provide simple editing facilities 
for source data on terrorism, supplied by intelligence agencies, news agencies and 
other government sources. Although data within the TADIMS system is valid, its 
limited functionality has vastly reduced its usage. Many analysts within the Threat 
Analysis Division have now developed their own terrorism related chronologies and 
databases, running under Microsoft Access. Although this doesn’t serve the division 
with a departmental-wide database on terrorism, it does permit specialists to 
develop subject-specific terrorism databases that are relevant to their work needs. 
 
TIPOFF  Database 
Although external co-operation with the operation of terrorism databases is fairly 
unusual, an increasing amount of liaison and co-ordination within government 
agencies has increased in recent years.296  One such venture has been the U.S. State 
Department’s TIPOFF database, developed and operated by its Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research (INR).  As part of the State Departments many responsibilities, it is 
charged with denying terrorists or suspected terrorists and their supporters entry 
visas to the United States. The TIPOFF database holds detailed information on known 
or suspected terrorists, which it is passes on to the State Department’s Consular 
Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database. This is operated by the Bureau of 
Consular Affairs who use the declassified information given to them by TIPOFF as 
part of their security checks, to monitor visa applications to help detect known or 
suspected terrorist who apply for U.S. entry visas from overseas consular offices.297 
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This type of co-ordination and co-operation between departments using 
databases has met with some success. Since TIPOFF’s inception in 1987, the 
database has identified in excess of 722 suspected terrorists as they made visa 
application for entry to the United States.298  Compared with TADIMS’s, the TIPOFF 
database runs on a fairly modern and sophisticated hardware and software 
operation. In its earliest days TIPOFF ran as a manual card index system; it now runs 
under the powerful database management software Oracle. Unlike other terrorism 
databases such as the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organisations File (VGTOF) or the 
EDB, which are operated over wide area networks,TIPOFF’s  operation is run over a 
local area network.  The network runs under Windows NT©.299 Access is strictly 
limited to INR staff.  TIPOFF has no connection to any other computer system; much 
of the information INR receives is sensitive intelligence and classified law 
enforcement data.  
The type of data on individuals held on the TIPOFF system is fairly detailed; 
the aim is to build up a ‘thumb-sketch’ profile of suspects that is of use to the State 
Department and other relevant government agencies.300The type of information, 
being intelligence based, differs considerably from academic terrorism data sets. The 
database includes such variables as date of birth, passport number, physical features 
and known aliases.301  The criteria for inclusion in the TIPOFF database is that there is 
reasonable suspicion that an individual or individuals have been involved in known 
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acts of terrorism, or that they (State Department), have reason to believe that 
suspects operate in terrorist related activities.  Intelligence data from TIPOFF is not 
limited exclusively to one agency. As part of its operation it also provides the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the U.S. Customs Service with 
relevant terrorism datawhen running their computerised Interagency Border 
Inspection System (IBIS).  
The integration of TIPOFF data into the INS and Customs systems offers a 
powerful facility to detect known or suspected terrorists as they arrive in the United 
States. Upon presentation to any of the 350 U.S. border entry points the IBIS system 
is able to run checks to flag-up any suspects registered on the TIPOFF database. 
Although difficult to gauge or compare against other figures, the TIPOFF database, in 
conjunction with IBIS has successfully intercepted 196 suspected terrorists from 56 
countries since 1991.302 
 
Interagency Systems  
With increasing concern in the United States, and many other countries, of 
escalating numbers of inadmissible aliens at ports-of-entry, action to stem rising 
numbers requires high levels of vigilance. Known or suspected terrorists, among 
many other categories, present immigration services with a formidable challenge. In 
fiscal year 1992 the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimated that 
over 120,000 inadmissible aliens had arrived in the United States. 303 By October of 
1996 INS calculations suggested this figure had risen to roughly 275,000, with 5 
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million illegal aliens residing in the United States. The complexities of guarding 
against illegal entry have been partly addressed in the United States by the INS’s 
Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) database. This database differs from 
other databases such as the Electronic Data Base (EDB) or TIPOFF in that itis a multi-
agency lookout database. The term lookout correctly implies its status as a pro-
active database used for real-time searches. The IBIS database’s multi-agency remit, 
permits it to carry out queries upon arriving aliens and non-aliens into the United 
States against other U.S. agency databases. These include the Department of State’s 
Consular Lookout Support System (CLASS), and the FBI’s National Criminal 
Identification Center (NCIC).304  Unlike academic or commercial terrorism data sets, 
which generally tend to be maintained and used within the limits of university or 
office boundaries, the IBIS system as its job remit dictates operates over a wide area 
network (WAN). The system hardware and software has to be robust, handling 
literally millions of queries per year. For fiscal year 1992, 513 million people sought 
entry to the United States, through airports, land and seaports.305 While the vast 
majority of those seeking entrance to the United States do so lawfully, events such 
as the World Trade Centre and Oklahoma bombings have raised both public and 
government awareness of the need to intercept and detain known or suspected 
terrorists at ports of entry. The 1994 World Trade Center bombing played a 
significant rôle in persuading the U.S. Congress to direct the State Department to 
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install its automatic lookout system at all visa-issuing offices worldwide.306  Although 
the IBIS database would appear to provide a water-tight system of detection, the 
sheer volume of traffic at some U.S. ports-of-entry results in only partial checks. At 
land and border entry points, every car number plate is checked against the IBIS 
system; however name checks on individuals are left to the discretion of 
inspectors.307 The IBIS database differs considerably from other databases such as 
the VGTOF, TIPOFF or the Terrorist Information System (TIS).  It is not a dedicated 
database on terrorism activity, although it does handle detailed terrorism 
information. With its multi-agency remit, it is linked to a complex and sophisticated 
array of other U.S. government agency databases. One of these databases, 
maintained by the INS is the National Automated Lookout System (NAILS). Terrorist 
details, among others are entered into the NAILS system on the grounds of exclusion 
of entry, based upon national security.308To add to the complexities, the NAILS 
database also holds U.S. Department of State records for known or suspected 
terrorists deemed ineligible for visas. Other agency records held within NAILS include 
those from the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Marshals Service. 309  Worth 
noting, is the distinction between IBIS records and the Department of State’s CLASS 
database, accessible from within the IBIS database.310 The State Departments’ 
records relate specifically to the eligibility of aliens to be granted visas for entering 
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the United States. The IBIS system is a lookout database on behalf of several 
agencies, to identify inadmissible aliens, under the Immigration Act of 1990. 
The issue of visas for entry into the United States, the responsibility of the 
State Department, has always been a difficult process. Balancing legitimate access 
against potential fraudulence, terrorism, drugs or other criminal activity requires 
timely and accurate intelligence. To help in this process the State Department 
initiated in 1989 its machine-readable visa program.311The creation of a global 
database holding the names of those ineligible for U.S. visas would be logged onto 
the system. The automated approached is two pronged. Firstly, by making the visa 
on the passport machine readable, printed on synthetic material, with an encryption 
code, potential fraudulence could be minimised. Secondly, the system has access to 
the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database. The duality of the 
system has helped significantly to improve screening procedures. The introduction of 
both machine-readable visa systems and the CLASS database was patchy however. 
Their introduction was neither parallel nor comprehensive. The ramifications of the 
World Trade Center bombing, finally forced the U.S. Congress in 1994 to require all 
visa-issuing posts to operate the machine-readable and CLASS systems by the end of 
1995.  
By April of 1997 all visa-issuing posts had the machine-readable visa system 
installed. In addition, an updated version of the system known as MRV-2 began to 
replace the original database system from 1996 onwards. The cost of upgrading such 
systems was substantial. Figures available for fiscal years 1996-1998 indicate the 
State Department invested in excess of  $68.9 million dollars in the new version 
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MRV-2. 312 While Federal funding explains the considerable provision of resources for 
such projects, resources of such proportions would be out of the question for 
academic or even commercially based terrorism data set projects. 
Large capital investment in such databases systems does not always 
guarantee success. Despite considerable capital investment in CLASS, the U.S. 
General Accounting Office (GAO) noted both technical and policy orientated 
problems with the CLASS database. Initial technical difficulties can commonly arise in 
most new database projects operating over  local area networks, such as the TIPOFF 
database or the South Pacific Islands Criminal Intelligence Network (SPICIN), which is 
linked to a wide area network.313  More serious than the initial inconvenience of 
broken communication, is the practical impact upon security. When first established, 
links to U.S. missions in Mexico City, Sydney and Seoul were problematic. With 
transmission connectivity problems, U.S. officials checking for known or suspected 
terrorists had to rely on traditional manual methods of search by microfiche. The 
resultant real-time delay presented the possibility that visa approval could be given 
to individuals that had been registered with the CLASS database but had not been 
updated on the microfiche.314 
The need for real-time information on known or suspected terrorists, 
accessible on a national or global scale, presents particular difficulties that academic 
or commercial terrorism data set operators do not encounter. These problems relate 
to ‘live’ or real-time operation of the data set. If the data set is required for 
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intelligence-based work, such as the VGTOF, CLASS or TIPOFF data sets, time can be 
of the essence. Remote access to such data sets will always present some potential 
risk. For example, early versions of the State Department’s Distributed Name Check 
(DNC) database, with its slow access, and limited software functionality, meant that 
U.S. mission staff often by-passed the system in favour of manual searches by 
microfiche.315 Academic terrorism data sets such as the RAND/St.Andrews or the 
University of Tel Aviv’s terrorism database are not maintained and developed on the 
basis of the need for instant accessibility of data. While bonafide external requests 
for information may be required quickly, it is worth bearing in mind that academic 
terrorism data sets are not intelligence-driven real-time operations. With access 
restricted solely to staff working at their respective centres, immediacy of access to 
data may be dependent upon other commitments.316  For clients using commercially 
based terrorism data sets over wide area networks, such as Pinkertons, the American 
Society for Industrial Security (ASIS), Control Risks or Kroll Associates, accessibility to 
timely information on security advisories is expected. Clients pay for, among other 
services, access to up-to-date security information. 
In addition to transmission and accessibility problems with the CLASS system, 
the GAO reported other potential vulnerabilities in its operations. Concerns were 
noted over validation of visas at border security posts. The validation of visa issuance 
at border points could not be established automatically and relied on manual 
methods of authentication. 
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The involvement of several agencies in the use of Interagency databases 
containing details on known or suspected terrorists present operational problems 
unique to this type of data set.  Integrity problems over entry of information into the 
CLASS database was highlighted in the GAO’s report. These concerns arose over the 
realisation that not all U.S. missions overseas were adhering to established 
procedures and controls over entry of data. Five U.S. missions were allowing foreign 
nationals (FSN’s) to check for names in the CLASS database without the supervision 
of a U.S. officer. Small and technical as this concern may appear, the implications for 
compromising security are apparent. The reliance on locally employed foreign 
service nationals to detect and notify U.S. missions of know or suspected terrorists 
places a very heavy emphasis on trust.317 Further concerns over interagency co-
operation on terrorism issues have become apparent since the inception of Lookout 
Committees at U.S. consulates and embassies.318 Lookout committees were 
established after the World Trade Center bombing, to enable diplomatic, political 
and consular staff  to meet regularly and identify the names of suspected terrorists 
that could be entered into the CLASS database and deny visa applications. The 
concept of the Lookout Committee depends upon four principle factors: co-
operation, co-ordination, intuitive professional judgement and sound intelligence. 
Surprisingly, the weak link in the equation has been co-operation. Although not 
identified in the GAO’s report officials, at least two embassies questioned the 
usefulness of such co-operative ventures, as liaison and co-operation appeared to be 
less than forthcoming. The problems appeared to stem from law and intelligence 
agencies reluctance to provide terrorism information to embassies and consulates, 
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for fear of compromising their work and source information.319 This type of 
interagency friction can potentially undermine the validity and integrity of terrorism 
information held on databases. Conflict of this nature, apparently petty and political 
in nature, illustrates the potential vulnerability of intelligence-based systems on 
terrorism that have a large user audience. Compared with most academic terrorism 
data sets, that reside within the relative safety of University campuses, the potential 
volatility of such widely accessible databases can be high, as a result of their wide 
user audience. 
 
The Violent Gang and Terrorist Organisations File 
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the United States have in recent years 
developed their own subject-specific computerised terrorism data sets to meet 
increasingly specialised intelligence requirements. One such data set is The Violent 
Gang and Terrorist Organisations File (VGTOF), established in October 1995. 320  
Operated through the FBI’s National Crime and Information Center (NCIC), the 
VGTOF acts as a pointer system in identifying known members of terrorist 
organisations or violent gang members. The VGTOF differs markedly in several 
respects to other agency data sets holding terrorism information. The VGTOF was set 
up in part to protect not only U.S. citizens, but with an emphasis on helping police 
identify known suspects, and therefore protecting them in their duties. Many 
medium to small police departments in the United States do not have the resources 
to develop and maintain their own national data sets on criminal and terrorist 
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activity. With the spread into smaller communities of criminal and violent activities 
related to criminal gangs, drug trafficking and political motivated actions, the need 
for accurate and timely intelligence has increased. The VGTOF has addressed in part 
some of these needs, while maintaining sensitivity to local intelligence.  
As its title suggests, the VGTOF’s remit is to hold data on both terrorist 
organisations and organised criminal groups and gangs. This mixture of information 
on politically motivated violent group activity, coupled with criminal gang 
operations, differs considerably from the traditional separation of  political and 
criminal violent events data. For example, nationally published information on 
terrorism information in the United States such as TERRORISM  in the United 
States,strictly limits itself to acts of political violence.321 While the inclusion of both 
criminal and politically activity in one data set may be unusual, the activities of such 
terrorist groups and criminal gangs have, over recent years, taken on some similar 
traits. These include illegal drug and money laundering activities to fund terrorist 
groups and gang organisations. Unlike simple chronological file formats such as the 
ITERATE data sets or the Serbian Unity Congress Chronology on Terrorism, the 
structure of the VGTOF closely reflects  its practical operation.322  The VGTOF 
classifies its data into two principle file categories: the Group Reference Capability 
(GRC) file, and the Group Member Capability (GMC) file. Coded details on the 
respective group and individual members must adhere to strict guidelines laid down 
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by the NCIC.323 This requirement to adhere to national standards not only offers 
consistency in entry of variables nationally, more importantly the integrity of the 
data set is maintained. Another unusual attribute of the VGTOF is the variety of 
agencies that are permitted to make entries to the data set. Unlike academic 
terrorism data sets that are mostly maintained by a small specialist group of trained 
coders, the VGTOF procedures for data entry vary from state to state. For example, 
in some states a control terminal agency, such as the State Police will enter terrorist 
and gang details on behalf of the whole state. In other states, local and county police 
are permitted to enter data. Even more unusual, but reflective of its disparate 
operation, individual agencies are permitted to create new terrorist or gang records 
as long as they adhere to established NCIC standards. The type of variable created 
and coded within the VGTOF data set differs considerably from traditional 
chronological style terrorism data sets. Information known as  ‘essential identifying 
data’ describes in detail the attributes of terrorist group and gang members.324  
Information detailing the type of clothing of individuals or gang members, tattoo 
signs, communication signals, such as hand signs, are logged onto the VGTOF data 
set. This emphasis on intelligence based identifying criteria is beneficial in two 
respects. Firstly, it permits local law enforcement agencies to recognise the traits of 
known or suspected terrorists and gang members operating in their locale. Secondly, 
as neither terrorists nor criminal gangs recognise or limittheir activities to specific 
states, they can be identified by the VGTOF on a national scale. Whereas traditional 
terrorism data sets such as Pinkertons or ATIC code basic variables, such as location 
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of incident, type of attack, and number of casualties mandatory variables within the 
VGTOF are much more personal in detail. This difference in emphasis relates 
primarily to the VGTOF’s remit: it is an intelligence based data set, secondly agencies 
are able to legally hold personal data, a privilege academic and commercially based 
terrorism data sets do not enjoy. 325 Some of the mandatory variables that are coded 
include sex, the names of individuals, their race and group affiliation. Optional 
information held by the VGTOF, highly detailed in nature, and information not 
always readily available to officers, includes information on an individuals eyes and 
hair colour, as well as their height and weight. The date and place of birth, if 
available, of known or suspected terrorists and gang members is also recorded. The 
value of such data for comprehensive quantitative analysis across terrorist groups 
and gangs operating in the United States would have to be highly selective, and may 
be of limited value, particularly as they relate to highly personalised information. At 
the risk of developing profiles of terrorists based on personal criteria that would 
promote stereotypes, careful analysis of data would be necessary.  To dismiss such 
highly detailed information as irrelevant, would however, be a mistake. At an 
operational level, for security and police agencies working in communities, such data 
can be invaluable. Strongly related to practical intelligence data sets, but missing 
from standard terrorism data sets, is information pertaining to an individuals known 
psyche. Such details are contained within a miscellaneous field of the VGTOF.  Law 
enforcement agencies are encouraged to “pack the record” with as much pertinent 
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information as possible.’ Typical information could detail previous history of groups 
or individuals carrying guns or using threatening behaviour. 
Intelligence based data sets such as the VGTOF stand apart from 
conventional terrorism data sets in two main respects. Their factual base tends to be 
cumulative, live and ongoing.326  Furthermore, as information is added or updated, 
any information that is found to be invalid must be deleted immediately. This 
deletion of data is not purely for reasons of integrity, although that in itself would be 
a valid argument.  Law enforcement officials using VGTOF data that is found to be 
outdated could place themselves and others at risk. Unlike academic or commercial 
terrorism data sets, intelligence based systems such as the VGTOF are required by 
law to be audited by Federal authorities. The ramifications of inaccurate data for 
both police and civilians can be very serious. There is no obligation with managers of 
commercial or academic terrorism data sets to retain their source documentation. 
Although in many instances this may occur. By law the VGTOF is required to hold all 
source documentation and evidence that results in the generation of a Group 
Reference Capability (GRC) record or Group Member Capability (GMC) record. 
Eligibility of data for entry into the VGTOF is strict. A weak association of evidence 
would not be enough to justify the creation and entry of data into the system. 
Indicative of the seriousness of adhering to these regulations is the potential threat 
of litigation against a police agency from federal level.327 Although figures fluctuate, 
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the VGTOF had 445 groups and 180 individuals entered on the system at the end of 
1996. 328 
Although the VGTOF data sets operates throughout the United States, the 
federal nature of law enforcement in the U.S. allows certain states to adopt different 
approaches to its use and operation, sensitising it to local operations. Such states 
include the State of Texas and the State of Florida.  In Texas for example, criminal 
justice agencies are not permitted to enter data into the VGTOF data sets. This 
despite it being a state-wide database. This derives from state legislation stating that 
‘..a local criminal justice agency may not send information collected under this 
chapter to a state-wide database.’329 Strangely enough, despite state restrictions of 
data entry from Texas, relevant Texan agencies are permitted to use the VGTOF file 
for intelligence purposes. It would appear mutual reciprocity takes second place to 
the states interests. Another state which has made provisions for itself, in addition to 
the VGTOF,  is the State of Florida.  After initial use, local law enforcement officials 
decided that the VGTOF was not meeting all their information requirements on 
terrorist and gang intelligence. A localised database was established in early 1997 to 
meet the VGTOF’s short-comings, this then fed data into the state-wide VGTOF. 330 
The local operational sensitivities of law enforcement agencies can present 
problems in trying to operate effectively a nation-wide intelligence based system. 
While reciprocal agreements between states is beneficial to all differing states 
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political and practical priorities can take precedent over the concept of a truly 
national database on terrorism and  gang intelligence. 
 
Other U.S. Government Terrorism Data Sets 
An array of other computerised terrorism data sets provide the U.S. Federal 
government with information on interpreting and responding to acts of terrorism. 
These range from specialist data sets on domestic bombings, aviation data on 
terrorism, and federal emergency management, to acts of international terrorism 
directed against U.S. citizens as well as acts of international terrorism in general. 
No one central U.S. government agency retains and publishes information on 
all acts of domestic or international terrorism. The dispersed nature of these data 
sets although frustrating for novice researchers, provides by default, a healthy 
separation of data calculation. Reliance on one central data set for definitive 
statistics on all acts of terrorism has the potential for limiting any reference to 
secondary government sources, or the possibility of questioning data credibility. 
 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Data Sets 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has for many years collected and published data 
on acts of domestic terrorism. The FBI’s remit to collect and disseminate information 
on acts of terrorism goes beyond the standard delivery of statistics on terrorism. 
With the advantage of federal funding it has been able to specialise in particular acts 
of violence, politically and non-politically motivated. With the creation of the 
Explosives Unit Bomb Data Center  (EU-BDC) in 1994, resulting from the merger of 
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two separate units, concentration of skills has permitted better co-ordination in 
bomb investigations.331 
The EU-BDC Computer Reference Library operates what is thought to be the 
worlds largest computerised collection of data that can be automatically identified 
and compared with other bomb data.332  Its capability by any standards is extensive, 
and offers FBI analysts facilities well beyond the functionality of academic and 
commercially based terrorism data sets. The database known as the Explosives 
Reference and Search System (EXPRESS) differs from other terrorism-based data sets 
in both its functionality and content of data. A particular advantage of the EXPRESS 
system is its ability to compare in detail across FBI recorded cases, to detect relevant 
data or common denominators. While some computerised terrorism data sets such 
as the Political Violence Research Unit database, at the University of Tel Aviv, 
operates with the powerful database Microsoft Access™, it cannot match the 
functional capabilities of the EXPRESS system. This is not to suggest that academic 
terrorism data sets are the poorer relative. They perform a different function, and 
are not generally designed and used for intelligence-based purposes.  
One particularly capability of the EXPRESS system is its ability to compare 
cases of bombings using narrative based FBI reports along with photographic 
evidence for forensic examination purposes. This is a powerful tool. Further 
advantages include search facilities that can find similar bomb devices and their 
components, that are used in potentially linked incidents.  The nature of this type of 
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data set tends to be forensic in purpose, as such it encompasses not only politically 
motivated bombings within the United States but other criminal bombing acts.  
The sheer array of statistics on terrorism and bombing related incidents in 
the United States can present a confusing picture of where the data originally 
derives from. The collation and dissemination of information on bombings and 
explosive-related incidents is a joint effort carried out by the FBI and the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). Although the resultant statistics are combined, 
their respective remits to collect data, is by law, carried out separately.333  For 
example, the FBI’s  Explosives Unit Bomb Data Center is mandated by law to collect 
and hold bombing statistics reported to them by state and local agencies. At Federal 
level the statistics on bombings and explosives details are produced by the ATF. 334  A 
point worth noting, with agency-based systems such as EXIS and AEXIS, is that they 
are not simply data sets on bombing incidents. The intelligence-based nature of the 
system means they perform several other functions in addition to merely reporting 
statistics. For example, the EXIS system, in addition to detailing aggregate totals of 
bombing incidents, acts as a repository for information on stolen explosives, as well 
as their recovery. Its new counterpart AEXIS will hold even more detailed data, 
including the ability to provide information on placement methods of bombs, their 
initiation and target, as well as details on suspected culprits.335 
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Although acts of terrorism form only part of the information held within 
these systems, their operation illustrates several points. These systems are truly 
multi-functional database systems, responding to a plethora of differing needs and 
requirements. The include the provision of annual statistics for publication, to acting 
as a repository for explosives material, as well as holding information on suspects, 
among many other functions. 
While an increasing amount of government agencies have established, or are 
in the process of developing computerised data sets on incidents of political 
violence, their operation across international boundaries tends to be limited. A 
mixture of political and national security sensitivity, coupled with a reluctance to 
share intelligence, has resulted in very few truly internationally co-operative 
arrangements. One such database project, operational since 1990 and which 
includes terrorism as part of its remit is the Interpol Explosives Incident System 
(IEXIS). Running alongside this is the Interpol Trafficking in Arms System (ITAR) 
database. 336These two specialist systems although built and maintained separately 
complement each others remit. An interesting feature of both the IEXIS and ITAR 
system is the ability to simultaneously search both databases.  The reasoning behind 
such a facility was that it was felt that increasingly criminal and violent actions can 
have many common denominators and links that may go unnoticed if left separated.  
 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
The threat to aviation security from terrorist attacks is ever present. Attacks such as 
the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, in 1988, serves as a brutal 
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reminder of the heinous acts terrorist are prepared to commit.  Public revulsion at 
such atrocities, sadly, has not annulled the actions of terrorists to commit similar 
acts. Bombings at Jorge Chavez International Airport, Lima, Air France offices in 
Tehran and  the hijacking of a Royal Swazi Airline, all in 1993, serve as a sorry 
reminder that air travellers and the aviation industry must be ever vigilant.337 
As part of its obligations to minimise potential terrorist attacks and counter-
act where possible, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) implemented its 
computerised Civil Aviation Security Information System (CASIS) in 1985.338 Although 
CASIS is still used, a new system, of which very little is known, is being phased in to 
replace CASIS. The new system, known as the Airport-Airline Incident Reporting 
System (AAIRS), can operate from P.C. based systems over local area networks, 
connecting into the FAA’s main network when required.  
Despite the paucity of information on AAIRS, valuable lessons can be learnt 
from its predecessor, CASIS that will likely be incorporated into the new AAIRS 
system. The CASIS system when introduced in the mid-1980’s operated from a 
mainframe system, and was used to allow FAA personnel to target resources and 
monitor trends. Although a subject-specific database, the CASIS system could not 
strictly be classified as an intelligence-based system, as with the VGTOF or TIPOFF 
data sets. Its purpose was part intelligence, part trends and analysis. The type of 
information contained within CASIS is varied, containing chronological details of 
bombing incidents at airports to the results documented from airport inspections. 
                                                          
337
 These selection of incidents form only a minute proportion of incidents recorded by the Federal Aviation 
Administration during 1993. For further details see: U.S. Department of Transportation.   Criminal Acts 
Against Civil Aviation.Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Civil Aviation Security.Washington D.C. 1993. 
338
 For basic information on the role and operation of CASIS see: U.S. General Accounting Office. Aviation 
Security. Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and International Challenges. U.S. General Accounting 
Office Washington D.C. GAO/RCED-94-38, 1994.pp.42-45. 
246 
 
This mixture of events based data to evidence based information is unusual. In part it 
reflects the comprehensive nature of the system relative to the period of its design.  
While the CASIS system was relatively advanced for its time, the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO) in its 1994 report to Congressional Committees, identified 
several weaknesses in the CASIS system. 339  The GAO highlighted problems relating 
to the FAA’s use of CASIS in emerging trend analysis and its allocation of resources. 
As the report notes: 
‘…CASIS does not contain information on the severity of a deficiency or how it 
relates to airport security as a whole.   FAA denotes inspection findings as 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory. According to officials, this has led to a “check-list” 
mentality in the FAA security workforce that focuses more on filling out the 
inspection form than seeking long-term solutions to pressing security problems.’ 
340 
 
These observations by the GAO illustrate several problems that administrators of 
terrorism data sets can run into. Firstly, the lack of quantifiable measurement of 
inspections can so very easily occur if specific fields within the data set are not dis-
aggregated. The simple, and clinical Yes/No, Good/Bad and 
Satisfactory/Unsatisfactory type of variables provide minimal information to allow 
for informed decision making. While interpretation of words can cause problems, 
some form of numerical ranking, for example 1-5, can provide an indication of the 
seriousness of situations.  Detailed breakdown of variables is not without precedent. 
The PinkertonsAnnual Risk Assessment, for example, provides in its table of total 
incidents of political violence world-wide, four levels of identified risk to countries: 
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extreme, high, moderate and low.341  Although these risk assessment levels are very 
general, they do provide clients and analysts with some indication of a countries risk 
status at a glance.  
The GAO’s concern over the “check-list” mentality of staff using CASIS is 
indicative of the assumption that just because data has been coded on computer it is 
legitimate. The FAA’s failure to both effectively use the data, and suggest 
improvements in CASIS’s design, again adds weight to the fallacy that legitimacy 
derives from computerisation of data.Part of the GAO’s report on CASIS highlighted 
one of the classic mistakes that can be made from the computerisation of data in 
general, and can be just as applicable to the design of terrorism data sets. If data is 
not coded, the problem does not exist. Likewise, if terrorist incidents are not coded, 
they have not taken place. Any serious student of political violence would dismiss 
the last statement instantly. Where the CASIS system failed was its inability to detail 
where the unsatisfactory security conditions derived from. Detailed security 
information included carry-on baggage screening, passenger screening, airport 
fences and identification badge control (temporary). As GAO notes: 
 
‘…CASIS does not include information to determine whether the 
unsatisfactory [security] conditions resulted from carelessness on the part of 
the individuals or were symptomatic of much larger problems.’ 342 
 
In its defence the FAA argued that: 
 ‘… CASIS was not developed to capture the state of security at the nation’s 
airports. Instead, important information on the strengths and weaknesses of 
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air carrier and airport security reside with individual FAA security inspectors.’ 
343 
 
As part of its response to the GAO report, FAA officials revised the CASIS system to 
enable it to incorporate the information noted above. 
In concluding it observations on the CASIS system, the GAO made several 
valid points worthy of elaboration. The GAO highlighted the incompatibility of the 
CASIS database and its inability to integrate with FAA and other computerised 
systems. 344 This particular problem is not unique to the FAA. Early versions of the 
RAND databases and chronologies on international terrorism, the ITERATE data sets 
and the U.S. State Departments TADIMS system, have encountered compatibility 
problems, particularly their execution on a Windows based operating system 
environment.345 These problems derive primarily from the time period they were 
developed. All the above data sets were designed in the 1970’s or early 1980’s.  
Operating primarily from mainframe computer system, their compatibility with other 
system was extremely limited. The advent of Microsoft Windows™  and Apple Mac™  
operating system environments, vastly superior software and hardware, as well as 
sophisticated network technology has revolutionised the scene. Terrorism data sets 
currently benefiting from the new technologies  include the State Department’s 
TIPOFF database and the Overseas Security Advisory Council’s (OSAC)  Electronic 
Data Base.  
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Nearly seventy five percent of the FAA’s security workforce were identified as 
having problems easily accessing the CASIS system to conduct basic work A third of 
their time was spent entering data into the CASIS system.346Purely on efficiency 
grounds alone, problems of accessibility and sheer time consumption spent on data 
entry makes the CASIS database a highly unattractive piece of technology.  More 
importantly, where such a security system is seriously under-performing, the risk of 
terrorism security breaches will tend to be higher. 
One of the most important recommendations of the GAO’s report on CASIS was 
to introduce facilities for carrying out more detailed numerical analysis: 
 ‘A first step would be to develop quantitative measures to analyze security 
inspection data. As noted earlier, most inspection results only indicate 
whether a satisfactory or unsatisfactory condition exists. A more analytical 
approach would provide FAA with better information to make decisions 
regarding security.’ 347 
 
The lack of quantitative measurement facilities in CASIS highlights a problem not 
solely restricted to the FAA’s system. Many of the early, computerised terrorism data 
sets developed on mainframe systems in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, such as 
the RAND, TADIMS and the University of Tel Aviv’s data sets, were unable to offer 
even basic aggregate data analysis. While numerical variables such as number of 
causalities were either coded or entered among narrative descriptions of incidents, 
the software was unable to calculate data on numerical variables. These functions 
among many other basic and complex numerical and statistical functions are now 
available to data sets such as the TRPUV and TIPOFF.348 
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Publicly acknowledged short-comings of security related government run 
database systems such as CASIS is rare, and is to be welcomed. Balancing security 
considerations with the publics right to know of potential weaknesses in a system is 
always a finely tuned consideration. The particular sensitivity of aviation, a mass 
form of transport, illustrates the acute need to handle these matters with care. The 
FAA’s report tackles the weaknesses of the CASIS system head on, and makes 
practical and realistic suggestions for improvement in both hardware and software 
operations that are now entirely feasible. 
 
Other Government Computerised Data Sets  
In recent years the amount of computerised data sets handling terrorism and 
security related issues has increased significantly. The general and subject-specific 
terrorism data sets mentioned above form part of an even wider series of 
computerised networks that operate within the United States and beyond. Again 
publicly available information on these data sets tends generally, though not 
exclusively, to derive from North America. 349 Among the more relevant data sets 
that encompass terrorism issues is the South Pacific Islands Criminal Intelligence 
Network (SPICIN). Its unusual and rather large title reflects it enormous geographic 
remit: the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, the French Society Islands, Western Samoa, and the Solomon Islands are 
among its twenty one country membership.  
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The SPICIN system, in part fills an intelligence gap in a geographic area of the 
world that is both very large to cover and often underreported. With heavy coverage 
of terrorism events in the Northern Hemisphere, particularly North America, Europe 
and the Middle East, attention on terrorism activity in much of the Southern 
Hemisphere tends to be minimal. Admittedly, compared with other regions of the 
world, Australasia and the Pacific regions have considerably less incidence of 
terrorism activity than their Northern counterparts. The U.S. State Department’s  
Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996 makes no mention of terrorism activity in the 
region for that year.  Pinkerton’s however, identify activity in Vanuatu and Australia 
in their 1996 report.350  The regions low terrorism activity should be no excuse for the 
non-recording of incidents. The SPICIN system is not a dedicated database system for 
terrorism activity in the South Pacific. It deals with the collation, coding and 
reciprocal exchange of terrorism information, drug intelligence data and other 
criminal activity among relevant agencies in the Pacific region.351 
Other lesser-known systems that encompass terrorism related information, 
among many other areas of security, include: the FBI’s Fingerprint Identification 
Records System (FIRS), the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the National 
Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) and Sentry. The Sentry 
system is  operated by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons, and contains information 
on all prisoners held with jail in the United States since 1980. 352 
Illustrative of such new developments in the field have been comments made by 
Kay C. Goss of the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In a speech 
                                                          
350
 U.S. Department of State.Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996.U.S. Department of State Publication.Office of 
the Secretary of State, Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, Washington D.C. 1997.Pinkerton Risk 
Assessment Services.Annual Risk Assessment 1996.  (Arlington,VA: Pinkerton, 1997.) 
351
 For further information on the operations of SPICIN see:  http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/osi-97-2/soi_ch4.htm 
352
 For more detail on these computerised systems see: http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/osi-97-2/soi_ch4.htm 
252 
 
before the NATO Civil Emergency Preparedness Symposium meeting in Moscow, 
Goss outlined the essential elements – still relevant today - required in the handling 
terrorism incidents co-ordinated at local, state and federal level.353  These include: 
‘Pre-positioned resources, which allows all levels of government to have the 
necessary databases, communications links, inventories of assets, 
equipment, availability of experts, and other critical requirements.’ 354 
 
The ‘necessary databases’ which Goss refers to do not have to be strictly limited to 
data sets on known terrorist groups. Their value may be of limited use in the 
immediacy of injuries, death and the need for crisis management. What Goss argues 
for, is that pragmatic and practical advice be made available to FEMA and other 
agencies in handling terrorism incidents. In the aftermath of a terrorism incident, 
databases could hold, for example, information on local medical specialists, fire and 
safety personnel, as well as trained counsellors. This holistic approach to the use of 
terrorism data sets, with their acknowledged shortcomings, could offer a powerful 
integration of infrastructure data in handling critical post-incident events. 
Goss highlights the three levels of terrorism incident crisis management. These, 
in part, compliment some of the functions of existing terrorism data set such as the 
VGTOF, IEXIS and TIPOFF. 
‘Crisis management includes proactive measures for prevention, immediate 
incident and post-incident response, including command of the operational 
response as the on-scene manager for an incident.’ 355 
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What may be more realistic however, is a move towards relationally linked terrorism 
databases that are maintained separately by respective specialists, and drawn upon 
as required.356 
For FEMA and other agencies involved with post-terrorism incident 
management, one of the crucial factors involved in successfully minimising 
causalities is time. As operational tools, computers can execute commands within 
mili-seconds; much faster than the most competent human. Through networks such 
as the Internet, information can be accessed almost instantly, on a global scale. 
Particularly where chemical and biologically based attacks occur, the need for an 
almost instant response is paramount if lives are to be saved. As Goss notes: 
‘Expert advice in terrorism, on the other hand, may make the difference 
between life and death for thousands, particularly if chemical or biological 
weapons are used. There are so many different types of agents that could be 
used, with many variables in medical response, that expert advice must be 
quickly available to any community.’ 357 
 
As attractive a scenario as this may paint, instant accessibility to local, national or 
global expertise must be qualified in one vital respect: the frailty of human decision-
making. Acknowledgement of this ever-present weak link in the chain, should not be 
a deterrent for dedicated professionals to fully grasp the exciting potential of new 
technology.  The increasing mobility and accessibility of computerised systems in the 
form of mini-computers that can be activated in or around the scene of a terrorist 
incident has not been lost on FEMA: 
‘That’s another reason why pre-positioned and easily accessible databases 
are so invaluable. Thankfully, computerized access to vast sources of 
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information makes quick answers to questions a possibility – and, where 
chemical or biological agents are involved, time is of the essence.’ 358 
 
4.6. Academic Terrorism Data Sets 
Academically maintained computerised terrorism data sets form one of the major 
sources of reference for academics and analysts researching the field of terrorism.359 
Increasing interest in the subject area is not, however, reflective of the amount of 
computerised terrorism data sets available. Confusion between the availability of 
terrorism data sets via computer and the development and maintenance of 
computerised terrorism data sets needs to be clarified.  Only a handful of academic 
and policy institutions world-wide could seriously be described as maintaining and 
developing substantial computerised data sets in the field of terrorism. Where some 
confusion arises, is that a number of sources, both government and academic, 
provide links to terrorism data sets, on computer via the Internet. These include: the 
United States Department of Justice, Department of State, the FBI and the Northern 
Ireland Office among others. 360  These are discussed at length in Chapter V of this 
thesis. 
The principal academic institutions holding such data sets are the Centre for 
the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, at the University of St. Andrews, 
Scotland, (until recently, in conjunction with the RAND Corporation of Santa Monica) 
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and the University of Tel Aviv’s Political Violence Research Unit (PVRU). 361  Although 
not strictly deriving from an academic institution, the series of ITERATE chronologies 
and data sets published by Edward Mickolus at Vinyard Software, form another 
major source of academic reference. Smaller computerised projects, and subject-
specific in content, include the Attributes of Terrorism in Canada (ATIC) data sets 
developed and maintained by Ian Jeffrey Ross and a series of South African data sets 
maintained by the University of Natal, South Africa. The remit of academically based 
terrorism data sets differs considerably from their government and intelligence 
based counterparts. They are maintained and developed primarily for use in 
research-based activities. They have no intelligence role, although they are often 
consulted by external media, commercial organisations and research analysts for 
information. Access to the full data sets over such mediums as the Internet generally 
is not permitted.  
 
 
RAND-St.Andrews Database on Terrorism and Low-Intensity Conflict 
 
The RAND-St Andrews data sets on terrorism and low-intensity conflict, in the league 
of computerised terrorism data sets, can be considered to be one of the longest 
established data sets of its kind. Its long history merits some attention. Originally 
developed in 1972, at the RAND Corporation, a U.S. policy think tank, they have been 
maintained and developed for over quarter of a century. 362 That is a considerable 
amount of time, considering the fact they are computerised, and require on-going 
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maintenance and development. As mentioned in Chapter IV of this thesis, the RAND 
chronologies and data sets were designed and built at RAND using custom-built 
software called CODA. The advantage for terrorism researchers was that their own 
particular research requirements were incorporated into the functional capabilities 
of the CODA system in its early design.363  At the time, these were basic facilities, 
such as text fields to hold narrative on terrorism incidents as well as basic editing 
facilities. Annual hard copy publication of the RAND Chronology of International 
Terrorism provided external researchers and analysts with access to data held at 
RAND.364  The RAND chronologies included narrative comment on trends in 
international terrorism, including terrorist tactics, regional trends in international 
terrorism and specific attacks on American targets. In addition to the annual RAND 
Chronology of International Terrorism, a breakdown of terrorist incidents by 
perpetrator, tactic, target and region was also provided. The data sets operated from 
a mainframe computer system running under the UNIX operating system software. 
365 For its time the RAND system was fairly advanced. Shortcomings however in its 
ability to carry out arithmetical and statistical operations for quantitative analysis of 
terrorism events meant that these often had to be calculated manually.  
The mid 1990’s saw major changes as RAND’s Santa Monica headquarters 
with the funding for long-term terrorism projects such as the data sets under some 
pressure. The move by Dr. Bruce Hoffman of RAND to the Department of 
International Relations at University of St. Andrews, Scotland resulted in the RAND 
terrorism data sets being moved from its Santa Monica headquarters to the Centre 
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for Terrorism and Political Violence (CTPV) at the University of St. Andrews, 
Scotland.366 
In addition to the RAND data sets, and the considerable terrorism research 
material already held at St. Andrews, Control Risks Ltd. of London, a leading 
security/risk consultancy business, agreed to donate on a regular basis its archival 
material on terrorism and twentieth century conflict data. The cumulative results of 
this merger of resources meant that the Centre for Terrorism and Political Violence 
at St Andrews held one of the world’s most formidable collection of terrorism 
research material, and was complemented by on-going development of the newly 
titled RAND-St.Andrews Chronologies on Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict. 
As a source of data, the RAND-St.Andrews data sets provided a rich and 
comprehensive  collection of electronic and hard copy material, for undertaking 
terrorism research. The computerised data sets allowed researchers to carry out 
trend analysis of terrorist behaviour, their methods and motivation. Contextual 
analysis of terrorist attacks, principally by means of text fields, as well as coded 
variables, provided researchers with a macro view of events. Other forms of analysis 
that could be  undertaken using the data sets included group and policy analysis.  
One of the strengths of the CTPV data sets in addition to its chronologies on 
international terrorism, is the computerised ancillary data sets and archive material 
on terrorism and low-intensity conflict data. These topics included: maritime and 
aviation security, emerging conflicts data, organised crime, religious fundamentalism 
as well as ethnic violence and genocide among many other topics. This truly eclectic 
collection of specialised terrorism and low-intensity conflict data, both computerised 
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and manual, provided researchers with one of the richest collections of data to be 
found in any University within North America or Western Europe. 367 
The establishment of the RAND-St.Andrews chronologies at the University of 
St.Andrews not only provided a superb collection of research material but 
importantly provided a focus from which other terrorism analysts and researchers 
were encouraged to contribute to a research field that requires considerable 
attention. As discussed in earlier parts of this thesis, there continues to be very little 
academic research work written on the application of computerised database 
systems to the terrorism research field. This void has not gone unnoticed. The 
leading academic journal in the terrorism field Terrorism and Political Violence which 
published the RAND-St Andrews Chronologies on International Terrorism, has 
encouraged contributions to the database field.  Professor Paul Wilkinson, its co-
editor, aware of the lack of published literature has invited contributions among 
others on: domestic terrorism databases, analysis of trends in terrorism and counter-
terrorism, the impact of terrorism on victims as well as socio-economic, cultural and 
religious databases on terrorism. In addition, Wilkinson also promotes the need for 
further research to carried out into database design and management, technical 
issues as well as emerging trends in Information Technology.368  The call for more 
research into technical and management issues relating to terrorism data sets, as 
well as Information Technology is to be welcomed.  Although there has been a slow 
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response, contributions by Gordon as well as Devost, Houghton, Pollard et al. have 
set in motion the development of a vastly under-researched literature base.369 
While at the Centre for Terrorism and Political Violence, the RAND-St.Andrews 
chronologies began to broaden the methods by which it collected source data. The 
advent of the Internet and clipping services such as Lexis-Nexis enabled research 
staff to access a much broader forum of literature. Reliance mainly on hard-copy 
source material has been a trait of most terrorism data sets, until the arrival of 
electronically accessible material via such mediums as the Internet. Increased access 
to source material however does not guarantee the perfect data set. Data has to be 
captured, accurate and coded. Even then the chances of logging every incident of 
terrorism occurring world-wide is almost impossible.  Claims by any data sets 
administrator to have the most authoritative collection of recorded incidents should 
always be tempered with reality that the recording of acts of terrorism, domestically 
and internationally is an imperfect science.  One of the great strengths of the RAND-
St.Andrews data sets was acknowledgement by its director that while the chronology  
attempted to be as inclusive as possible absolute perfection was neither possible nor 
realistic.  As Hoffman notes: 
‘It should also be emphasised that the data contained in the Chronology is 
intended to be illustrative only and does not purport nor claim to be a 
definitive listing of every international terrorist incident that has occurred 
everywhere since 1968. Its value, accordingly, is as a means of identifying 
terrorist trends and projecting likely future terrorist patterns.’ 370 
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The end of 1998 saw major changes in the operation of the RAND-St.Andrews data 
sets. With the return of Dr. Hoffman to the RAND Corporation in December of 1998, 
the RAND-St Andrews chronologies and data sets on terrorism reverted back to their 
original home base at RAND in Santa Monica.371 The data sets are to be known as the 
RAND Database. The future development of the RAND Database is as yet unknown. 
From a software perspective, the retention of the data sets on the CODA system will 
likely become increasingly untenable. The CODA system although having provided 
years of service is quickly reaching, if not already reached, its sell by date. Although 
the continuity of CODA has been one of its strengths, the adoption of readily 
available relational database software supported in a Windows environment is long 
overdue.  
A small, but crucial point worth noting, is the potential fate of the original 
RAND data sets had RAND decided not continued their maintenance. Any stoppage 
in their maintenance could seriously have put at risk the future of the data sets. 
Their move to the University of St.Andrew’s CSTPV ensured their continued 
development at time when their future within RAND was uncertain.  Data sets of this 
type of magnitude require to be maintained constantly. They cannot be treated as  a 
hobby or a passing interest in the subject field. To have intermittent or periodic 
recording of data not only threatens their integrity, but makes the task of coding 
back-logs of data an almost impossible task. These projects are for the long run; 
temporary respite even for a few weeks or months can seriously jeopardise the data 
sets operation. 
                                                          
371
 Although Dr  Hoffman has taken a new position as Director of the RAND’s Washington  bureau the newly 
titled RAND Database is to be run from RAND’s Santa Monica headquarters. 
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Although little is known of RAND’s plans, the Centre for Terrorism and Political 
Violence at St.Andrews has indicated some of its plans for the future development of  
computerised data sets on terrorism.372  Instead of replicating existing terrorism 
chronologies and data sets, which would be a vast waste of both financial resources, 
and time, it plans to develop new databases on post-conflict resolution. These would 
encompass such areas as South Africa, Northern Ireland and Israel. Other areas that 
are planned for computerised database development include data sets on 
international organised crime, issues relating to multi-national peace keeping and 
peace-enforcement operations. This deliberate move to cover other areas of 
terrorism and conflict research is refreshing, and will broaden the availability of 
research data in a field requiring much attention. 
 
 
The Political Violence Research Unit Terrorism Database ,University of Tel Aviv 
 
The Political Violence Research Unit (PVRU) terrorism database, rates along with the 
RAND and RAND-ST.Andrews data sets as one of the longest established 
computerised data sets on terrorism and political violence. The data sets were 
established by Professor Ariel Merari in 1978 at Tel Aviv University’s JaffeeCenter for 
Strategic Studies.The data sets were originally held on a manual card-index system; 
this followed a very similar pattern to the early development of other data sets such 
as TIPOFF and the Pinkerton’s PRAS data sets.373  As is often the case with terrorism 
data sets, their development and maintenance forms part of a larger project. The 
TPVU terrorism data sets in their early phase provided the core data to support the  
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 See http://www.st-and.ac.uk/~www_sem/IR/about.html 
373
 (PRAS) - Pinkerton Risk Assessment Services data sets. 
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Jaffee’s  Project on Terrorism and Low Intensity Warfare from 1978 until 1989. 374  
The JaffeeCenter’s annual publication of the INTER terrorism data sets, derived its 
data from the Jaffee project.375  The data sets moved from the JaffeeCenter in 1989,  
with the creation of the Terrorism and Political Violence Unit (TPVU) under the 
directorship of Professor Merari.  
Continuity over the years in the use of software to support terrorism data 
sets has varied among agencies and organisations. The dilemma between upgrading 
software to provide improved functionality, and the cost, design, training and 
maintenance implications can be a difficult act to balance. The TPVU data sets have 
encountered several changes in software, unlike the RAND and RAND-St.Andrews 
terrorism data sets, which have had long software continuity with CODA.  For 
example, the TPVU’s terrorism data sets have undergone several changes:  from 
operating under a card-index system, mini-computer and mainframe software, to its 
present Microsoft Access database system.376The TPVU’s current hardware and 
software system provides in part, a model from which other systems designers could 
learn from.377The availability of sophisticated software and hardware is no guarantee 
                                                          
374
 Terrorism data sets can be free-standing, such as the U.S. State Departments Patterns of Global Terrorism, 
the ITERATE data sets or the RAND-St.Andrews data sets on terrorism. Alternatively they can be developed to 
support large on-going projects. These include: The  Project on Terrorism and Low Intensity Warfare (as 
above), the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organisations File (VGTOF) or the U.S. State Departments TIPOFF 
data sets.   
375
 INTER International Terrorism in 1987 (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post 1987). 
376
 Information derived from communications with Professor Ariel Merari, Tel Aviv University, July 1998. Also 
from communications and meetings with Zvika Adar, TPVU administrator, Edinburgh September 1998. The 
TPVU terrorism data sets were originally computerised from  1979-83, under the supervision of Professor 
Merari. Initially, only acts of Palestinian Terrorism (International) were coded on computer. Form 1983 all 
events data  were computerised. The TPVU terrorism data  sets operated on a VAX computer system run by 
DIGITAL Inc. hardware, the software used to hold the data sets was written specifically for the project and 
was known as X-FIC. Over the years the system was transferred to the University’s main VAX computer. 
Requiring closer control of the data sets from within the TPVU, a programmer was employed to code them to 
run under Microsoft Access database software. 
377
Currently (1999)  the data sets run under Microsoft Access, operating  from a COMPAQ ProSignia server 
running under Microsoft Windows 95. The tables are relational in design. Data can also be entered via scanner 
and the World Wide Web (WWW).  Current development includes plans to make the data sets partly available in  
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of a quality data set. The TPVU’s data sets do, however, provide a comprehensive 
collection of terrorism and political violence events data, with specific emphasis on 
Middle East terrorism.  
The TPVU data sets are organised over three main database files, with 
relationally linked tables. The files are: Terrorist Events, Terrorist Groups and rather 
unusually - States’ Attitude towards Terrorism.  The Terrorist Events file offers an 
impressive collection of coded and narrative data. Key fields used to describe events 
include standard variables such as: date of event, place of occurrence and target. 
Further detailed variables provide more subtle but crucial information. For example, 
the data set differentiates between claimed respondents to acts of terrorism and the 
actual  perpetrating organisation.  Operational tactics as well as arms and equipment 
used by terrorist groups are also recorded, if available. A simple field titled ‘Success 
Event’ requiring a Yes/No entry, provides a quick, if crude assessment of an events 
‘success’. Calculated carefully, using specific Microsoft Access functions, this field 
could provide a simple aggregate comparative analysis of  terrorist groups successes 
or failures. The criteria for assigning a Yes or No to an incident would have to be 
clearly defined. Even more detailed variables coded within the file includes 
geographic  routes taken by terrorist’s to carry out acts of violence.  Others include  
‘Demands’ and resultant  ‘Threat*s+’ from terrorist groups. 
The Terrorist Groups file is substantial, containing information on over one 
thousand sub-national groups.  This file offers highly detailed information on the 
many attributes of terrorist groups, providing excellent profiles and data for further 
research. Details in narrative form include terrorist group history, general 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Hyper-Text Mark-up Language ( HTML ) format,  as is used  on the Internet Web pages. Other plans include 
running the data sets from various platforms including: Windows 95/98, Unix and AppleMac systems. 
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descriptions of the groups activities, strategies, ideologies, leadership and 
membership as well as their geographic spread of activity. Other variables include 
preferred tactics and modes of operation, state support as well as identified links to 
other terrorist organisations.  One particular variable in the Terrorist Groups file, 
which is rarely formally recorded - even among terrorism data sets - is details on the 
public attitudes towards terrorist groups. 
The third file in the TPVU data sets addresses an area of terrorism research 
requiring considerable attention: the ‘States Attitudes toward Terrorism’.  Details 
such as state support for terrorist groups, ideological positions, counter-terrorism 
activities, law-enforcement, special anti-terrorist units and extradition treaties, are 
among a gamut of state related approaches to terrorism activity held on file. The 
lack of publicly available data sets produced by government on this specific topic, is 
in part understandable. Apart from obvious sensitive political, security and 
operational reasons, few governments are willing to publicly record let alone 
acknowledge even a small percentage of the above activities. Publication of such 
data could by default result in governments being accused of implicit involvement in 
actions such as state sponsored terrorism. Academic centres such as the TPVU offer 
at a minimum integrity, un-biased analysis and objective rigour from which such 
sensitive data can be compiled. 
Despite the TPVU’s wide-ranging coverage of terrorist activity, the 
practicalities of maintaining a truly global database on terrorism were recognised by 
its owners as being rather ambitious. The drive for total inclusivity of events data can 
often weaken research bases. From 1989 onwards the TPVU’s data sets changed 
emphasis, concentrating, with the exception of several categories, on Middle East 
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terrorism at both domestic and international level.378   This pragmatic move was both 
a recognition of the limits of one institution trying to sustain global coverage of 
events but also strengthened their resources on coverage of Middle East activities, 
its natural ‘back-yard’.   
The TPVU data sets, as a well established repository of events data on 
terrorism, provide not only a rich source of reference for research, but redress 
geographically the Western bias in reporting and maintenance of such data sets. On 
the grounds of pure objectivity in the recording and assessing events data, this 
healthy situation can only be encouraged. The current hardware and software 
specifications of the TPVU data sets also provide a very useful prototype for other 
researchers interested in developing terrorism data sets. The considerable time 
period over which they have been developed and maintained, coupled with the 
TPVU’s willingness to refine and improve the data sets functional operations, 
illustrates the potential benefits that can be derived from new technologies. 
 
 
 
 
The ITERATE  Data Sets 
The ITERATE  (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) data sets form 
one of the longest established series of data sets and chronologies on terrorism. 
Published over five volumes, in varying titles, and recording incidents from 1968 
onwards, they can be classified as partly academic and commercial data sets.The 
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 The TPVU continues to records acts of international terrorism world-wide related to hostage and 
aviation incidents. 
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principal author over all five editions, Edward Mickolus has complied a considerable 
collection of terrorism events data, presented mainly in chronological format. 
The ITERATE data sets differ in several respects from other computerised 
terrorism data sets. The data sets are publicly available for purchase in both hard 
copy and computerised format. They are one of few terrorism data sets that can be 
bought on floppy disk and run remotely from the purchasers computer. Unlike 
Patterns of Global Terrorism, an annual publication, the ITERATE data sets are 
published on a periodic basis as and when the author deems the publication to be 
viable.  Despite several shortcomings, outlined below, the task of maintaining and 
producing such a comprehensive set of data is substantial, particularly over the time 
period covered. 
The ITERATE data sets could not be classified as a true database of terrorism 
incidents. The chronological listing of events within the data set is held within a text-
based system. Although this has served the authors over the years well its usefulness 
operationally can be limiting. For example, calculation of statistics for quantitative 
purposes within the data sets has to be carried out using external statistical 
software, such as SPSS. The computerised format of the data sets is held on text-
based software, thus limiting the potential for the generation of forms, reports, 
querying and statistical functions. Even within the hard-copy version of the 
chronologies the ability to calculate aggregate totals can be a potentially lengthy 
process given the narrative format in which the data is presented.  
As is often the case, quantity of data gives no guarantee of quality.  As Eubank 
notes on his review of the latest chronology: Terrorism, 1992-1995: A Chronology of 
Events and a Selective Annotated Bibliography: 
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‘The descriptions, admittedly not analytical, range from a very few lines to 
several pages, with the World Trade Center bombing an example of the 
latter.  Immediately preceding this event is a recording of  “…PKK members 
attacked Turkish interests in Zurich and Geneva. 93062430-31”, (p.430). 
Thus it is hard to know what to make of many of these descriptions, being 
similar in content.  …Admittedly not each event is of the same importance as 
every other, but it would be helpful if some had been a bit more 
informative.’ 
 
Eubank’s reference to the brevity of some incident descriptions could in part be 
explained by lack of data. However, if incidents are recorded, some form of 
minimum criteria for variables would be helpful, not only for basic information 
purposes, but also to allow minimum comparative analysis of basic variables. The 
voluminous nature of the manual data sets and the limiting functionality of its 
computerised equivalent render the ITERATE data sets awkward to use for detailed 
analysis, cross-referencing, identifying links and emerging trends and patterns in 
terrorism behaviour.  
In his 1988-1991 chronology of terrorism Mickolus has erroneously attempted to 
quantitatively measure aggregate trends in terrorism attacks by month and year, 
using computer bytes as the unit of measurement. Mickolus recognises that 
calculating terrorism activity and trends is not at times an easy task: 
 
‘Determining trends in terrorism has always been methodologically 
controversial.   ….At the risk of being self-referential, I have attempted to 
create a surrogate measure of such media attention [of terrorist attacks] by 
looking at the coverage of incidents by this chronology.  As the chronology is 
based primarily on media accounts around the world, tallying the amount of 
coverage by the chronology gives a rough idea of the richness of data 
presented in the media for each month’s incidents.’ 379 
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Op cit. 
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Unfortunately Mickolus’s use of computer bytes as a surrogate measurement of 
media attention renders the table and his consequent analysis of the figures 
completely null and void. Computer bytes provide absolutely no useful or meaningful 
measurement of aggregate or quantifiable data. The format and software program in 
which the file is saved, will determine to quite an extent the size of the file in bytes. 
Furthermore a small amount of bytes is no reflection at all on total fatalities of an 
incident or the amount of coverage. For example, the statement ‘275 people were 
killed in a terrorist bombing’ saved in computer bytes amounted to 11 kilo bytes 
whereas three full pages of text only amounted to 15 kilo bytes of memory.380   
Unfortunately Mickolus repeats the same mistake in his latest issue of Terrorism 
1992-1995.  
As a series of data sets on terrorism the ITERATE and consequent 
chronologies on terrorism provide yet another alternative to government based 
statistics and information on terrorism events.  Although a little awkward to use in 
terms of indexing and general searching of the data sets they make a valuable 
contribution the terrorism set field and are well used among academic researchers. 
Mickolus’s willingness to receive contributions and comments on his series of 
manual and computerised data sets provides a healthy forum in which their quality 
can be hopefully monitored and improved. 
 
 
 
                                                          
380
 This small, but useful example was carried out using Microsoft Word for Windows 95 Version 7. An 
explanation of the pitfalls of using bytes as a form of measurement in terrorism data was given to the 
author (Mickolus) at a meeting in July 1994.  
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CASE STUDY: SOUTH AFRICA 
To help redress this problem a research visit to the newly emerging South Africa and 
Namibia was undertaken to look at established data sets on political violence.  
 
Objectives 
The objective of the study tour was to assess the quality, breadth and type of 
political violence data sets available in South Africa and Namibia.  
 
Research Findings 
Data sets on political violence and conflict in South Africa are held by research 
institutes, the universities and non-governmental bodies. Official government 
statistics on political violence are also published. These publications tend to be 
periodic and are not always considered completely reliable. 
Across all the main centres holding data on political violence in South Africa 
the quality of the information gathered and coded was found to be of a very high 
standard.  Quality can be measured in the reliability and breadth of sources used to 
compile the data set. This includes material such as newspaper cuttings and the 
reporting of incidents by independent agencies and monitoring services. Other such 
factors as validity and consistency of data entry of variables to the data set (e.g. type 
of incident, number of casualties and groups responsible) was found to be of a high 
standard.One of the largest and most comprehensive data sets on political violence 
and conflict in South Africa is held by the Human Science Research Council of South 
Africa. The H.S.R.C. currently operates three computerised data sets on political 
violence in South Africa. The largest  - The Conflict Monitor Database, was first 
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established in 1970. This database holds in excess of 15,000 records and holds data 
on collective action protest events. A smaller though extremely detailed data set on 
political violence and conflict in the KwaZulu Natal region of South Africa has 
operated since 1986. A newer project established in 1990 on political violence 
protest within South Africa is also held. Each of these data sets holds in excess of 70 
variables. This is a substantial amount of variables for any data set, and highlights 
the in-depth detail available on conflict and violence events. The data sets include 
such variables  as social categories of victims, deaths, injuries, police involvement 
and response type and time as well as weapons used. The inclusion of police 
response details in the data set is particularly unusual. This is in part due to the 
general mistrust of the security forces and the demand for credible information on 
police and security forces responses to incidents. The data set  derives its sources 
from a large array of public documents, newspapers and independent monitors. 
These data sets are purely variable coded, enabling the use of statistical software for 
trend analysis and G.I.S. for time and spatial analysis.  
The data sets at the H.S.R.C. are not published regularly. However, bona fide 
academics requesting information can obtain relevant details. Charges are made for 
commercial requests. The system is fully computerised and uses Paradox database 
management system to hold the data. Where more complex statistical requirements 
are needed the statistical package SAS is used. 
 
Another main source of data on political violence in South Africa can be 
found at the Human Rights Committee of South Africa. Operating mainly a text-
based system, it has its own data sets on political violence and also deals with such 
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issues as labour unrest, the security forces, torture and political detentions. The data 
set has operated since mid 1990 and is used by academics, government and NGO's  
Their work tends to be more orientated towards conflict, however they do maintain 
significant material on incidents of political violence. For validity purposes cross-
checking of incidents with the Human Science Research Council is carried out to 
maintain qualitative standards. The committee produce a monthly report: The 
Human Rights Report, containing statistical and narrative evidence on acts of 
political violence.  
Within the universities one of the biggest research projects undertaken in 
South Africa on political violence is at the University of Natal, Durban. The Conflict 
Trends in KwaZulu Natal Indicator Project (linked to the Human Science Research 
Council  project) monitors political violence and conflict in the KwaZulu Natal region 
of South Africa.  The KwaZulu Natal, an area noted for endemic political violence in 
the past is of particular interest to researchers. This data set was established in 1986 
and currently holds 12,400 records on incidents (not overtly criminal in nature) 
involving two or more people. It details such variables as to where an incident 
occurred, who participated in the incident, and the political affiliation of 
groups/individuals responsible for the incident. In addition details pertaining to 
police response to incidents is also recorded, as well as the number of injuries and 
deaths. The sources are taken from the local newspapers, Durban human rights 
groups, and political parties. Discrete variables are coded bi-monthly. Researchers 
coding the database have encountered problems with the reliability of sources of 
information.  The highly sensitive nature of political violence in South Africa has led 
to a distrust of the authorities, police and security forces in their validation of events. 
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Lack of co-operation from the authorities in giving accurate information has been a 
recurring problem. In addition many acts of political violence go unreported out of 
fear of reprisal.  The project uses SPCC for statistical analysis. The data set is 
completely coded. Data is not published in a monthly or annual format, however 
statistics from the data sets do appear in issues of the journal  Crime and Conflict. 
Another large project holding data on political violence in South Africa is the 
Clipping Service of the Institute for Contemporary History at the University of the 
Orange Free State. The Institute operates a very large newspaper clipping service 
covering 64 newspapers throughout South Africa. The subjects collected by the 
Institute is of a more general nature than the specialist data sets, however clippings 
on incidents of terrorism and conflict feature heavily. The majority of information is 
held in a manual format. A computerised index of key words and a thesaurus  is used 
to provide information. The clipping service was established in 1970 and offers a rich 
source of information on political violence and conflict in South Africa.  Other 
sources used also include parliament, government and private papers.  It is one of 
the largest repositories in South Africa. 
Many other medium to small projects monitoring political violence in South 
Africa have been established. These include a political violence project run by the 
department of psychology at the University of Witwatersrand and  a data set on 
violence and conflict operated by the Centre for Inter-Group Studies in Cape Town. 
The Institute for Race Relations in South Africa also publish political violence data 
periodically. 
Official publications and statistics on political violence are produced in an 
annual yearbook.  The Commissioner of the South African Police publishes an annual 
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report on violence. This includes the number of incidents and arrests related to 
violent crime (both political and non-political) within South Africa.  As figures are not 
separated it is difficult to gauge the accuracy of events. A credibility problem with 
official statistics on political violence may in part reflect the number of independent 
projects being undertaken to monitor violence in South Africa. The police also issues 
from time to time periodic bulletins on statistics of violence. 
A survey of data sets on political violence in Namibia gained very little 
information. Due to its recent independence from South Africa (1990) statistics 
relating to Namibia were very difficult to find. The government does not publish 
statistics on incidents of violence in Namibia. Details of incidents are very often 
found among South African literature prior to 1990. Incidents of political violence are 
reported from time to time in The Windhoek Observer and The Windhoek Advertiser. 
Approaches to Government officials on the topic of political violence data were met 
with bemusement. 
My research visit to South Africa was both surprising and encouraging.  The 
amount of data sets on political violence and conflict found in South Africa were 
more numerous than expected. A healthy spread of institutions and agencies 
undertaking data collections, underpinned with well established data collection 
methods has ensured a rich resource of data available on political violence and 
conflict in South Africa.  In addition, the length of time in which these data sets have 
been established provides researchers and analysts with a long term view of political 
violence trends in South Africa. The same cannot be said for Namibia. This was not 
unexpected. Due to its strong historical ties with South Africa and relatively new 
status  as a new country little detail on incidents of political violence can be found.   
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General Implications and Conclusion 
The wider implications of the availability of South African generated data on political 
violence is significant. A largely untapped source of high quality data on political 
violence and conflict exists and is being further developed. General reliance on the 
mainstream data sets such as ITERATE, RAND/St.Andrews and the US. Department of 
State's Patterns of Global Terrorism can  further be complemented by data sources 
much closer to the heart of events in South Africa. This should be encouraged. The 
widespread use of computers in most of the above projects also permits potential 
use of such data in a larger more comprehensive computerised database project 
world-wide. 
 
4.7. Conclusions 
The eclectic nature of computerised terrorism data sets reflects not only a wide and 
disparate collection of data, it also mirrors the anarchic development of a subject 
field sorely in need of some structure and cohesion.The isolated development of 
governmental, academic and commercial terrorism data sets has resulted in an ill-
defined classification of terrorism data sets, with potential users either unaware of 
their existence and even less aware of their remit or functional capabilities. Without 
a broader perspective, analysis of terrorism events data can be limited to a small 
universe of data sets that risk over exposure at the expense of other quality data 
sets. Part of this limited perception of terrorism data sets derives from the lack of a 
simple framework from which classification, content, organisation and functionality 
can be assessed and compared. Section 5.5 of this chapter presents such a 
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framework.  Quality data on terrorism data sets provides a basis from which 
informed decision can be made.  
The insular development by agencies and organisations of computerised 
terrorism data sets can be explained in part by the remit and content of the data 
sets. Security and insecurity among developers have engendered a culture of 
isolation which can be difficult to break.  National security issues, political 
sensitivities, commercial competition, academic pride and occasional acts of 
goodwill and reciprocity illustrate a less than coherent subject field. Still within 
relative infancy both in content and technologically, the field of computerised 
terrorism data sets has yet to mature to the point that a coherent professional set of 
standards are established within this sub-discipline of terrorism research.  
Given the acknowledged frailties, there appears to be an emerging and 
diverse set of computerised data sets on terrorism that can offer intelligence 
analysts and researchers more than standard information gleaned from 
chronological events data. Terrorism chronologies have their place, and make a 
valuable contribution to research the research field. The new data sets such as 
TIPOFF, VGTOF and Electronic Database, along with the more established data sets 
such as ITERATE, RAND and the TPVU data sets illustrates the continuing interest in a 
specialist field that needs focus, imagination and a strong commitment to continuity 
once data sets have been established. The comparative analysis of computerised 
terrorism data sets can be a difficult task given the wide array of definitional remits, 
hardware and software specifications and content data and without context, 
judgements as to their applicability in either research, intelligence or commercially 
based work can be misleading.  
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CHAPTER V 
TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM DATABASES POST 
9/11: A COMPLEX MATRIX WITH FUTURE CHALLENGES 
 
5.1.  Introduction 
Undoubtedly, the defining moment for the development of terrorism and counter-
terrorism databases in the past forty years occurred on the 11th of September 2001. 
The field of study was irrevocably changed. The catastrophic events of that day had 
ramifications across the whole gamut of counter-terrorism efforts by governments 
and security agencies.  No less immune from these events, the academic field of 
terrorism studies was also struggling to come to terms with the enormity of 9/11. 
What emerged very quickly from the shock and chaos of the New York and 
Washington terrorist attacks, was a cardinal weakness in intelligence systems.  By 
2001 the Internet was widely available, computer networks were well established in 
Government, and database management systems were becoming ever more 
sophisticated. In the counter-terrorism field some databases such as the U.S. State 
Departments TADIMS systems and the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organisation 
File (VGTOF) had been operating for over a decade. In academia, the ITERATE 
chronologies on terrorism and Pinkerton Terrorism Database had been operating for 
over three decades.  A classic, but necessary question: so what went wrong?  In 
relation to the specific focus of this thesis, three important areas can be identified: 
systems, intelligence (including HUMINT) and politics. Critical to the operation of 
databases systems, networks and the Internet is the concept of the system.  
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Moreover, the concept of the system should be acknowledged within the wider 
conceptual idea that Government, intelligence agencies and academics all work 
within political systems. Where boundaries within a system are confused, are not 
explicitly stated, and are unresponsive to users needs or completely ignored, 
problems are inevitable. The intelligence element of terrorism and counterterrorism 
analysis provides the unique qualities of intuition, experience, objectivity and raw 
source data such as interpersonal contact with individuals on the ground. Even the 
smartest terrorism database system would have trouble codifying the subtle 
elements of anger, ideological belief, nationalism, cynicism or even joy and elation.  
Finally, to blame politics as the raison d'etre for the events of 9/11 would seem 
obvious, yet unsatisfying. To have an effective terrorism and counter-terrorism 
strategy, actors must abide by legal and political frameworks that politicians create. 
While terrorists have the freedom to reject the norms of the body politic, terrorism 
and counter-terrorism agents must abide by an imperfect system. The elements of 
systems, intelligence and politics are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, quite 
the opposite. By their very nature, this trinity of elements requires that the ‘dots’ be 
joined up to enable a cohesive and effective terrorism and counter-terrorism 
strategy. The reality on 9/11 was, however, quite different. Within the intelligence 
agencies and government, such as the FBI, CIA, the U.S. State Department and U.S. 
Immigration Service a territorial culture had emerged. Each respective government 
agencies had their own statutory remits, which were at times driven by internal 
power agendas and external political sensitivities to what their counter-parts in 
government were doing. Even official definitions of terrorism varied between 
Federal agencies. Interoperability of database systems was limited. While their sense 
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of allegiance to the protection of the United States was never in doubt, the systemic 
way these agencies went about their business meant that the bigger picture was not 
always evident. In others words, localised power politics and departmental 
management of counter-terrorism efforts took precedence over the need to respond 
to a rapidly changing macro view of global terrorism events. The result was a series 
of government ‘islands’ with no connecting bridges. Simply interconnecting 
government by using technology misses the point. What was lacking was a synthesis 
of technology, human intelligence and political will power to address the 
complicated world of domestic and international terrorism in the 21st Century. The 
blurring of the binary divide between the domestic and international incidents of 
terrorism added to a much more sophisticated schema that required urgent 
attention. For example, the move from purely nationalists, separatists and regional 
terrorism causes to a more pan-global activity in the form of al-Qaeda and its 
regional franchises, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (ALM) and al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AAP). Ironically, these terrorist groups could see the 
advantage of systematically embracing technology and the Internet to operate a 
distributed network of alliances. Geography became an irrelevance. Technology was 
both the glue and conduit to allow them operate and promote their causes from 
anywhere in the world.   
In responding to the events of 9/11, Governments, intelligence agencies, academics 
and commercially interested terrorism database providers have all been faced with a 
wide range of complex challenges. Even after a decade, these challenges are on-
going and in many ways still evolving. 
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 Chapter 5 will focus on some of the key issues that have impacted upon 
terrorism and counter-terrorism databases post-9/11.  In particular, it will ask, what 
have been the main legislative requirements placed upon the intelligence 
communities to improve the quality of terrorism and counter-terrorism databases?  
In addition, many policy ideas have been generated in response to 9/11. This chapter 
will assess some of the key policy recommendations, particularly focussing on the 
work of the Markle Commission. The chapter will then turn to look at the legal 
requirements for Government and intelligence agencies to share and integrate 
terrorism and terrorism related data; this has in many ways been a culture shock for 
all concerned. Moreover, while the cultural shift and political will power to share 
terrorism related data may be improving, to share data, one must have 
interoperable systems. Technical capability does not always coincide with political 
and legal requirements. Some of these issues will be addressed. Among the principle 
worries about the creation of large government terrorism databases has been the 
issue of privacy. Chapter 5 will discuss the issue of privacy in relation to the wider 
impact the use of terrorism databases has had upon the general public. For example, 
what are the concerns about issues of accuracy in identifying correct individuals at 
airports, wrongly placed on a watchlists? Conversely, while the wrong people may be 
logged, the real terrorists may be missing. Other critical debate has centred on the 
subject of mission creep. Is it overstated? In other words, are terrorism and counter-
terrorism databases stretching their tentacles into areas of people’s lives that should 
be out of bounds? 
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5.2. The 9/11 Commission 
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States381 was established on the 27th November 2002.382  The 
commission, established by an act of congress, was signed into law by President 
George W. Bush. The principle aim of the commission was: 
‘.…to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the 
immediate response to the attacks. The Commission is also mandated to 
provide recommendations designed to guard against future attacks’. 383 
Furthermore, the 9/11 commission was specifically tasked under section 604 of U.S. 
Public Law 107-306 to investigate: 
‘…. “facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001," including those relating to intelligence agencies; law enforcement 
agencies; diplomacy; immigration, nonimmigrant visas, and border control; 
the flow of assets to terrorist organizations; commercial aviation; the role of 
congressional oversight and resource allocation; and other areas determined 
relevant by the Commission for its inquiry’. 384 
The commission’s investigative remit was wide and varied. In addition to the obvious 
investigations into Al Qaeda’s organization of the 9/11 attacks, the commissions 
work touched upon many areas relevant to this thesis’s research: the application of 
database technologies to the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism. In particular, 
investigators looked at the areas of intelligence collection, analysis, and 
management. Further specialist groups investigated border security, law 
enforcement and intelligence collection, terrorist financing, and commercial aviation 
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and transport security. 385 One recurring theme binds the above investigative topics: 
pre 9/11 all of these areas of Government security required the use of database 
systems. While many database systems were in place, their effective operational use 
and wider system connectivity to security relevant cognate groups left much to be 
desired.  
The commission’s research uncovered a wealth of database problems prior to 9/11 
that illustrated the fractured nature of intelligence systems. One such example was 
the case of Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian born member of al-Qaeda who entered 
Canada in 1994, claiming political asylum and using a fake passport and 
documents.386  Living in Montreal, Ressam supported himself from the proceeds of 
low level theft and benefit fraud.  Despite having a criminal record (he was arrested 
four times) and travel to terrorist training camps in Afghanistan in 1998 and 1999, 
his profile remained below the security services radar. Along with associates Ressam 
planned to attack a U.S. Airport on the 1st of January 2000. Ressam’s associates could 
not obtain the requisite Candian documents; he therefore planned to carry out the 
attack on Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) himself. On departure for the 
United States, Rassam’s passport was run through a variety of INS databases that 
failed to alert authorities. His passport was genuine, but had been obtained 
fraudulently. Ressam was finally apprehended by authorities in Port Angeles, WA 
after acting suspiciously. While in theory, the database correctly did not identify 
Rassam’s passport as suspicious, the database systems in place failed to alert other 
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cogs in the intelligence wheel that may have set alarm bells ringing. Another 
intelligence failing identified by the 9/11 Commission relates to the many U.S. 
Government databases set up for terrorist, criminal, immigration and financial 
information.387  These databases, each with varying remits, holding different kinds of 
data and accessibility rules have for years presented intelligence agencies with many 
challenges. Legitimately, they may well contain different types of users data relevant 
to an organizations needs. If the domestic scenario for the United States was 
challenging, attempts to agree access to foreign Governments terrorism related data 
often involved protracted negotiation. Even if successful there was no guarantee 
that terrorism data had been digitized or could be integrated into existing U.S. 
database systems. Add to this, suspicion by other sovereign states as to why the U.S. 
intelligence community needed access to their data, without reciprocal 
arrangements, and one is presented with a highly politically sensitive scenario.  
A vital weakness in the intelligence communities was their failure to recognize the 
value of other non terrorism and counter-terrorism databases. The 9/11 Commission 
picks up on this point.388  While terrorism and counter-terrorism databases are 
critical in the fight against terrorism, many other databases that are not deemed 
‘intelligence’ systems can be highly useful.  No individual lives within a complete 
vacuum. To operate, terrorists need to communicate (e-mail, mobile phone, 
Internet); they may need to travel (book flights and hotels); and purchase material 
(clocks, wiring, chemicals). Often these transactions require payment by credit card. 
Even if cash is paid, a receipt is produced. What is increasingly difficult to avoid in all 
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of the above transactions is the use of database systems in some form or other. The 
routine and banal occurrence of billions of such transactions daily, masks a potential 
source of terrorist data that can potentially build a highly detailed profile of an 
individual or terrorist groups activities.  
What Government, and in particular intelligence agencies have failed to 
recognize, is the relevance of what would appear on the surface to be a completely 
disparate set of data. For example, what does the FBI’s Terrorist Financial Database 
389 have in common with the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS)390  and the 
Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS)391  Everything.  A terrorist could 
withdraw funds from a ‘legitimate’ bank account to book a flight to a city near the 
border to enable them to cross the border by car for a ‘vacation’. Yet again the 
common denominator is the need for effective databases and systems in place.  One 
of the weaknesses of U.S. government databases pre-9/11 was that they were 
modeled around a ‘hub and spoke’ system.392 It weakness lay in the fact users could 
only send and retrieve information to and from an agency’s internal mainframe hub. 
This did not allow for any cross-checking with other Government and intelligence 
agencies. In many ways the technology suited the cultural mindset that each agency 
had ownership of their data. Given the ‘competing’ demands for resources, the focus 
was on building strong internal information systems on subject specific databases. 
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Ironically this type of thinking missed two key points. Firstly, technology had 
matured to the point that integrated and cross-network databases systems were 
perfectly feasible by the year 2000. Not withstanding the usual technical challenges 
and glitches that any new databases systems project would be presented with, 
integration and cross-referencing of terrorism data sets was possible. Secondly, the 
introspective culture among Government and intelligence agencies missed the 
critical point that terrorism in the year 2001 had moved on. The binary 
domestic/international criteria had changed. A much more sophisticated series of 
terrorism events were taking place against a globalised backdrop. The 
communications backbone for this was the Internet. The outdated hub to spoke 
terrorist group structure was morphing into a much more de-centralised network of 
terrorist groups, reflected in such groups as al-Qaeda.  Government and intelligence 
agencies needed to respond to this new world, by adopting a much more integrative 
database approach to counter-terrorism needs. The 9/11 Commission therefore 
recommended a decentralized network model, whereby in addition to hierarchical 
needs, relevant terrorism data could be shared horizontally. The concept one ‘global’ 
database on terrorism data was a non-starter. The strength of a decentralized 
systems was that intelligence analysts and police could draw from an eclectic range 
of database, reflecting the reality of real-life events. To reassure respective agencies 
an “information rights management” strategy was recommended allowing analysts 
access to specific data without complete access to the network. The Markle 
Foundation labeled it a “trusted information network”.393  It is not without some 
                                                          
393
   A broader discussion of the work of The Markle Foundation is presented later in this Chapter. 
For information on the Markle Foundation see: http://www.markle.org/  
 
285 
 
irony that the trust word was promoted to label the network schema. In particular, a 
culture of trust needed to be engendered within Government intelligence agencies 
to fight the very external agents (terrorists) they least trusted and who put U.S. 
national security at risk.  While it would be naive to assume some collegial system 
would evolve, there was recognition by the 9/11 Commission that to safely bring the 
territorial barriers down, a safe mechanism was needed, encouraging a culture of 
trust.    
Another example of ineffective use of databases systems identified by the 9/11 
Commission related to the U.S. Governments analysis of terrorists travel 
strategies.394 While often the focus of attention is around the terrorist event, the 
lead-up to such incidents can often provide vital clues to intelligence authorities. Up 
until the 9/11 terrorist attacks, no U.S. government agency was charged with 
analyzing terrorist travel strategies. The 9/11 Commission highlighted the potential 
for terrorists to exploit border security weaknesses. Where travel strategies and 
arrangements can be identified, useful information can be gleaned. For example, 
patterns may be identified, or frequency of travel may be indicative of some form of 
pre-planning. Other pertinent questions a database may flag up to an alert border 
official could be: was the method of entry to the U.S. unusual?; was a flight paid for 
by cash or credit card?; if so who was the registered owner of the card?  All 
mundane details, however, even ordinary events have their part to play in building a 
wider picture of terrorist’s movements. It is such normalcy that terrorist strive to 
melt into. Indeed the 9/11 Commission indentified that at least fifteen of the 
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nineteen September 11th terrorists ‘were potentially vulnerable to interception by 
border authorities’.395 The report argues that, from inspection of their travel 
documents and patterns of travel, had effective databases systems been in place, 
between 4 and 15 of the 19 hijackers could have been intercepted. Moreover, at 
least three hijackers could have been identified.  In other words, intelligence data 
was available, however, the ‘dots’ were not joined up.  
While it is easy to blame ineffective border control database systems, as part of the 
overall intelligence failings of 9/11, these particular weakness’s needs to be placed in 
some context. Border security and immigration legislation prior to 9/11 was not 
geared for counter-terrorism efforts. The focus was on the routine task of upholding 
immigration legislation, preventing entry of illegal aliens and processing legitimate 
travelers and migrants. This presented an opportunity to al-Qaeda; they could 
exploit the loopholes, as outlined below: 
‘Because they *al-Qaeda conspirators] were deemed not to be bona fide 
tourists or students as the claimed, five conspirators that we know of tried 
to get visas and failed, and one was denied entry by an inspector. We also 
found that had the immigration system set a higher bar for determining 
whether individuals are who or what they claim to be – ensuring routine 
consequences for violations – it could potentially have excluded, removed, 
or come into further contact with several hijackers who did not appear to 
meet the terms for admitting short-term visitors’.396 
As the 9/11 Commission identifies, this low threshold, with a lack of ‘consequences 
for violations’ was combined with two key weaknesses: INS’s inability to deliver on 
its basic commitments, and to provide an effective counter-terrorism strategy.  Thus, 
database systems can have an effective part to play in counter-terrorism strategy, 
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only if, however, the wider intelligence framework they are designed around is 
responsive to both its original remit (for example immigration) and embraces an 
effective counter-terrorism strategy.  
Key Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
The many recommendations outlined in the 9/11 Commissions report extends well 
beyond the focus of this chapter. Discussed below however, are some of the 9/11 
Commissions key recommendations as they relate to application of databases 
technologies to the terrorism and counter-terrorism field.  
The creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in August 2004 was the 
direct result of a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission.397 The NCTC hosts 
the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) database398  and the Terrorist 
Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) 399 database among others. The NCTC 
succeeded the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). The Commission was keen 
that the NCTC differed from its predecessors, ‘breaking the mold’ of other national 
government organizations. The NCTC would be both a centre for joint operational 
and joint intelligence, drawing upon the expertise of several intelligence and 
government agencies. Instead of a high boundary wall the NCTC was tasked to 
source expertise from other agencies such as the FBI and CIA that would encompass 
intelligence on domestic and international terrorist organizations. To strengthen it 
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further, much of the analytical expertise from within the CIA’s Counterterrorist 
Center and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) Joint Intelligence Task Force – 
Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) would be integrated into the NCTC. This move, to 
create an eclectic intelligence community, was responsive to and reflective of a post 
9/11 world, whereby good intelligence could only be acquired from a cross-pulling of 
resources. However, as the Commission notes: ‘The most serious disadvantage of 
the NCTC is the reverse of its greatest virtue’. 400 By this it refers to the potential 
worry that while the NCTC may be the U.S. Government’s central repository for 
terrorism data, too much power may be vested in one agency. Other intelligence 
agencies may have their concerns. This point did not go unnoticed by the 9/11 
Commission and U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as noted below: 
‘We * the 9/11 Commission+ recognize that this is a new and difficult idea 
precisely because the authorities we recommend for the NCTC really would, 
as Secretary Rumsfeld foresaw, ask strong agencies to “give up some of their 
turf and authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more efficient 
government wide joint effort.”’ 
The ceding of power can be a difficult exercise for any large organization at the best 
of times. The realization was however, that for any post 9/11 counter-terrorism 
effort to succeed, it would need to be a collaborative project. Given the new global 
terrorism landscape, intelligence agencies may have had little choice in the matter. 
The problem remains, however, in terms of coordination of such intelligence. As the 
Commission acknowledged: 
 “Each intelligence agency has its own security practices, outgrowths of the 
Cold War….Current security requirements nurture over-classification and 
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excessive compartmentation of information among agencies. Each agency’s 
incentive structure opposes sharing, with risks (criminal, civil, and internal 
administrative sanctions) but few rewards for sharing information. No one 
has to pay the long-term costs of over-classifying information, though these 
costs – even in literal financial terms – are substantial. There are no 
punishments for not sharing information. Agencies uphold a “need-to-know” 
culture of information protection rather than promoting a “need-to-share” 
culture of integration.” 401 
 
 
As illustrated above, the foundations of many security practices within the U.S. 
Intelligence Agencies were formed during the Cold War. Mainframe computers were 
in their relative infancy, while database systems were virtually unheard of until the 
mid 1960’s. The stand-alone nature of computer technology at that period also 
reflected the technological and political vacuum that intelligence agencies operated 
within. A culture of insularity was built and sustained, as the technology was not 
available to share and reciprocate intelligence. The concept of sharing database 
information among agencies was both technologically extremely difficult and 
politically highly contentious. While this rigidity in classification of information 
continued for many decades, database and network technology surged ahead.  
Externally, major organizations such as businesses, education, and transport were all 
starting to embrace and view the concept of network and database technologies as 
integral to their future development. Combined with an ever increasing public 
appetite for the Internet, the fusion of all interested players further spawned the 
increasing phenomena of globalization.  Intelligence agencies, it must be noted, were 
using technology, but generally with an insular mindset. With the misguided concept 
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that the more classified certain data was the ‘safer’ it was; ironically this could be the 
opposite. As noted above the 9/11 Commission highlights in its report ‘*there were+ 
… few rewards for sharing information’.  It was almost as if the concept of sharing 
intelligence was perceived as a weakness, and perhaps a betrayal of the very essence 
of classification. 
5.3. U.S. Border Screening 
Among the key recommendations cited within the 9/11 Commission Report 
was the creation of robust and effective U.S. border screening mechanisms at 
airports, sea ports and land entry to the United States, for both domestic and 
international travelers. Given the modus operandi of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, using 
aircraft as the principal weapon of attack, improving future airport security was 
cardinal to any counter-terrorism effort within transport infrastructure. The failure 
of intelligence and database systems to flag any of the 9/11 terrorists on any of the 
four flights hi-jacked that day, was a testimony to the weakness and shortcomings in 
U.S. airline security.  
While the obvious remedy may appear to advocate stringent airport and transport 
security systems that would rout out every single potential threat, the 9/11 
Commissioners were mindful that a very fine balancing act had to be made. On the 
one hand the freedom of the individual to go about their lawful business epitomizes 
the very ethos of American liberty and enterprise, yet at the same time never again 
could airport and border entry points be so porous as to let slip even one terrorist, 
intent on causing devastation.   
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In response to this situation the United States Government created a dual identifier 
system based upon biometric technology which includes a photograph of every 
individual and fingerprints of both index fingers.  This is operated under the US VISIT 
scheme (United States Visitor and Immigration Status and Indicator Technology 
program402  ). In creating the US VISIT program the Commission was keen that it 
mopped up the existing ‘patchwork’ of database systems under one cohesive 
security database that both consolidated and integrated passenger data. The US Visit 
program has not, however, been without its critics.  For example, the US watchlist 
has been criticized by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) for being “bloated 
and full of inaccuracy”. By 2007 the ACLU claimed the U.S. Government had 
compiled 750,000 “terror suspects” on its watchlist database. 403  In addition, part of 
the controversy emanated from their use not only within the United States, but their 
operation in other sovereign countries, such as Japan. 404  As the 9/11 Commission 
notes: ‘The further away from our borders that screening occurs, the more security 
benefits we gain’.405 This statement illustrates several key changes in security 
strategy. Firstly, the US Government has been keen to adopt the spatial advantages 
that network database technologies has to offer. No longer will US intelligence 
agencies rely on weeding out potential terrorists at points of entry to the United 
States.  Reciprocal counter-terrorism database agreements with other Governments 
means that known or suspected terrorist can be identified many thousands of miles 
away from their intended airport or port of departure. Secondly, the verification of 
                                                          
402
  See: http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/usv.shtm [Accessed 08/08/11] 
403
  See: http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20071108f1.html [Accessed 17/08/11] 
404
  Ibid. 
405
  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Philip Zelikow, Executive 
Director; Bonnie D. Jenkins, Counsel; Ernest R. May, Senior Advisor). The 9/11 Commission Report. 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004. P.389 
292 
 
passenger details, both domestically and now internationally, requires that 
intelligence agencies must operate out-with their ‘safe fiefdoms’ in a world where 
reciprocity and information sharing among trusted partners is becoming the norm. 
Despite the criticisms of the watchlist databases, and their have been many, some of 
which will be illustrated at a later stage in this chapter, the US Government has been 
resolute in implementing a comprehensive database watchlist system, based on the 
9/11 Commission recommendations.  
While sophisticated database technologies can in part address some of the 
intelligence failings of 9/11, another vital element of the post 9/11 intelligence world 
was the acknowledgement by the 9/11 Commission: that no one single agency could 
possibly handle the labyrinthine schema that was the U.S. intelligence community. 
Leadership was required from the very top. In other words, the White House would 
be expected to take the lead.  While the technological challenges requiring all U.S. 
intelligence agencies to co-operate fully on sharing terrorist data were potentially 
difficult, three further challenges added to the weighty burden placed upon 
Government. The trinity of legal, policy and the political dynamic could only be 
succeed if driven from the Presidential and Executive level. Congressional legislation, 
policy consistency and above all political consensus were critical to the 
establishment of a credible Intelligence Community (IC) that could begin to meet the 
challenges of 21st Century counter-terrorism operations. The result was improved 
congressional oversight of the United States intelligence operations, the creation of 
the National Counterterrorism Center and the Office of the Director of National 
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Intelligence (DNI). The DNI serves as the head of the United States key 16 
intelligence agencies.  
 
 What Progress? 
 What progress in terrorism database technology has actually occurred from 
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, a decade after those tumultuous 
events?  There have been several improvements worth illustrating; however, there 
have been some notable failings that serve as a reminder of the need for on-going 
vigilance. 
Not only did the U.S. intelligence agencies fail to apprehend any of the 19 bombers 
that September morning, the terrorists preparation in the lead-up months to  9/11 
fell below the radar of intelligence and counter-terrorism officials. While some 
individual’s action and movements may have been thought slightly suspect or 
unusual, no overall coherent picture of emerging plans was identified. Even as early 
as late April 2001 some of 9/11 terrorists were arriving into the United States with 
cash and travelers cheque’s, thus avoiding any electronic footprint from bank 
accounts or credit cards. This situation has been redressed with the coordinated 
work of several U.S. Government agencies. The Terrorist Screening Center, the DHS, 
the NCTC and other U.S. Federal agencies now analyse travel-related data in order to 
better comprehend, understand and crucially ‘anticipate’ the travel movements of 
known terrorists or terror suspects.  
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Several database have come online in recent years including the Terrorist Screening 
Database (TSDB),406 the Advanced Passenger Information System (API), Passenger 
Name Records (PND) and  the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA). The 
TSDB is an amalgam of 12 previously operating terrorist watchlists into one 
consolidated Terrorist Screening Database; what the FBI describes as  “one-stop 
shopping” for relevant Government screeners.407  Travelers are not permitted to 
know if their name resides on the TSDB.  Since its implementation,  the watchlist has 
denied travel to both private and high profile public figures, such as former 
Presidential candidate John Anderson who was wrongly flagged on the database. 
One of the most high profile passenger denied boarding a flight to Boston was the 
late Senator Edward M Kennedy in 2004. 408 While astonishment and perhaps a little 
humour at the thought of such an eminent U.S. politician being labeled as a risk to 
U.S. national security filled many newspapers columns, there is a far more serious 
side to this type of incident. Many innocent member of the public have been caught 
unawares in the same situation – without the accompanying media interest. Among 
the most common situations to arise is where passenger’s names have been 
misspelled, passengers have changed their names or their name bears some close 
resemblance to known terror suspects. The TSDC is not totally without redress. 
Passengers who are continually stopped without good reason and identified as a 
“mis-identified” person can apply to have their name removed from the TSDB. The 
TSDB system is a real-time system, while the systems attempts to deal with the 
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immediacy of a check-in desk or Homeland Security official. The time taken to fix 
erroneous entries to the TSDB cannot be carried out in real-time.  While mistakes are 
inevitable from time to time with any database system, confidence in the efficacy of 
such terror watchlists has arisen. A 2007 report by the Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) under the U.S. Department of Justice entitled ‘Follow-up Audit of the Terrorist 
Screening Center’ outlined detailed problems watchlists.409 Among concerns raised 
was a report that the watchlists were operating under two interconnected versions. 
The OIG found that inspection of 105 records executed under the TSC’s routine 
quality assurance reviews, 38 percent were found to be erroneous or contained 
inconsistencies.  Added to their concern the monthly increase in entries to the 
watchlist database was averaging 20,000 per month with a running total of 700,000 
entries by April 2007.  As the OIG notes:  
“A single omission of a terrorist identity or an inaccuracy in the identifying 
information contained in a watchlist record can have enormous 
consequences. Deficiencies in the accuracy of watchlist data increase the 
possibility that reliable information will not be available to frontline 
screening agents, which could prevent them from successfully identifying a 
known or suspected terrorist during an encounter or place their safety at 
greater risk by providing inappropriate handling instructions for a suspected 
terrorist.” 
The relentless increase in numbers, with quality assurance procedures that were 
problematic presented the challenge of providing improved data integrity 
procedures while simultaneously attempt to handle a vast quantity of data that 
required being available on a real-time basis.  
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 By far the most notorious case relating to shortcomings in terrorist watchlists 
in recent years was what became known as the ‘Christmas Day Bomber’ incident. 
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,  a 23 year old Nigerian, concealed plastic explosives in 
his underpants, while travelling on Northwest Airlines flight 253 from Amsterdam to 
Detroit on the 25th of December 2009. From a failed attempt to blow up Flight 253 
over the Eastern Board of the United States, the individual was tackled, restrained 
and subsequently arrested on arrival into the United States.  This particular incident 
had implications on several levels. Firstly, it brought to the forefront the issue of 
terrorist watchlists as a critical element in counter-terrorism efforts. Not only were 
intelligence officials and politicians hugely concerned that the tactics of 
Abdulmutallab had almost caused a catastrophic air incident, the ramifications on 
land could have been even more disastrous. Yet, even more concerning, was the fact 
that he was not flagged up by the terror watchlists and apprehended, given the 
background knowledge of the individual.  The subsequent findings of the the U.S. 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence presents fourteen key points of failure.410  A 
complex matrix of shortcomings is outlined, ranging from ‘human errors, technical 
problems, systemic obstacles, analytical misjudgments, and competing priorities’. 411  
One of the most revelatory passages in the Senate report refers to the issue of 
language in watchlist databases.  As point 2 of the report notes: 
‘Abdulmutallab was not placed in the ‘‘Terrorist Screening Database’’ (TSDB), on the 
Selectee List, or on the No Fly List Conclusion:  
 
The standards to place an individual on the Terrorist Watchlists were 
interpreted too rigidly and may be too complicated to address terrorist 
threats. Although U.S. Embassy officials in Abuja recommended that 
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Abdulmutallab be placed on the No Fly List, the determination was made at 
CIA Headquarters and at the NCTC Watchlisting Office that there was only 
sufficient derogatory information to enter Abdulmutallab’s information in 
the general ‘‘Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment’’ (TIDE) database, 
but not sufficient derogatory information to place him on any of the 
watchlists. Because of the language of the watchlisting standard, the manner 
in which it was being interpreted at the time, or both, analysts responsible 
for making the watchlisting determination did not believe they had the 
ability to give additional weight to significant pieces of information from the 
field, such as the report that resulted from the meeting with 
Abdulmutallab’s father.’ 412 
 
 
Rigid interpretation of standards for database entries can be a laudable and 
necessary requirement to uphold database integrity in many instances. However, 
when dealing with potential terrorist classification, the information available on 
particular individuals can often be fuzzy, ‘soft’ qualitative information that requires a 
fine sense of intuition and wise experienced judgment.  Add to this, as illustrated 
above, geographic distance between local analysts on the ground and intelligence 
officers in Washington D.C. and one can end up with differing interpretations of 
severity of threat. Even the subtleties of language in the above statement when 
interpreting the term ‘derogatory information’ resulted in  Abdulmutallab’s eligibility 
for one database but not another. This semantic dilemma and subsequent 
interpretation remains an on-going challenge for analysts.  A useful method of 
strengthening these potential systemic weaknesses is to provide (as the report 
mentions) some kind of weighting system, that provides a more finely tuned 
interpretation of a potential terrorist eligibility for watchlist entry. Combined with 
Chiefs of Stations local angle on affairs, watchlist entries can be more reflective of 
localized situations. 
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One of principal organizations to feel the wrath of politicians from the 
Abdulmutallab incident was the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Senators 
wasted no time in reminding officials that the NCTC’s *mission was+: 
‘‘to serve as the primary organization in the United States Government for 
analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the 
United States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism’’  
413 
 
A mixture a under staffing in the NCTC’s Directorate of Intelligence, with their focus 
predominantly on Yemini AQAP’s operators, meant that other regions of AQAP’s 
coverage were not given sufficient attention. In addition, while Abdulmutallab’s 
name was registered with the Terrorist Threat Identities Datamart (TIDE) the NCTC 
failed under the legislative requirement of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA ) to further enhance their intelligence on the 
individual. If further information had gathered, his name may well have been added 
to the U.S. watchlists and consequently been flagged when travel commenced.  In 
addition a further criticism of the NCTC was its failure to ‘connect the reporting on 
Abdulmutallab’. 414  The ‘connecting’ was the dual task of ‘analyzing and integrating 
all intelligence…’ received on the the perpetrtator.  What the Senate Committee 
states unreservedly is that the NCTC it duty bound by law to carry out such tasks, 
and just as importantly was perfectly capable of doing so, it simply failed to do so. 
Such shortcomings are easy to comment on with hindsight. The NCTC has achieved 
much since its creation in 2004. Among some notable public successes has been the 
development of its state of the art Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), 
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which super-ceded the U.S. State Departments Patterns of Global Terrorism. 415 
More specifically, in its quest for improved methodological rigor, NCTC’s willingness 
to involve non-governmental specialists on counter-terrorism to serve on its  
Terrorism Metrics Brain Trust, has shown a level of transparency and openness that 
few other intelligence agencies have shown to date. Despite the many positives, 
when near catastrophic terrorism events occur on its patch, politician demand 
accountability. 
Complex information systems, pressurized staff and political agendas with limited 
resources can all too easily loose sight of the basics, which then morphs into 
systemic failure.  This eclectic set of failures illustrates that while one could design 
the most rigorous database systems, they are always dependent upon external 
elements: human factors, political judgments, and analytical interpretation, all of 
which cannot simply be scripted into computer code.  
With the improvements in travel watchlist databases a much wider intelligence 
database net has been cast both spatially and temporally, in order to pre-empt 
potential terrorist attacks. The use of dedicated travel databases combined with 
existing intelligence systems has undoubtedly closed many potential security 
loopholes.  
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5.4. Information Sharing 
As discussed at several stages in this thesis, one of the key weaknesses of terrorism 
and counter-terrorism databases prior to 9/11 was the fragmented, disparate and 
often disconnected nature of database intelligence systems. In order to close many 
security loopholes and provide a comprehensive network of ‘joined-up’ database 
systems, a more robust and cohesive strategy needs to be adopted. The concept of 
Information Sharing as a pivotal element in post 9/11 database technology has 
surged ahead relentlessly over the past decade. Among these developments has 
been the introduction of over 70 fusion centers. One of their key responsibilities has 
been to promote the sharing of terrorism related information among the principle 
U.S. intelligence agencies. These agencies include the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the United States Military and the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). In addition to the ‘big players’ terrorism related 
information is also passed up the chain of command from local county state level 
police departments. The benefits of a fusion center approach to information 
processing is that a massive array of data can be captured and processed from a 
disparate collection of data points in order to join the ‘intelligence dots together’. 
This provides law intelligence officials with a more cohesive pictures of potential 
terrorist related data that might otherwise have been missed had fusion not taken 
place. While the benefits of fusion centers appear attractive, their introduction has 
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not been without criticism. 416  A key criticism has been that they go well beyond 
their original remit into a whole new array of areas that Fusion Centers were never 
originally designed to operate. For example, Fusion Centers have been accused of 
excessive secrecy, generating information that is both erroneous and incomplete and  
of developing and using data mining software. Further criticisms have included 
Fusion Centers involving the Military and private sector businesses to conduct 
intelligence activities, including Mission Creep.  In particular the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) has been critical of their potential to violate privacy laws and 
civil liberties. 417  Among the several concerns the ACLU has had over Fusion Centers 
has been the issue of ‘Ambiguous Lines of Authority’, whereby it argues: 
The participation of agencies from multiple jurisdictions in fusion centers 
allows the authorities to manipulate differences in federal, state and local 
laws to maximize information collection while evading accountability and 
oversight through the practice of "policy shopping." 418    
When a complex set of jurisdictions inter-play, to collect, analyse and eventually 
disseminate terrorism information, lines of authority and ultimately responsibility, 
can potentially be lost. The tiers of U.S. federal, state and local legislation do not 
always chime together. Creating both horizontal and vertical synthesis may well be 
an unlikely scenario or even desirable by certain political actors.  
Another concern for Civil Liberty activists is the use of private organizations in their 
work with Fusion Centers. For privacy activists, Government has crossed the line 
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between the role of the state and its obligation to protect its citizens and the use of 
profit making companies that may use some information to their advantage. The 
ACLU has voiced an array of concerns. For example, some fusion centers have 
contracted out the storage and analysis of data to private vendors. The ACLU cites 
the decision by the Texas Department of Homeland Security to award a $1.4 million 
dollar contract to the Northrop Grumman Corporation to operate a database that 
would amass a wide selection of government and law enforcement data and 
consumer dossiers,419 that would eventually be used by the Texas Fusion Center. 
According to reports in the Texas Observer the database project failed, amid 
allegations of mismanagement and that it was unclear who had access rights or what 
eventually had become of the database contents.420  This example illustrates several 
potential problems when Government mixes the public with the private. Firstly, the 
very essence of the role of the state at the ultimate guarantor of an individuals 
safety and liberty could potentially be questioned when sensitive terrorism related 
data is outsourced to private enterprise. Given the severe economic constraints that 
Governments find themselves in, the attraction of a commercial organization that 
can provide the desired product for less cost can be tempting. This economic 
argument has proven successful and profitable in many countries. For example, the 
de-nationalization in the United Kingdom in the 1980’s of car production, 
telecommunications and airlines such as British Airways has both relieved the public 
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purse of liability and returned generous profits to shareholders.421 Furthermore, the 
belief that private enterprise has the specialist knowledge to successfully operate 
terrorism related databases, given their sophisticated schema, may well persuade 
Government of the efficacy of this route. In other words, can issues of national 
security, specifically large databases of individuals details be sourced safely to the 
private organizations that primary objective is to make profit?  A more subtle point, 
but just as crucial, relates to employees loyalty to an organization. For instance, 
should an employee of a private vendor, handling sensitive terrorism related data, 
view their primary loyalty to their employer, from whom they are dependent upon a 
salary, or to the primacy of the state, which ultimately is sworn to defend the 
individual. With access to a breadth of personal information, the ACLU is concerned 
that: 
“Companies participating in fusion centers could be tempted to use their 
access to sensitive information to retaliate against company critics, 
competitors or troublesome employees, or to gain an advantage in difficult 
labor battles”. 422 
 
This externalisation of sensitive terrorism and terrorism related data also adds 
another dynamic. A whole series of power conflicts, as cited above, could undermine 
the integrity of data. It would be more than a little naïve to assume that the internal 
machinations of Government security agencies are without their own internal 
power-politics. However, even with tacit acknowledgement of such behaviour, there 
is a clear set of boundaries. These boundaries provide Government and the citizens 
with the guarantee that state will robustly guard sensitive data and that it is 
processed safely within a clear framework of responsibility with intelligence 
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agencies. While many private organisations provide the highest standards of data 
integrity, some fall short of the benchmark. Complicated sub-contracting of 
intelligence field work and data processing can obfuscate management lines of 
responsibility. In addition, the clandestine nature of gathering terrorism related 
intelligence has meant that not all private enterprises involved in Fusion Center 
intelligence gathering are publicly declared. 
 
5.5. The Markle Foundation 
The lengthy reflective process of addressing the events of 9/11, required a 
multifarious approach which not only dealt with political strategy, but grasped the 
need to integrate sophisticated database and network technologies into overall 
counter-terrorism thinking.  
As a consequence, the work of the Marke Foundation, 423 based in New York, 
provided a series of groundbreaking recommendations, recognised within the 9/11 
Commission Report,424 which encompassed an eclectic combination of the political, 
technological and human elements that could contribute to an effective post 9/11 
counter-terrorism strategy in the United States.  The Markle Task Force, comprising 
of bi-partisan members and national security specialists produced a wide ranging set 
of reports dealing with Information Sharing within Government and the intelligence 
communities. Among these were Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland 
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Security425, Mobilizing Information to Prevent Terrorism,426 and Protecting Americas 
Freedom in the Information Age. 427  What made the contribution of the Markle 
Foundation refreshing, was their ability to view terrorism related intelligence and 
data from a wider perspective. Firstly, they argued, information residing within 
intelligence systems had to be both discoverable and secondly, accessible. The 
discoverable element would appear to be an obvious statement. However, one 
should not confuse retention of data with the ability to link or retrieve data.  One 
particularly pertinent example is provided in their 2002 report  Protecting America’s 
Freedom in the Information Age. 428  The authors illustrate that if certain software 
had been operating prior to 9/11 a whole series of linkages between the 9/11 
perpetrators could have been established relating to addresses and frequent-flyer 
accounts. Invoking a cliché about hindsight detracts from the slightly more subtle 
point: information about the 9/11 attackers was already available on computer 
databases systems, the information had not been discovered, nor the dots joined. 
Adding to the weakness in systems, Markle argues that even if information on the 
attackers had been available, in was not always accessible, crucially in a timely 
manner. Therefore, on the most basic level, some of the most important variables 429 
in running an effective counter-terrorism database intelligence system were flawed. 
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Both these sequential and linear information processes have since been 
strengthened among the large array of new post 9/11 database intelligence systems.   
 In the ten years since 9/11, it is often easy to cite failure, shortcomings and 
concerns in Government attempts to build effective terrorism and counter-terrorism 
database project. For example, the short-live Total Information Awareness (TIA), 
subsequently named Terrorism Information Awareness program under the George 
W. Bush administration. 430 Many concerns around this database centred upon 
privacy, data mining and ‘misson creep’ issues. Others included the eventual collapse 
of the Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange Program (MATRIX) database 
project, developed for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. 431 The project 
was abandoned after cuts in Federal funding and public outcry about state 
surveillance and privacy concerns. Despite such shortcomings, there has been some 
recognition that not all that Government attempts are doomed to failure, with the 
legacy of wasted time, money and resources. In an acknowledgment that the U.S. 
Federal Government has achieved some relative success, Zoe Baird from the Markle 
Foundation, wrote an op-ed for the Washington Post presenting an upbeat message 
declaring: ‘A lesson of 9/11: Washington can work”. 432  The op-ed argues that: 
‘There has been a virtual reorganization of government, a shift in thinking 
that inspires reform in the way agencies, people and technology collaborate 
and communicate. The need-to-know culture is being replaced by a need-to-
share principle; information is increasingly decentralized and distributed. 
Informal and flexible groups of analysts from different parts of government 
and the private sector are able to work together and share expertise’. 433 
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This change in mindset is to be welcomed. As with any deeply engrained culture, 
change does not always come easily. Rigid hierarchical thinking and inflexible 
database systems do not sit easily with the modern complex matrix that 
sophisticated terrorism informatics now operate in.  The move towards distributed 
database technologies 434 has allowed analysts the opportunity to access intelligence 
across a wide panoply of potential terrorist information ‘footprints’. For example, 
bank/credit card details, mobile telephone records, e-mail and Internet connectivity.  
While much attention is paid by counter-terrorism analysts to the use of social 
networking sites by terrorists and their associates, 435  their adoption for use across 
the U.S. intelligence networks prior to 9/11 was virtually non-existent.  There has 
been a sea change in this area. The vertical and hierarchical chain of commands that 
previously were required for one agency to communicate to another has been 
transformed.  Agencies such as the NCTC, FBI and Homeland Security are now 
routinely able to connect with each other using highly sophisticated database 
systems and social networking software. There are several benefits. Firstly, a more 
‘collegial’ and collaborative culture is encouraged, which by-passes highly formal 
communication protocols between agencies that may miss critical data. Secondly, 
some of the most important terrorism intelligence data is nuanced or embedded 
within other information. In addition, levels of interoperability between terrorism 
and counter-terrorism databases are much higher than a decade ago. Many of the 
technical challenges over operating system software and interoperability of database 
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software have been overcome. For example, as cited above, U.S. watchlist databases 
are now interoperable with Japanese security counterparts.  
However, successful counter-terrorism success post 9/11 not only demands 
that database systems speak together, it also requires humans are able to handle the 
copious amounts of high volume of data made available literally by the minute, on a 
daily basis. To be able to discern between what is routine and what is critical is a 
tradecraft that can take many years to master. Human experience and basic gut 
instinct cannot be de-lineated to a binary level or coded on a microchip. Where 
technology has assisted analysts post 9/11 is the ability now to share thoughts with 
other agencies on a real-time basis providing a finer level of granularity.  The human 
element, has been one of the great strengths of the work carried out by the Markle 
Foundation. Their emphasis has not only been on the technicality of terrorism 
databases and the political issues, but their emphasis on the individual and people 
such as outlined in their briefing: Meeting the Threat of Terrorism: Cultural Change 
436 Key to the Markle Foundations thinking, is the development of some type of 
metric to measure the benefits derived from an information sharing culture.  
For example: 
‘….given the importance of enabling information consumers to find 
information, an early metric for discoverability would measure what 
percentage of an agency’s data holdings are registered in a directory of data 
indices.’ 437 
 
Further examples include: 
 
‘Enhanced metrics improve agency and individual accountability for meeting 
certain benchmarks or milestones and significantly reduce the voluntary 
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aspect of exposing select data with data indices. Penalties would be widely 
known, applied consistently, and proportionate to the misuse or failure. ‘438 
 
 
A quantifiable metric to measure discoverability offers the chance for terrorism 
database designers to refine and improve methodological rigor in the database 
schema, in addition to providing some measurement of discoverability weaknesses. 
Furthermore, for the first time, metric assessments could be used to provide some 
measurement of success in terrorism information sharing. Also, in-built, is a 
mechanisms for accountability and even penalties where deemed necessary.   
5.6. Legislation Post 9/11 
The ramifications of September 11th 2001 saw major new legislation 
introduced by the United States Senate and House of Representatives that had a 
profound impact upon the U.S. Intelligence agencies and the way in which they 
conducted their counter-terrorism operations.  Within weeks of the 9/11 attacks the 
USA Patriot Act was signed into law on October 26th 2001. 439 Given the brevity of 
time for the drafting of the legislation, its contents were wide ranging and highly 
controversial, particularly among advocates of privacy rights and civil liberty activists. 
The legislation permitted much wider access by security and intelligence agencies to 
e-mail accounts, landline and cell phone accounts, financial transactions and medical 
records. Given the global implications of Al-Qaeda’s operations and their associates, 
restrictions on the collation of foreign intelligence were eased. Significantly, for the 
first time domestic terrorism was to be included in the United States definition of 
terrorism. Eventually this inclusion would be reflected in the NCTC’s TIDE database 
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and their WITS database which records both domestic and international acts of 
terrorism. In many ways this legislation set in motion the creation of many 
sophisticated terrorism and counte-terrorism databases. These databases would 
stretch their tentacles deep into the heart of Americans personal lives, business 
operations, Government business and foreign interests.  Another of the earliest and 
most significant pieces of legislation was the introduction of the Homeland Security 
Act (HSA) of 2002. 440   A new era had arrived for the United States Intelligence 
Community; they were to experience their biggest shake up in culture, operations 
and organization since the start of the Cold War. With the signing into law of the act, 
on November 25th 2002 by President George W. Bush, the United States Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) was also established. As a result, over twenty existing 
U.S. intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies were subsumed into the newly 
created DHS.441 Significantly, the position of head of the DHS was also made at 
cabinet level, with Tom Ridge serving as the United States first ever Secretary of 
Homeland Security.  
Another pillar of post 9/11 counter-terrorism legislation was the enactment 
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).442  Among 
key developments, the IRTPA act set in law the creation of a Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI).  It also laid the legislative foundations for the creation of the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the subsequent development of the 
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TIDE and Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) database on terrorism events 
worldwide.  The act covers a comprehensive array of terrorism and homeland 
security issues, encompassing reform of the FBI, transportation security, border 
protection and immigration.   
 The above legislative programs introduced over the past decade has provided 
the legal framework from which has emerged a transformed U.S. Intelligence 
Community that is more reflective of, and responsive to, the complicated domestic 
and global political narrative that is 21st century terrorism.  
5.7. Conclusions 
As discussed, the status quo was not an option for U.S. intelligence and 
security agencies in a post 9/11 world. Responses to the terrorist attacks were 
initially swift, politically and militarily, with the invasion of Afghanistan on October 
7th 2001,  by American and UK forces, and the Afghan United Front (Northern 
Alliance). However, the impact of new technology and legislation upon the operation 
of the United States intelligence community has changed forever the way Americans 
think about their own security.  
Database systems form an integral part of any counter-terrorism intelligence system. 
Several key thematic issues have changed the way in which terrorism and counter-
terrorism databases operate.  Firstly, as illustrated above, a much more cohesive 
systems approach to collating, analyzing and using data has emerged. Bridges have 
been built to connect the ‘dots’ of intelligence data. In other words, a much more 
integrative, interoperable series of networked database technologies have been 
built. This in turn has strengthened the knowledge base on terrorists and potential 
perpetrators. It is also in this area of study that the term terrorism informatics has a 
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crucial role to play. The above post 9/11 world of counter-terrorism has needed to 
respond using a multi-pronged approach. The use of legislators, statisticians, social 
scientists, computer scientists and information systems specialists requires that 
some cohesive title be given to the complex interdependent world of counter-
terrorism. Again, where terrorism informatics has its strengths is in its ability to host 
such a wide gamut of inter-disciplinary topics under one common title. Only a few 
years ago many security analysts would have scoffed at the idea that such a 
divergent field of subjects could have any meaningful relationship together. What 
has emerged is a field of study – terrorism databases – that now truly reflects the 
real 21st century world. From airports, banking, hotels, travel, security, economics 
and I.T. to name a few – the world is truly interconnected. Acts of terrorism are 
committed within that very world. It therefore makes sense to develop over time the 
sub-field of terrorism informatics, so that it can best serve the needs of academics, 
and the Intelligence and security communities in minimizing if not preventing acts of 
terrorism. 
In addition, lessons from the 9/11 Commission have been learnt. Namely, that 
counter-intelligence officials can no longer take a passive approach to potential 
terrorists pre-event movements. Where database systems have proven invaluable is 
their ability now to glean complex data on individuals that can alert agents to 
potential situations. Success in such matters can come at a price. Privacy issues have 
been and will continue to be an on-going issues for Government and civil liberty 
activists. The freedom of movement to fly, open a bank account and use a credit 
card, have not escaped the scrutiny of the state to ask questions. Even the innocent 
have been apprehended, after appearing on watchlists. Also, controversially, can the 
313 
 
defence of the state be, in part, carried out by business enterprises whose bottom 
line is to make profit and satisfy shareholders?   
 A second theme to emerge from the development of terrorism and counter-
terrorism databases post 9/11 has been the quality of intelligence and human 
intelligence (HUMINT). Rigorous database design methodology and thousands of 
terabytes of digital data can be rendered useless if humans are unwilling to co-
operate effectively in the use of such terrorism data. Cutting edge technology can 
provide a pseudo sense of legitimacy that can mask systemic and cultural 
shortcomings. What has changed, as illustrated above, is the cultural mindset of 
intelligence and security agents.  A zero tolerance for self-serving power bases and a 
drive to rid the almost competitive culture of inter-agency rivalry has transformed 
fundamental thinking about how terrorism database technology in the U.S. is 
operated.  The arrival of what the Markle Foundation calls a ‘Trusted Information 
Network’  has engendered a more horizontal and reciprocal database schema, that 
works for the common good. What also has emerged post 9/11, is revised thinking 
on the rich value of human intelligence and experience. The fusion of this priceless 
asset with modern technology strengthens immeasurably the value of terrorism and 
counter-terrorism databases.  
 Finally, a third thematic issue, the political dynamic has driven and influenced 
the enormous sea-change in counter-terrorism database technologies since 2001. 
Major legislative reform of the Intelligence services, their structure and increased 
accountability to both the U.S. Legislature and Executive has been seismic. The 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security, its wide-sweeping powers and its 
absorption of many other security related agencies, has brought under one umbrella 
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a disparate and at times fragmented intelligence community.  Also, with the creation 
of the NCTC and its ability to draw upon specialist knowledge from many other arms 
of Government, the information sharing culture of post 9/11 is flourishing. 
Having embraced technology, with the richness of human knowledge and 
combined this with new structural agency support, despite its many shortcomings, 
the post 9/11 world of terrorism database technologies is stronger and more 
powerful than at any point in history. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This thesis set out with the aim of answering the following questions: first, what is 
the quality, practical value and impact of database technologies in the field of 
terrorism and counter-terrorism post 9/11?;  and second, how can the application of 
database systems improve the quality of terrorism and counter-terrorism research? 
Also, it argued that the study of computerised terrorism databases has had very little 
direction. The subject area needs to be drawn together under the classification of 
‘Terrorism Informatics’ if its full potential is to be realised.   
In addition the thesis argued: 
5. That despite the fact that computerising terrorism data sets has allowed for more 
sophisticated levels of interrogation, this still does not deal with the issues 
surrounding the problem of soft qualitative data. 
6. The application of computerised databases to terrorism research requires a high 
level of inter-disciplinarily. This includes the disciplines of international relations, 
computer science and other techniques (empirical, quantitative, content analysis, 
link analysis etc.) derived from a variety of social science disciplines, e.g. 
economics and psychology. The task of integrating such an eclectic array of 
subjects requires a systems approach to the fusion of computers and the study of 
terrorism.  
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7. The inevitable shift towards a more technologically based response to countering 
acts of terrorism requires the field of Terrorism Informatics to be more formally 
recognised for the full potential of technology to be realised.  
 
6.2. Summary 
The thesis was particularly concerned with the information aspects of terrorism and 
counter-terrorism in general, and database management systems specifically. The 
scope of databases used in this thesis was mainly limited to publicly available data 
sets, databases and chronologies on terrorism. The rationale was simple. Given the 
large amount of documentation already available on publicly available databases, 
there was enough source material to provide a substantial discourse. However, as 
has been illustrated, there is very few comprehensive monographs covering the wide 
array of terrorism and counter-terrorism databases post 9/11. This thesis sought to 
redress this issue. Private and classified databases were in the main excluded from 
this thesis. Given the volume and difficulties associated with access to such classified 
database systems, the focus of this thesis remained firmly in the public domain. 
Further research on the subject of classified terrorism and counter-terrorism 
databases would, however, be a valuable future research project. 
The thesis drew upon a wide range of publicly accessible sources of information. 
These included opens source material, as well as a number of case studies. Given the 
wide accessibility now in electronic form of such databases as the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) and the NCTC’s Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WTS) 
database, this study was able to make use of the commensurate amount of primary 
and secondary source material now available electronically. The thesis illustrated the 
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lengthy temporal development of quantitative data in International Relations in the 
1930’s to the complex statistical use of terrorism data in the 21st Century. Through a 
variety of field visits, outlined in Appendix B of this thesis, the opinions of those 
people currently working in the field of terrorism research, as to the efficacy of 
particular data sets has been considered. These were highlighted throughout the 
thesis. 
Using a number of case studies throughout the thesis, this thesis 
demonstrated that the historical development of early terrorism data sets and 
chronologies  on terrorism were primarily Government run systems, with the 
exception of a few privatly owned data sets. The thesis argued that with the sheer 
cost of mainframe computers with  limited functionality and accessibility to a small 
universe of data available in the late 1960’s,  the concept of joined-up integrated 
networked database technology was decades away. Following a review of the 
historical context for the use of databases in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Chapter 3 set 
out to trace the design and development of terrorism and counter-terrorism 
databases, and the issues that can arise in their design and management.  
The thesis was able to outline the complex matrix of issues that present when 
attempting to design terrorism and counter-terrorism databases. The classic and 
recurring issue of how to define an act of terrorism was discussed. Given the 
variations in definitions between and within Government(s), academics and other 
interested parties, arriving at a definitive answer is simply impossible. What the 
thesis was able to demonstrate, was, that with sophisticated software technology, 
users are able to refine their criteria for an act of terrorism, within agreed 
boundaries. This functionality would have been impossible only a few years ago. The 
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thesis then went onto to discuss the difficulties associated with terrorism database 
methodology, including sourcing primary data, data validity and error rates. To add 
to this complicated narrative, the thesis was able to provide evidence that simple 
cross-comparison of terrorism databases and data sets can be fraught with 
problems. While simple aggregate totals comparing events data may have some use, 
the underlying spatial, temporal and methodological design of the database may 
render cross-comparison difficult to achieve. The thesis also clarified the difference 
between data sets, chronologies on terrorism and terrorism and counter-terrorism 
databases. The inter-changeability of the terms has added to confusion about their 
remit and functionality. 
Following this, Chapter 4 outlined the many public, private and ‘in-between’ 
terrorism and counter-terrorism databases from a post 9/11 perspective. The thesis 
demonstrated that there has been a large variety of terrorism data sets and 
databases that have been developed over the past forty years. Not all have survived, 
as discussed, for example the MIPT’s Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB).  Furthermore, 
the thesis was able to demonstrate that even although some terrorism databases 
have had a considerably longevity, their original founding hosts have relinquished 
the database, renamed the database, or merged the data with other databases. For 
example, the MIPT data was in-part returned to RAND and the Pinkertons database 
was encompassed within the newly formed Global Terrorism Database (GTD). One 
particular problem with such mergers is the paucity of meta-data accompanying 
databases. In surveying terrorism databases, the thesis discovered an eclectic 
mixture of systems. It found that they were hosted by a mixture of academic, 
Government and private organisations. What appears to be the main reason behind 
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the predominance of Government funded projects is the sheer costs involved in the 
design and on-going maintenance of databases on terrorism. Ironically, it appears as 
technology has become relatively cheap, the cost of sourcing data and employing 
staff to run the database and the on-going commitment (which in theory could be 
years) can be prohibitive. The research undertaken for this project also illustrated 
the difficulty in retrospectively coding terrorism events data. From the survey of 
terrorism and counter-terrorism databases undertaken, the thesis illustrated that 
the largest proportion of these databases reside within North America followed by 
Western Europe. There are some exceptions, notably  in Israel and South Africa. As a 
result of this imbalance, there is a paucity of databases based within Central and 
South America, the Africa’s, the Middle East and Asia-Pacific.  In researching and 
analysing these databases, to the authors knowledge, this post 9/11 analysis of the 
twenty key terrorism databases in Chapter 4 of this thesis is the largest 
comprehensive assessment of terrorism databases ever undertaken.  
Finally, Chapter 5 finally examined the complex world of terrorism databases 
post 9/11. The chapter demonstrated that no contemporary terrorism database 
system can sit within its own narrow confines. It illustrated that terrorism and 
counter-terrorism databases post 9/11, needs to be placed within a wider political, 
legal and technological context. In addition, while many benefits can be derived from 
network based database technologies, they do have their critics. The thesis 
demonstrated the many concerns among civil liberty groups about privacy issues, for 
example in travel watchlists and increasing trends in mission creep. One particular 
issue was the relationship between the citizen and the state, and the increasing use 
of commercial vendors to collect, store and use private citizens data for counter-
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terrorism purposes. The thesis also assessed the 9/11 Commission Report and its 
recommendations. Chapter 5 demonstrated that a more systematic, integrative and 
transparent culture needed to be developed. What the thesis was able to 
demonstrate was a revolution in information-sharing across a vast array of 
intelligence and Government database system. Using the legislation introduced in 
the immediate years after 9/11, the thesis was able to illustrate the most 
fundamental change to the structure of the Intelligence Community (IC) since 1947. 
This in turn allowed the thesis to show the extent to which new agencies, a cultural 
change in thinking and a more ‘trusting’ approach within the Intelligence Community 
was in everyone’s interest. This new approach needed to reflect the new 
technologies and globalised stage upon which terrorism operates in the 21st Century. 
 
6.2. Conclusions 
The technological leap and change in terrorism tactics over the past forty years has 
been immense. From crude bombing devices to sophisticated cyber activities, 
terrorists have, in recent years shown a keen willingness to embrace the 
technological revolution. Often one step ahead of their avowed Governmental 
enemies, they have lead often where others have followed. Quick to grasp the 
potential of the Internet and network technologies, many terrorist groups have been 
more than adept at using technology to their advantage. Be it propaganda videos, 
Internet chatter, blogging or scam financial trading for fund raising, the distributed 
typology of database systems, and internet domain hosting has provided an 
excellent vehicle with which to pursue their cause. 
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As demonstrated within this thesis, the same levels of success with internet based 
technologies cannot always be attached to academic and counter-terrorism 
intelligence databases prior to 2001.  It took the horrific events of that day to change 
irrevocably a political and intelligence narrative that was essentially fragmented, 
insular, outdated and highly ineffective.   
Ten years later, formalisation of terrorism and counter-terrorism data has advanced 
both the quantitative and qualitative value of data almost beyond recognition. From 
the most basic events based chronologies on terrorism, held on a card-index system, 
data can now be accessed globally and deliver analysts with the most sophisticated 
schema of data that would have been unimaginable in 1968.   
What can be learnt from this study that could be carried forward for future 
research?  Outlined below is a series of recommendations for future best practice in 
terrorism database design. 
1. A comprehensive feasibility study should be undertaken to assess the viability 
of developing new terrorism databases. Is the project duplicating existing 
data (as is often the case). Can, for example, a new database compliment 
rather than replicate existing data? Furthermore, are their sufficient funds 
available to provide long-term finance for what can be an extremely costly 
lengthy project? 
2. Meta-data should always be provided as part of the development stage of 
any terrorism database. This would allow future designers the ability to 
understand and improve methodological rigor.  
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3. Designers should, where possible, design a terrorism database platform that 
can be functionality as integrative and interoperable as possible, to permit 
future synthesis of data with other databases.  
4. The nature of database technologies is changing at a ferocious pace. 
Designers of databases need to think beyond the standard terrorism events 
data approach, to data modelling that meets the needs of terrorism 
researchers and is not dictated by computer programmers alone. At all stages 
of such projects terrorism analysts should be involved, to ensure the end-
product meets the users requirements. 
5. There may be a case for developing regional terrorism database units that 
would focus purely on local source data. For example, in the Africa’s, South 
America and Asia-Pacific. This would help overcome language and cultural 
barriers, whereby data can be under-recorded due to language difficulties.  
As long as there was agreed methodological rigor, regional terrorism 
database units could then ‘bolt-on’ regional data to a centralized system. 
6. Consideration should be given to the possibility of designing terrorism 
databases that can also be widened to include ‘peripheral’ issues that provide 
greater contextualisation of events. For example, one could attach other data 
sets such as failed terrorist attempts, hoaxes, socio-economic indicators, 
political election results, poverty indicators as well as drug, gang and conflict 
data. No terrorism event occurs without context. Synthesis of such data into 
a sophisticated database schema could provide rich events data sets for 
social scientists to analyse. 
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7. Provision should be made, that in the event of a terrorism database dis-
continuing, that no data should be lost, or left languishing on a hard-disk. 
Many terrorism databases are in theory and also in practice projects that will 
continue ad-infinitum. Financial resources cannot always be guaranteed 
forever. The Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland has 
made such provision. In the event that the GTD funding is halted or the 
database discontinues, the data will be placed within the Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of 
Michigan. 
8. The creation of a Terrorism Informatics forum, within a University 
environment or Government funded think-tank would provide a focus for key 
steak-holders from Homeland Security, Academia, Business, and the 
Intelligence community to regularly discuss and push the boundaries of the 
field. This type of forum is not totally without precedent, the Institute for 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) has already developed its own 
Intelligence and Security Informatics sub-field. 
A key fundamental point needs to be made. There requires a carefully considered 
synthesis of sophisticated databases technologies to be mapped onto to a complex 
21st Century globalised world of terrorism. As illustrated in Chapter 4 of this thesis, 
too often have databases been limited in their ability to ‘talk’ to other terrorism 
databases. Some form of agreed best practice among vested organisations could in 
part help to resolve the same recurring design and methodology issues. Concerns 
about compromise on security should not be an obstacle to such interaction. Many 
of the refinements in database methodology can easily be tested using mock data 
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that reflects real-life situations. Security and intelligence organisations can be   more 
transparent with their counter-parts using tiered levels of security access. This would 
allow the safe discussion of problems and issues without compromising safety and 
security. Despite the many different U.S. agencies holding terrorism related data, 
often the recurring problems are common to their colleagues in the intelligence 
sector. Much also can be learnt from an open dialogue with the academic 
community. Given the sophisticated front-end interfaces that such databases as the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) presents, academics specialists have a wealth of 
knowledge and experience to share. Furthermore they are not encumbered by the 
same security restrictions and political agendas that Government place upon the 
intelligence communities. Where there is a paucity of data is in the amount of 
feedback users provide on their satisfaction with the use of such databases. This can 
be a difficult issue to address. Some users would rather not be identified. For 
perhaps differing reasons, users of academic databases are not always content to 
identify themselves. Future research might include some form of questionnaire 
undertaken by a University research centre. Often users can provide valuable insight 
into a databases shortcoming’s that designers are unaware. An improvement to any 
terrorism database is a constant cyclical process. The end user must feature in that 
process for the database to be of value.  
As illustrated in this thesis, one must always be mindful of the issues of 
privacy and data integrity. Ever sophisticated data mining techniques, surveillance 
and identity issues will continue to present Governments and non-government 
groups with ever increasing challenges. The sheer volume of terrorism data 
available, as well as related ‘innocent’ data such as credit card and phone account 
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details all provide the potential for ever increasing scrutiny by the state. As 
consumers we already experience this moulding of adverts/brands, our likes and 
dislikes to our everyday internet searches. It is no coincidence that adverts sitting at 
the side of ones search engine just happens to be local, or is a product that one has 
previously purchased. Applying this scenario to state surveillance and the retention 
of our personal data in the name of counter-terrorism may require that the 
individual has some form of data protection identity or system of redress. 
 Academics and counter-terrorism analysts must also remember that 
numbers, graphs, maps and pictures can only tell part of the story. As this thesis has 
demonstrated, what database technologies have still to achieve and is impossible to 
code in the 21st century, is the human element; the human experience. Terrorism 
databases cannot, to date, code such entities as ‘gut instinct’ ‘hate’ ‘anger’ and 
‘fear’. The list is endless. One could attempt to dis-aggregate the elements down to 
the finest, most detailed level of granularity, and yet one would still fail.  Hence, the 
need for a systems approach whereby academics and terrorism analysts can use the 
very best of technological advances coupled with a political framework that works to 
everyone’s advantage. It is the political framework that this chapter now turns.  
The thesis has demonstrated one of the key lessons from 9/11 was a complete lack 
of ‘joined-up’ counter-terrorism strategy.  The territorial culture of intelligence 
agencies and isolated development of databases resulted in a highly fractured, 
almost brittle world of counter-terrorism databases. While academic database can 
survive as stand-alone systems, this state of play for counter-terrorism database post 
9/11 is unthinkable.  Three key foundations need to be in place. Firstly, a legal 
framework that is both effective and protective of its citizens, when drafting 
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terrorism legislation in relation to terrorism and counter-terrorism databases. Given 
the rapidity of terrorism database technology development, regular revision of 
terrorism database legislation would be valuable. This would not only be a useful 
reflective exercise but would highlight any potential loopholes in legislation that 
agencies and individuals are able to exploit given improved database functionality.  
Secondly, all relevant government agencies should fully adopt integrative network 
technologies that permit terrorism analysts to safely cross-reference data from the 
many databases available. A new generation of information sharing professionals 
with highly honed skills in intelligence analysis is now emerging. Their role will be 
ever-evolving and responding to technological change. However, one prime asset 
than will forever serve them well is their ability to synthesise their human knowledge 
and experience with cutting edge technology to produce terrorism knowledge bases 
of the highest standard.     
A decade after 9/11, much has been achieved in the development of 
terrorism and counter-terrorism databases. Mistakes have been made, and will, 
from time to time be made again. The overarching picture however is of a robust 
decentralised network of terrorism databases that are now enhancing the full power 
of the Internet and network technologies.   
Finally, the political will-power must be in place to support intelligence and 
security agencies in fostering a culture of meaningful reciprocity in the fight against 
terrorism in the 21st Century.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
List of Publicly Accessible Terrorism Databases included for Chapter 4  
 
1. Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
 
2. Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) 
 
3. ITERATE -  International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events  
 
4. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base  
 
5. RAND – Worldwide Terrorism Incident Database (RWTID) 
 
6. Country Reports on Terrorism – United States Department of State 
 
7. Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED) 
 
8. South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) 
 
9. The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) – Terrorist 
Incident Database  
 
10. Political Terror Scale (PTS) 
 
11. The American Terrorism Study 
 
12. Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 
 
13. Global Pathfinder  
 
14. The Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) Database 
 
15. Monterey WMD Terrorism Database 
 
16. Armed Conflict Database 
 
17. Iraq Body Count (IBC)  
 
18. Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB)  International Atomic Energy Agency 
 
19. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
 
20. The Minorities at Risk (MIR) Project 
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APPENDIX  B 
 
Field Visits undertaken pre and during Thesis research 
  
1. Australian Bomb Data Center (Canberra, Australia) 
 
2. FAA (Washington D.C. United States) 
 
3. United States Department of State (Washington D.C. United States) 
 
4. Office of Diplomatic Security, United States Department of State, (Washington D.C. 
United States) 
 
5. RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, CA, United States) 
 
6. RAND Corporation (Washington D.C. United States) 
 
7. University of St. Andrews (RAND-St.Andrews database) 
 
8. MIPT – Meeting with Chip Ellis  (McLean, VA, United States)  
 
9. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (Washington D.C. United States) 
 
10. National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) (McLean, VA, United States) 
 
11. National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) Terrorism Metrics Brain Trust (McLean 
VA, United States) 
 
12. Terrorism Incidents Conference (NCTC) (McLean, VA, United States) 
 
13. ITERATE – Vinyard Software Inc.  (Dunn Loring, VA, United States) 
 
14.  Served on the NCTC Terrorism Metrics Brain Trust (2008) 
 
15. Attorney General for Australia’s Office (Canberra) 
 
16. Global Terrorism Database – GTD (START – University of Maryland) 
 
17. Institute of Strategic Studies (Pretoria, South Africa) 
 
18. Pinkertons (Washington D.C.) 
 
19. 2010 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics 
(Vancouver Canada) 
 
20. Terrorism.com Washington D.C. 
 
21. United States Library of Congress (Washington D.C. United States) 
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